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i Preface 
 believe it is important to include a brief preface 
with my doctorate project for a couple reasons.  Not 
only because it is generally insightful to do such, 
but because it is almost essential for the future reader of 
this dissertation to understand how this project came into 
being, how the idea was developed, and therein why it 
subsequently transpired in the manner it did.  In doing so, 
my hope is that the content of the project will then become 
ever more clear to the ‘would-be reader,’ and compel them to 
contrast my position with whatever position they might hold 
as their own.  That, in part, I feel is the instrumental 
value of this dissertation.  Therefore, given that notion, 
it is useful to divulge a few things about myself to better 
explain how the idea for this project came into realization.   
Perhaps one of the most significant aspects one should 
know about me is that I am a child of the United States 
military, and I believe that I am fortunate to be one.  As 
such, I have had the privilege to consistently alter my 
living environments, and undergo the wide range of 
experiences that comes in doing so.  While the concept of 
traveling might not be foreign to most, I think the concept 
of complete immersion into varying environments is.  For, I 
feel it is only through my continual engagement with various 
environments throughout the course of my life that I was 
able to acquire a more inquisitive awareness as to the 
extent our environment – and our built environment in 
particular – effects our being.  Nevertheless, while I might 
be more sensitive than others to this phenomenon, I myself 
did not fully understand it in its totality in any regard.   
In 2008 I was further fortunate in that I lived in, and 
traveled throughout, Mainland China and Taiwan.  
Additionally, that year I took intermissions from my Asiatic 
travels by means of European stints to countries such as 
Germany, France, England, Czech Republic, and Luxemburg.  
Needless to say, that was a very productive year on many 
experiential fronts.  It was a year that got me thinking 
evermore so about humankind’s exceedingly complex and 
profound relationship with their milieu, and with their 
architectural structures in particular.  It further 
reinforced my inclination that humankind formed a 
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substantial, dynamic and reciprocal exchange of tacit 
understanding with their environment.  Moreover, an 
understanding that contributes to the quality and character 
of our existence, overall well-being, and – ultimately – our 
spirituality.   
During the abovementioned year I - as an architecture 
student – like most tourist, visited many of the more 
notable sites which quite often took the form of religious 
edifices such as cathedrals, monasteries, temples, and the 
like.  Many of these buildings had histories of thousands of 
years; while others still were quite modern.  These types of 
buildings, by common conception, epitomize the embodiment of 
spirituality; or the capability of spirituality to manifest 
via architecture.  For instance, if I were to ask an 
individual (as I have many times) to describe to me a 
spiritual experience they had which involved architecture 
(if in fact they ever had what they considered to be one) 
the vast majority of the time they would speak of an 
experience comprising of the architectonic forms inherent in 
cathedrals or temples; if not directly of cathedrals or 
temples themselves.  If by chance, they did mention anything 
else, they would mention something about family or nature.  
While not architecture parse, I would later come to find out 
that both family and nature would still – in their own 
unique ways – manage to play an important piece in solving 
this architecture-spirituality puzzle.   
As for me, no matter how many of these ‘spiritual’ 
buildings I visited – regardless of their grandeur or lack 
thereof – I was skeptical that those architectural 
embodiments of spirituality exemplified the potential height 
of a spiritual experience that architecture was capable of 
manifesting in our lives on earth.  That is not to say that 
my experience of these structures was always flat and void 
of spirituality, because that was not always the case, but I 
became convinced that there was other more successful 
alternatives.  I needed to understand what they were, and 
how they manifested.  To do that however, I needed to 
firstly understand how to conceive of them so they could 
even be recognized.  Lastly, I also need to find out if it 
was then possible to capitalize on their existence as an 
 
iii Preface 
architect and architecture appreciator alike.  Gaining that 
understanding, in short, became the goal of my project.  
While, perhaps a seemingly simple goal if taken at face 
value – to understand the association between architecture 
and spirituality - I had no leads into the means in which 
this profound association occurs.  The occidental ideology 
in which I am versed mandates a rather exclusive association 
and understanding of architecture and spirituality.  One 
that I feel quite often serves as a hindrance, rather than 
an aid, to what I am compelled to believe is an authentic 
‘spiritual’ experience.  By ‘authentic’ I mean not only 
respecting the implications embedded within the concepts of 
architecture and spirituality, but also containing the 
‘universality’ I felt this subject matter requires.   
All I knew was that these overtly ‘religious’ 
structures were too far removed from the everyday experience 
in which we live our lives to be the quintessential 
embodiment of spirituality via architecture; the same 
‘everyday experience’ which I felt should also be accessible 
to the realization of spirituality.  I did not feel it 
necessary to have an understanding for Christianity to allow 
the domes or spirals of cathedrals to manifest spirituality.  
Nor did I feel it necessary to have an understanding for 
Daoism to allow for the manifestation of spirituality via 
the hierarchal or figurative floor plans of temples.  
Furthermore, I questioned if this type of spirituality, 
afforded by this type of architecture, was truly even a 
spiritual experience to begin with?  Why should the 
realization of spirituality via architecture start and end 
there?  Why could it not manifest amongst the everyday 
architecture in which we carry out our lives?  I felt that 
these stereotypical architectural embodiments of 
spirituality were merely one of many more enthralling 
aspects of architectural understanding and sensibility 
pertaining to spirituality.  Additionally, other 
‘nonreligious’ buildings serve as testament to this notion 
as they are often described as providing a ‘spiritual 
experience’ or ‘embodying spirituality’ while containing one 
or none of the above formal architectonic characteristics. 
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My quests for an answer eventually lead me to the 
philosophical realm of aesthetics.  The ensuing 
documentation takes the ‘would-be reader’ down the course of 
my investigation.  Furthermore, I understand that just 
mentioning subjects such as ‘spirituality’ can be 
significantly off-putting to some individuals.  Believe me; 
I’m not one to preach, and I don’t like to tell anyone about 
spirituality (or architecture) just as much – if not more – 
than they would probably like to be told.  And while the 
motivation for this project may have been largely self-
centered in that regard, I truly feel its content is of 
great value to everyone.  Therefore, I invite the ‘would-be 
reader’ to take the time to examine this documentation, and 
let the concepts contained herein marinate.  My hope is that 
others might find this dissertation as insightful as I do.  
Lastly, I would like to thank my entire committee: David 
Rockwood, William Paulch, and Roger T. Ames, for working 
with me in this somewhat unconventional direction, and for 
believing in the importance of this project.  It has been a 
long pursuit, but one I feel well worth the return in its 
investment.   
- S.G. 
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2 The Introduction 
Abstract: 
e live in a world where architecture has disregarded 
spirituality as a means to its concretization, and the 
individual hasn‟t cultivated their ability to perceive 
it.  This is an interdependent aesthetic problem, and in 
conjunction with other proliferating ideological 
misconceptions, has contributed to a spiritual deficiency in 
architecture.  As such, this dissertation examines the 
influence the aesthetic formation and perception of 
architecture has on humankinds spirituality.  By 
investigating this indispensable relationship I introduce 
the aesthetic pragmatism of John Dewey as the spiritually 
qualitative measure with which to reflect, understand, and 
subsequently formulate a spiritual direction for aesthetic 
perception and architectural concretization.  I utilize the 
contentions contained within Dewey‟s aesthetic pragmatism, 
in conjunction with other likeminded ideologies, to 
implicate the nature that is an architecture-centered 
aesthetic experience exploiting the conditions of aesthetic 
form.  In order to illustrate this spiritual pragmatist 
aesthetic disputation I compare and contrast two case study 
dwellings, their architects, and discern the spiritual 
ramifications for each in juxtaposition with the 
abovementioned information.  This dissertation challenges 
the oriental and analytic aesthetic hegemony in 
architecture, and in doing so concludes with an 
understanding essential for greater spiritual perception and 
manifestation in architecture.   
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Methodology: 
ne‟s first inclination might be to question the 
conviction that philosophical aestheticism, and 
pragmatist aesthetics in particular, is the ideal 
means for the advancement of spiritual subject matter in 
architecture.  After all, architecture and spirituality are 
perhaps two of the most universally contemplated phenomena 
known to mankind.  Therefore, there are conceivably as many 
ideological avenues for approaching these topics as there 
are materialized buildings to line them.  The manner in 
which this subject matter is often muddled by the varying 
sentiments and contentions of architects, philosophers, 
historians, theorist, critics, religious sages, and 
laypeople alike further complicates the already difficult 
goal of establishing cohesion between these two.  
Nevertheless, “man‟s first impression of the surrounding 
world is aesthetic, through the senses of sound, smell, 
touch, movement, and vision.  This direct aesthetic 
perception is the gateway to the emotional and cognitive 
processes, when we become aware, discover, are stimulated 
by, recognize and assess the environment.” (Cold 2001)  As 
such, I believe that aesthetic perception is also the 
gateway to the spiritual processes, when we realize, 
conceive, manifest, experience, and perceive architecture.   
To reinforce this belief in the onset it should be 
noted that John Dewey regarded aesthetics as central to 
philosophy.  Even Friedrich Nietzsche believed that, “this 
world can only be justified as esthetic phenomenon.” 
(Nietzsche 1956)  An idea which reemerges in Foucault‟s 
Greek ideal of an “aesthetics of existence.” (Foucault 1986)  
Herein, there is – and indeed has been – quite a drive 
toward the conceiving of aesthetic phenomena as central to 
our being-in-the-world.  Dewey further believed that 
“philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device 
for dealing with the problems of philosophers, and becomes a 
method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the 
problems of men” (Dewey 1916)  Therefore, the philosophical 
objective is to assist in the resolution of human problems. 
(Eldridge 1998)  Fundamental problems concerning matters 
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such as existence; to which architecture and spirituality 
both play a gigantic part.  A failure to aptly address 
architecture and spiritually with a philosophy that allows 
for one to immediately exploit their understanding for the 
possible enrichment of both is – to me and many others – 
undoubtedly a pressing problem.  A problem that, by and 
large, stems from a misguided philosophical foundation.   
 Further propagating the problem Karsten Harries claims 
that “architecture remains uncertain of its way.  Such 
uncertainty is presupposed by the increasing willingness of 
architects and architectural educators to look beyond their 
discipline, not just to the natural and social sciences and 
to the arts, but also to the humanities (i.e. philosophy).” 
(Harries 1987)  He believes that philosophical problems 
“emerge wherever human beings have begun to question the 
place assigned to them by nature, society and history, and 
searching for firmer ground, demand that this place be more 
securely established.” (Harries 1987)  Harries continues by 
questioning: “What then does philosophy have to contribute 
to a well thought-out program of architectural education?”  
Concluding, “Little, it may seem: no clear direction; a few 
pointers; but mostly questions: questions that may help make 
architects [open to] more questioning, more open to new 
possibilities; considerations that put into question some of 
the maps on which architecture has long relied and which 
have led to its continuing confusion.  Thus philosophy may 
contribute towards the eventual formulation of new maps.” 
(Harries 1987)  Maps discover something, and create a visual 
representation of it.  Therefore, philosophical maps can 
help us to discover what architecture represents.   
So then, to philosophy – and principally to the 
pragmatic aesthetic philosophy of John Dewey - we look for 
new maps.  Architectural professor/philosopher Andrew 
Ballantyne, in his editorial introduction for the book What 
is Architecture?, also advocates the utilization of 
pragmatic philosophy as applicable to architecture.  He 
mentions that the pragmatist tradition of philosophy doesn‟t 
usually figure into an architectural discussion, and 
maintains that it is quite unfortunate as they have much to 
offer. (Ballantyne 2002)  He continues by deferring to the 
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architectural metaphor of Italian pragmatist Giovanni Papini 
who described pragmatism as being in the midst of our 
theories, allowing us to move between them like a corridor 
in a hotel, thereby allowing for a degree of coherence much 
greater than that to be found in the hit-and-run eclecticism 
which marks some of the current usage of philosophy by 
architects. (Ballantyne 2002)  Such instances can be 
witnessed in the manipulative utilization of philosophical 
quotes in projects with little or no sustained philosophical 
grounding; merely as latter justifications for particular 
decisions.  Or worse yet, detrimentally misinforming the 
decisions to begin with.  Interestingly enough, even with 
Ballantyne‟s pragmatic endorsement, he does not once mention 
John Dewey.  Nor do any of the other authors, of any of the 
other books, whose subject matter pertains to a 
philosophical or spiritual discussion of architecture.  As I 
mentioned in the abstract I believe this is quite 
unfortunate, not just for the architectural community, but 
this inadequacy extends into the environment at large.  It 
should be noted that this “Deweyan deficiency,” as I have 
dubbed it, in architecture – true to the eclectic 
philosophical reputation of architects – is an oversight of 
architects, and not a shortcoming of Dewey‟s aesthetic 
pragmatism.   
Richard Shusterman, in his book Pragmatist Aesthetics; 
Living Beauty, Rethinking Art, also describes pragmatic 
philosophy as being somewhat of a „corridor.‟  He regards 
pragmatist aesthetics as being “placed between analytic and 
continental aesthetics, combining the latter‟s insights and 
wider concerns with the former‟s empirical spirit and down-
to-earth sense, pragmatism is very well placed to help us 
redirect and reinvigorate contemporary philosophy of art.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  Shusterman, in speaking of the philosophy 
of art (similar to myself and Harries in speaking of the 
philosophy of architecture), believes that a contemporary 
aesthetic resolution - one fit for our contemporary world - 
is needed.  Analytic aesthetics is simply not the most 
viable option when it comes to advancing the manifestation 
and perception of spirituality in architecture.   
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Additionally, and in accord with pragmatism‟s middle-
road nature, I do not solely rely on pragmatism as the 
contributing philosophy to this project.  As we get into the 
“Dwelling” section and the case studies we will see that the 
continental philosophy of phenomenology lays a essential 
philosophical foundation to which I believe pragmatism can 
subsequently build upon and effectively substantiate.  
Pragmatism „picks up‟ what phenomenology „puts down‟ so to 
speak.  Moreover, phenomenology tells us why architecture is 
so important to the realization of spirituality, and then 
implicates architectures task.  Pragmatism, respecting the 
why of phenomenology, then provides us with the how 
phenomenology can‟t seem to resolve on its own accord.  
Therein, pragmatism provides us with new maps by aiding us 
in manifesting an aesthetic response. 
In order make the rationale behind my methodology a 
littler clearer here in the beginning I feel it is necessary 
to quickly gloss over the nature of aesthetic pragmatism.  
Shusterman provides us with further insight into the 
contribution of the pragmatic philosophical tradition beyond 
that afforded by Papini, and is worth quoting at length.  
Shusterman says that:  
In rethinking art and the aesthetic, 
pragmatism also rethinks the role of philosophy.  
No longer neutrally aimed at faithfully 
representing the concepts it examines, philosophy 
instead becomes actively engaged in reshaping them 
to serve us better.  The task of aesthetic theory, 
then, is not to capture the truth of our current 
understanding of art, but rather to re-conceive 
art so as to enhance its role and appreciation; 
the ultimate goal is not knowledge but improved 
experience, though truth and knowledge should, of 
course, be indispensable to achieving this.  
Similarly, while it should not ignore the 
tradition problems of philosophy of art, 
pragmatist aesthetics, if it wants to make a real 
and positive difference, cannot confine itself to 
the traditional academic problems, but must 
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address today‟s life aesthetic issues and new 
artistic forms. (Shusterman 2000)   
In this short excerpt Shusterman has quite poignantly 
illustrated some important rationale behind my utilization 
of pragmatist aesthetics; specifically pertaining to the 
content matter of architecture and spirituality.  As we will 
see, pragmatism has as its foremost precept a dire quest to 
return the bounty of newfound understanding to the heart of 
everyday experience.  In short, pragmatic theory holds that 
truth is verified and confirmed by the results of putting 
one's concepts into practice. (Pragmatic Theory of Truth 
1969)  “Deweyan aesthetics is interested not in truth for 
truth‟s sake but in achieving richer and more satisfying 
experience, in experiencing that value without which art 
would have no meaning or point, without which it cannot as a 
global phenomenon exist or be understood, let alone be 
defined.  In Dewey‟s pragmatism, experience rather than 
truth is the final standard; even „the value of ideas lies 
in the experiences to which they lead.‟” (Shusterman 2000)  
In the ensuing documentation we will come to understand some 
of the ways Dewey‟s pragmatism is opposition with other 
philosophies, and the implications these differences have on 
our aesthetic perception of architecture - as well as - our 
realization of spirituality.   
Shusterman further mentions that Dewey‟s “instrumental 
theory of knowledge sees the ultimate aim of all inquiry, 
scientific or aesthetic, not as mere truth or knowledge 
itself but as better experience or experienced value.  The 
value of knowledge is in being „instrumental to the 
enrichment of immediate experience through the control over 
action that it exercises;‟ and for Dewey nothing can match 
the enriched immediacy of aesthetic experience.” (Shusterman 
2000)  Therefore, what avenue could be more fitting to 
divulge the particulars of spiritual realization via 
architectural perception than one that aims to return this 
understanding to the immediacy of experience?  Moreover, 
“for Dewey all art [architecture included] is the product of 
interaction between the living organism and its environment, 
an undergoing and a doing which involves a reorganization of 
energies, actions, and materials.” (Shusterman 2000)  
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Furthermore, Dewey believes that “art is the living and 
concrete proof that man is capable of restoring consciously, 
and thus on the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, 
impulse and action characteristic of a live [spiritual] 
creature.” (Dewey 1934)  In the ensuing documentation, 
architecturally speaking, we will find that a profound 
philosophical and spiritual understanding can only be 
faithfully communed through pragmatist aesthetics.   
Herein, I have talked primarily about the need for more 
philosophical discourse in architecture, and hinted as to 
why I believe that the pragmatist tradition is so fruitful 
as a method of architectural pursuit.  “Since aesthetic 
experiences is the „experience in which the whole creature 
is alive,‟ and „most alive,‟ Dewey argues, „to esthetic 
experience, then, the philosopher must go to understand what 
experience is.‟” (Shusterman 2000)  Additionally, I briefly 
revealed some of the more prominent factors of pragmatism 
which I believe needed to be disclosed here in the start.  
As I continue to address „aesthetics‟ and „spirituality‟ 
more thoroughly (in their ensuing self titled sections) the 
ramifications of pragmatist philosophy on both architecture 
and spirituality will become exceedingly clearer.  
Additionally, in using terms such as „aesthetic,‟ 
„spirituality,‟ and „architecture‟ I am entailing many 
varied conceptions and ideologies.  All of which will be 
clarified and concluded in their own right with regards to 
aesthetic pragmatism.   
Section II 
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Philosophical Aesthetic Background: 
t is necessary to make some fundamental aesthetic 
distinctions so that we may further elucidate the 
implications embedded within pragmatic aesthetic 
philosophy as opposed to other aesthetic philosophies.  
Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish between the varied 
historical discrepancies of philosophical aesthetics in and 
of itself; or more precisely, between that of „analytic 
aesthetics‟ and „pragmatist aesthetics‟ as analytic 
aesthetics tends to govern our general disposition via our 
occidental education system.  Therefore, pragmatist 
aesthetics can be seen as a challenger to the norm in many 
regards.  Through addressing these two ideologies we will 
also divulge how aestheticism came to be a philosophical 
discourse.  Next, it then becomes necessary to address the 
history of aesthetics specifically as it is applied to 
architecture.  Here too, the history of architectural 
aesthetics is primarily that of analytic aesthetics.  In 
providing this background we are better positioned to form 
our association of architecture with spirituality.  
Thereafter, we can further implicate the importance of 
Dewey‟s pragmatist aesthetics within this complex matrix of 
ideologies.   
The subject of aesthetics is as old as philosophy.  
However, as Thomas Munro points out in his book Oriental 
Aesthetics, Western historians largely wrote on this subject 
which has led to a heavy over-balance on the Western side.  
“It is as if the development of thought had followed only 
one sequence from Egypt and Greece to modern Europe.  Even 
though, it has long been recognized that from the earliest 
historic times Oriental philosophers, rulers, priests, and 
diviners were meditating on problems much like those which 
challenged Western minds.” (Munro 1965)  “Indian and Chinese 
sages were meditating on the arts and their potential values 
for man about the same time that Pythagoras, Plato, and 
Aristotle were doing so in the west.” (Munro 1965)  
Nevertheless, addressing the East-West operation in 
aesthetics would in fact require a whole book, and there are 
many obstacles in tow.  For instance, most non-western 
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cultures don‟t even have a word in their language comparable 
in meaning to our occidental word for „art,‟ so 
understandably a discussion of aesthetics then becomes 
exceedingly confused, and therein lies part of the problem.  
As Crispin Sartwell points out in his book The Art of 
Living; Aesthetics of the Ordinary in World Spiritual 
Traditions, they do not distinguish art from craft, or from 
spiritual devotion.  Indeed, Western culture did not draw 
these distinctions until perhaps three hundred years ago. 
(Sartwell 1995)  In this document, we will just be focusing 
on the hegemony of the analytical account of aesthetics as 
we have come to understand it.  Nevertheless, oriental 
aesthetics must undoubtedly be addressed.  Especially 
because we are addressing architectural subject matter 
specifically in regards to spirituality, and the Orient does 
afford a significantly differing understanding worth 
implicating in this project.   
Analytic & Pragmatist  Aesthetic:   
Continuing with the analytic aesthetic history in 
general the term „aesthetics‟ derives from Alexander 
Baumgarten‟s 1750 book Aesthetica, and the root of its 
meaning is in the Greek word for perceptions and feelings. 
(Ballantyne 2002)  The ancient Greeks used the word to mean 
the ability to receive stimulation from one or more of the 
five bodily senses, and had merely meant „sensibility‟ or 
„responsiveness to stimulation of the senses.‟ (Ballantyne 
2002)  It should be dually noted that ancient Greece was, 
for all intensive purposes, more akin to pragmatist 
aesthetics than to the analytic aesthetics of today.  In 
fact, Dewey “begins his theorizing by invoking the more 
aesthetically integrated society of ancient Greece, where 
good acts were also described as beautiful and where the 
arts were such „an integral part of the ethos and 
institutions of the community [that the] … idea of „art for 
art‟s sake‟ would not have been even understood.‟” 
(Shusterman 2000)  This is getting a little ahead in our 
aesthetic discussion, but worth noting here in any case 
while we are on the topic of ancient Greece.   
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Ballantyne mentions that with the development of art as 
a commercial enterprise linked to the rise of a nouveau 
riche class across Europe, the purchasing of art inevitably 
lead to the question, „what is good art?‟  Baumgarten 
developed aesthetics to mean the study of good and bad 
“taste,” thus good and bad art, linking good taste with 
beauty. (Ballantyne 2002)  “By trying to develop an idea of 
good and bad taste, he also in turn generated philosophical 
debate around this new meaning of aesthetics.  Without it, 
there would be no basis for aesthetic debate as there would 
be no objective criterion, basis for comparison, or reason 
from which one could develop an objective argument.” 
(Ballantyne 2002)  Baumgarten's reappraisal of aesthetics is 
often seen as the key moment in the development of aesthetic 
philosophy. (Wikipedia 2010)  Dewey believes that, in part, 
the “nouveaux riches, who are a important by-product of the 
capitalist system,” helped engender and entrench the museum 
conception of art. (Dewey 1934)  One which he is fervently 
opposed to.  Dewey‟s aim at “recovering the continuity of 
esthetic experience with normal process of living,” is part 
of his attempt to break the stifling hold of “the 
compartmental conception of fine art,” that old and 
institutionally entrenched philosophical ideology of the 
aesthetic which sharply distinguishes art from real life and 
remits it “to a separate realm” – the museum, theater, and 
concert hall. (Dewey 1934)  A sharp distinction which is 
still very much alive today.   
In 1781, Immanuel Kant declared that Baumgarten‟s 
aesthetics could never obtain objective rules, laws, or 
principles of natural or artistic beauty. (Wikipedia 2010)  
Thus, the subject of philosophical aesthetics “takes its 
modern form from Kant, who was the first philosopher to 
suggest that the sense of beauty is a distinct and 
autonomous employment of the human mind comparable to moral 
and scientific understanding.  Kant‟s division of the mental 
faculties, into theoretical, practical and aesthetic (or, as 
he put it, understanding, practical reason and judgment), 
provided the starting point for all later investigations, 
and gave to aesthetics the central position in philosophy 
which it occupied through much of the nineteenth century and 
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would, but for established scholasticism, occupy even now.” 
(Scruton 1979)  “Twentieth-century Anglo-American aesthetics 
has displayed two characteristic forms deriving from two 
distinctive philosophical sources: analytic philosophy and 
pragmatism, the former born in Britain, the later 
representing America‟s unique contribution to philosophy.  
Analytic aesthetics has prospered, while pragmatist 
aesthetics has virtually disappeared.” (Shusterman 2000)  
Nonetheless, I believe that pragmatist aesthetic is the most 
advantageous choice for the content matter of this project.  
“The analytic hegemony in Anglo-American aesthetics is 
being severely challenged by continentally-inspired theory 
based on hermeneutic, poststructuralist, and Marxian 
philosophies.  In contrast to traditional analytic 
philosophy but in accord with pragmatism, these philosophies 
oppose foundationalist distinctions and ahistorical positive 
essences, emphasizing instead the mutability, contextuality, 
and socio-historical paraxial constitution of thought and 
objects.” (Shusterman 2000)  Shusterman further concurs with 
Richard Rorty in suggesting that the epistemological and 
metaphysical conflict between analysis and pragmatism 
reflects a more ancient quarrel between Kant and Hegel which 
can be roughly extended to aesthetics.  “Dewey‟s aesthetics 
was distinctly Hegelian in its holism, historicism, and 
organicism.” (Shusterman 2000)  Shusterman maintains that 
“it is not surprising that pragmatism lost out to the more 
single-mindedly scientific program of analytic philosophy.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  “Part of the opposition is surely 
traceable to analytic philosophy‟s hostility to Hegelian 
themes of holism and historicist anti-foundationalism which 
are central to pragmatism and particularly John Dewey.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  “Hegelianism was a critique of the 
holistic doctrine of internal relations and organic unity, 
the idea that no element or concept had an independent 
identity or essence but rather is entirely a function of its 
interrelations with all the other elements and concepts of 
the whole to which it belongs.” (Shusterman 2000)  This is 
one primary reason why Dewey‟s „Hegelian‟ aesthetics will 
ultimately prove most insightful conjoining spirituality and 
architecture.  Again, I find it unfortunate that it is not 
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more frequently utilized in either realm, and we will come 
to understand some probable causes for this “Deweyan 
deficiency” shortly.   
Naturalistic Dialectic:   
Shusterman makes some more very important distinctions 
between analytic aesthetics and pragmatist aesthetics which 
are important to bear in mind as we proceed and gear this 
discussion more specifically toward architecture and 
spirituality.  In fact, Shusterman even goes so far as to 
state that “Dewey‟s aesthetics were so contrary to the 
frequently Kantian assumptions, methods, and concerns of 
analytic philosophy of art as to make Dewey‟s theories 
irredeemably unpalatable to succeeding generations of Anglo-
American aestheticians working with the style, if no longer 
within the original program, or analytic philosophy.”  
Although I am refraining from going into a more detailed 
discussion of aesthetics these more generalized divisions 
are worth implicating.  Perhaps of foremost importance to 
our content is Dewey‟s somatic naturalism.  I will go into 
more naturalistic detail in the ensuing sections, and it is 
worth emphasizing here how much Dewey‟s contentions differ 
from the analytic ones.  “The main thrust of analytic 
aesthetics is sharply opposed to naturalizing art and 
aesthetic value.” (Shusterman 2000)  In fact, G.E. Moore, 
who is - as Susterman points out – hardly to most typical 
analytic aesthetician, provided the dominant analytic 
strategy on this matter with his doctrine of the 
naturalistic fallacy.   
“Analytic aestheticians refused to identify aesthetic 
qualities with natural ones, or even regard them as 
logically entailed by natural perceptual properties.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  Yet, naturalism will largely come to 
serve as the bonding agent in this project.  To give an idea 
of Dewey‟s stance he said that “„the organic substratum 
remains as the quickening and deep foundation,‟ the 
sustaining source of the emotional energies of art [and 
architecture] which make it so enhancive to life.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  This essential physiological stratum is 
not confined to the artist or architect.  The perceiver, 
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too, must engage her natural feelings and energies as well 
as her physiological sensorimotor responses in order to 
appreciate art and architecture, which for Dewey amounts to 
reconstructing something as art and architecture in 
aesthetic experience. (Shusterman 2000)  Indeed, “naturalism 
in the broadest and deepest sense of nature is a necessity 
of all great art [and architecture].” (Dewey 1934)  For art 
and architecture‟s role is not to deny the natural and 
organic roots and wants of man so as to achieve some pure 
ethereal experience, but instead to give a satisfyingly 
integrated expression to both our bodily and intellectual 
dimensions, which Dewey thinks we have been painfully wrong 
to separate. (Shusterman 2000)  These are my sentiments 
exactly, and we will come to realize the implications of 
such separation as applicable to architecture and 
spirituality through the case studies.     
Interested/Disinterested:   
Another Kantian notion which differs from pragmatist 
aesthetics is that of disinterestedness.  The name alone 
should be a warning flag for architectural appreciation, but 
is perhaps not so evident in other forms of art.  
Nevertheless, this analytic characterization has had 
reprimandable repercussions into architectural perception.  
The underlying motive for such an attempt to purify art from 
any functionality was not to denigrate it as worthlessly 
useless, but to place its worth apart from and above the 
realm of instrumental value. (Shusterman 2000)  “The hope 
was to protect some realm of human spirituality from the 
crassly calculative means-end rationality which had not only 
disenchanted the world but ravaged it with the festers of 
functionalized industrialization.  The aesthetic would 
represent a separate realm of freedom; art would be free 
from function, use, and problem solving; and this freedom 
from use would be its defining and ennobling feature.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  As Shusterman points out all this is 
alien to Dewey.  For what does one ultimately seek to gain 
from drawing such a division?   
To Dewey, “for anything to have human value, it must in 
some way serve the needs and enhance the life and 
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development of the human organism in coping with her 
environing world.” (Shusterman 2000)  Dewey argued that 
“art‟s special function and value lie not in any 
specialized, particular end but in satisfying the live 
creature in a more global way, by serving a variety of ends, 
and above all by enhancing our immediate experience which 
invigorates and vitalizes us, thus aiding our achievement of 
whatever further ends we pursue.  Art is thus at once 
instrumentally valuable and satisfying end in itself.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  “That which is merely a utility satisfies 
… a particular and limited end.  The work of esthetic art 
satisfies many ends … It serves life rather than prescribing 
a defined and limited mode of living.” (Dewey 1934)  
Architecture therefore should keep “alive the power to 
experience the common world in its fullness” and render the 
world and our presence in it more meaningful and tolerable 
through the introduction of some “satisfying sense of unity” 
in its experience. (Dewey 1934)  This is a quite different 
notion than merely viewing a particular architectural 
function or use as beautiful in and of itself; as one can 
also argue in contradiction to the „disinterested aesthetic 
notion.‟  Dewey makes a far more meaningful distinction.   
Individual/Whole Dialectic: 
There is another distinction that should be made of 
Dewey‟s that in many ways has to do with his naturalism and 
Hegelian roots, and that is his holism.  “It is crucial to 
note how radically his emphasis on continuity contrasts with 
the analytic approach, whose very name connotes division 
into parts and which prides itself on the clarity and rigor 
of its distinctions.” (Shusterman 2000)  Dewey believed that 
“aesthetic experience is differentiated not by its unique 
possession of a particular element but by its more 
consummate and zestful integration of all the elements of 
ordinary experience, „making a whole out of them in all 
their variety‟ and giving the experience a still larger 
feeling of wholeness and order in the world.” (Shusterman 
2000)  Dewey spoke of distinctions in terms of „significant 
tendencies‟ rather than „a single fundamentum divisionis.‟ 
(Shusterman 2000)  Furthermore, “Dewey extends his assault 
on dichotomous thinking to undermine more basic dualisms 
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which underlie and reinforce the sequestration and 
fragmentation of our experience of art.  Foremost among 
these are the dichotomies of body and mind, material and 
ideal, thought and feeling, form and substance, man and 
nature, self and world, subject and object, and means and 
ends.” (Shusterman 2000)  Dewey‟s holism bears a great deal 
of significance into our aesthetic perception of 
architecture in many fundamental ways.  For instance, “by 
the principle of organic unity to which Dewey subscribes, 
any aesthetic whole is more than the sum of the properties 
of its parts as isolated parts.  Indeed, the parts 
themselves would not even appear as they do, where it not 
for their integration into the whole from which 
compartmentalization separates them out.” (Shusterman 2000)  
This is one instance of Dewey‟s holism as applicable to the 
concretization of architecture through proper holistic 
inclusion, and not the separate compartmentalization of 
parts to the wide aesthetic whole.   
The Subject/Object Dialectic: 
It is important, at this junction, to divulge perhaps 
the most significant dialectic of all amongst aesthetic 
perception.  One which will undoubtedly have huge 
ramifications into a individuals spiritual association with 
architecture.  Tom Leddy, in his article entitled The Nature 
of Everyday Aesthetics, briefly alludes to an important 
concept of the aesthetic experience involving both 
architecture and spirituality.  He believes that the 
aesthetic properties of everyday aesthetic experience in 
here in the fusion of sense and imagination that is the 
experience itself, and not in the object of the aesthetic 
experience.  The question for everyday aesthetics therefore 
becomes not what are the formal properties of this object 
that make it beautiful (or spiritual), but rather what is 
the relation between the subject and object that makes this 
particular experience of that object beautiful (or 
spiritual). (Light and Smith 2005)  My intension is not to 
get into the complex debate over beauty, and the multitude 
of ways it can manifest in an object.  Rather, I am more 
interested in the subject/object relationship as that 
ultimately bears the most significance into the manner in 
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which spirituality manifest via architecture, and therefore 
how it can be universally understood and capitalized upon.   
Katya Mandoki depicts the problem the subject/object 
dialectic exceedingly vividly.  She begins – quite fittingly 
– with the notion of beauty.  She, like Leddy above, 
believes beauty is relative, and does not exists in itself. 
(Mandoki 2007)  While the adage „beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder‟ may not come as a surprise to most, the far 
reaching ramifications of this position might.  She says 
that, “beauty is a linguistic effect used by a particular 
subject to describe personal experiences and social 
conventions, not things that exist independently of 
perception.” (Mandoki 2007)  “Beauty subsists only in the 
subjects who experience it, just as life only exists in live 
beings.” (Mandoki 2007)  To follow that train of reasoning, 
spirituality then, only exist in spiritual beings.  Mandoki, 
like John Dewey, believes the notion of beauty, for 
theoretical ends, becomes an obstructive term.  “It is not 
possible to understand the concept of beauty [or 
spirituality] separated from the context, nor is it possible 
to penetrate it in a purely rational way.” (Cold 2001)  
Architecturally speaking, Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson in 
their book Functional Beauty, make a case for the beauty of 
functional objects – such as dwellings – which aesthetic 
theory has long failed to consider. (Parsons and Carlson 
2008)  While a very insightful perspective; it misses the 
point as there is still a more important notion to be had 
here.   
It seems as though there is a linguistic flaw in 
western language and our conception of the “ideology of the 
aesthetic.”  For instance, analytical aesthetics has taken 
literally what in its origin was a metaphorical expression, 
and thoroughly tries to prove the ontological status of 
beauty and of the work of art as existing by themselves, 
independently of the subject. (Mandoki 2007)  “The idea that 
a work of art „expresses‟ is an effect of language.” 
(Mandoki 2007)  “It‟s true that there are ways of speaking 
that allow us to envision an object being expressive.  In 
this case, however, the expression that seems to be found in 
a work of art is only that of the artist, coagulated as a 
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trace in the object.  Whoever is expressing is always and 
only a subject who is then interpreted by another subject.” 
(Mandoki 2007)  Mandoki concedes with Gadamer in claiming 
that aesthetics is mainly an act of interpretation, since 
appreciation and valuation are always interpretative.  “As 
for Dewey, „the word esthetic refers … to experience as 
appreciative, perceiving, enjoying.  It denotes the 
consumer‟s rather than the producer‟s standpoint,‟ it is an 
act of reception.” (Mandoki 2007)  So then, the method of 
architectural consumption takes precedence over the method 
of architectural production to a great extent.   
Mandoki insist that it is not art, artworks or forms 
that express; it is artists who do, just as it is not 
language that signifies, but the subject who articulates it 
to produce signification.  Art is not the expression of 
emotions; there are spectators who perceive and interpret 
certain properties of objects like sounds, colors or brush 
strokes as an expression of emotions stemming from their own 
experience with that object. (Mandoki 2007)  She believes 
that we „fetishize‟ the object and that this „fetishization‟ 
is so deeply rooted in language that it would be nearly 
impossible to defeat it.  We speak aberrations like the 
„objectivity of beauty,‟ the „expression of the work of 
art,‟ the „pleasures of the text‟ (and not through the 
text), and the „sensual objects,‟ or „aesthetic objects‟ 
(literally objects – not subjects – capable of experience or 
sensibility). (Mandoki 2007)  “We all practice a form of 
animism in language that anthropomorphizes things and 
invests them with human qualities.  In an artwork, this 
animism is more tempting since it is created to exhibit the 
traces of human activity, of the artist‟s emotions and 
attitudes.” (Mandoki 2007)  I find this to be case-in-point 
for architectural edifices, and particularly true of 
religious architectural edifices.  Perhaps Dewey‟s most 
important aesthetic theme is the privileging of dynamic 
aesthetic experience over the fixed material object which 
our conventional thinking identifies – and then commodifies 
and fetishizes – as the work of art.  “For Dewey, the 
essence and value of art are not in the mere artifacts we 
typically regard as art, but in the dynamic and developing 
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experiential activity through which they are created and 
perceived.” (Shusterman 2000)  This concept can find its 
origin in the postulate and criterion of Dewey‟s immediate 
empiricism.   
Therefore, the term „aesthetic object‟ is already an 
oxymoron since the aesthetic denotes, by definition and 
etymology, the capacity to perceive, appreciate, enjoy, and 
experience.  How then, taken literally, can an object 
perceive, appreciate, enjoy, or experience? (Mandoki 2007)  
The object qua aesthetic depends upon the aesthetic 
appreciation.  Its physical existence, on the other hand, 
does not depend on this judgment.  The aesthetic object 
depends on the aptitude of a subject to enjoy, appreciate, 
or endure it. (Mandoki 2007)  Thus, this project seeks to 
divulge the particulars of the sensibility necessary for an 
individual to do just that, but additionally to a spiritual 
level.  To slightly alter Mandoki‟s statement for our use; 
to deny that the aesthetic originates in the subject – 
psychologism or not – equals to denying that spirituality 
originates in the subject. (Mandoki 2007)  “Here we have the 
positivistic dream of some aestheticians [and architects] 
who believe that all problems of aesthetic theory would 
dissolve as soon as specific objects, features or qualities 
could be established so distinctly that they automatically, 
inescapably, produce an aesthetic experience in any subject 
exposed to them.” (Mandoki 2007)  Architecture as the 
aesthetic object is a product of an aesthetic relation that 
a subject establishes with it, and not the reverse (the 
subject is not the product of the object).   
For example, Anthony Lawlor in his book Finding the 
Sacred in Everyday Architecture; The Temple in the House, 
attempts to distinguish distinct objects, features, and 
qualities of architectonic forms which produce spiritual 
experiences.  He relates primal thought pattern – that of 
desiring, searching, and finding fulfillment – to the 
architectural patter of gate, path, and lotus seat.  He 
connects two extremes of human experience – turning outward 
to the aspiration of a higher goal and turning inward to 
gain healing inspiration – to the forms of steeple and 
sanctuary.  He describes the eight elemental building blocks 
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of architecture; floors, walls, pillars, roofs, space, doors 
and windows, ornament and rooms.  He depicts structures that 
embody what Joseph Cambell calls mythic archetypes, „the 
secret opening[s] through which the inexhaustible energies 
of the cosmos pour into human cultural manifestation[s].”  
Yet, his depictions and conclusions seem little more than a 
fetishized characteristics of architectural objects.  While 
not entirely ill contrived, he seems to be running circles 
around the authentic nature of an aesthetic object as just 
conceived.  He essentially undermines the prominence the 
subject/object contextual experience should take in a very 
analytic manner.  Nevertheless, I will also attempt a 
similar feat, but root the design rationale in naturalistic 
origins indicative of pragmatism.   
Furthermore, John Dewey believes that experiences 
involving art objects stand apart in the intensity and 
clarity of those properties that mark integral experiences.  
They also come across as being more concentrated in their 
impact and more integrated in their cohesiveness that do 
most other encounters with the world, even those that we 
find to be fulfilling in other ways. (Jackson 1998)  Dewey 
says, “The uniquely distinguish feature of esthetic 
experience is exactly the fact that no such distinction of 
self and object exist in it, since it is esthetic in the 
degree in which organism and environment cooperate to 
institute an experience in which the tow are so fully 
integrated that each disappears.” (Dewey 1934)  Dewey‟s 
contentions here are worth reflecting upon to gain a more 
profound spiritual understanding through the subject/object 
dialectic in the aesthetic perception of architecture.   
We have just seen how it is pertinent to implicate the 
distinguishing characteristics between the subject/object 
dialectic.  Spirituality is like beauty in that it cannot be 
found innately in the expression of the object, and as an 
experience has evolutionary, culturally-learnt, and 
individual-emotional roots. (Cold 2001)  Spirituality, like 
beauty, is multidimensional, it is a relation between 
properties of the environment and our senses, mind, and 
knowledge.  Time, place and role factors also influence the 
experience.  Therefore, when speaking of the association 
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between architecture and spirituality – like the association 
between architecture and beauty – it becomes more 
significant to have an understanding for what constitutes 
spirituality, than for what constitutes architecture.  
Architecture, being the artifact/object, is concrete.  
Spirituality, being a perception – much like beauty – is 
subjective, but beyond beauty it‟s also fleeting.  
Therefore, understanding the aesthetic will allow one to 
recognize and capitalize upon it in their perception of 
architecture.  I am not trying to argue for the total 
relativism of spirituality in architecture.  I believe that 
an architect can still usher in a spiritual experience if 
they recognize the complex aesthetic possibilities in 
architecture to which spirituality manifest, and these must 
stem from a sense of holism, organicism, and naturalism.  
Not merely architectonic forms as their possibilities are 
too numerous, contextual, and interdependent to enunciate, 
and if they do exist, as we are soon to see, they must stem 
from natural rhythms common to us all; not from physical 
forms, but aesthetic forms.   
Shusterman points out that Dewey also does not deny the 
importance of art‟s material objects.  Dewey insist, like 
Adorno, on the unavoidable “need for objectification,” for 
something reasonably fixed and qualitatively conducive to 
guide and structure the creation of aesthetic experience. 
(Shusterman 2000)  “For Dewey, „there can be no esthetic 
experience apart from an object, and … for an object to be 
the content of esthetic appreciation it must satisfy those 
objective conditions without which … [the necessary 
conditions of aesthetic experience] are impossible.‟” 
(Shusterman 2000)  “Just as „an esthetic product results 
only when ideas cease to float and are embodied in an 
object,‟ so the work of art as aesthetic experience results 
only when one‟s „images and emotions are also tied to the 
object, and … fused with the matter of the object.‟  But 
notwithstanding the necessity of art‟s fixed objects, Dewey 
privileges what Adorno later describes as „the processural 
essence of aesthetic experience and of the art work,” the 
fact that „works of art exist only in actu,‟ in lived 
dynamic experience.” (Shusterman 2000)  In the upcoming 
 23 
The Aesthetic 
“Dwelling” and “Study” sections we will address the 
architectural object in its materialized sense.  Herein, it 
is crucial to recognize the processural essence of aesthetic 
experience.   
These are by no means the only differing 
characteristics between analytic and pragmatic aesthetics.  
These are merely the differences I feel most important to 
bear in mind as we proceed with this project.  In other 
words, these are the differences within these aesthetic 
traditions I feel are most crucial to the concretization of 
architecture and the realization of spirituality.  There are 
still more significant notions to come as we begin to get 
more specific into the architectural and spiritual 
application of pragmatist aesthetic.  However, before we get 
more specific in that regard, it is still necessary to 
divulge more general aesthetic information.  Particularly, 
the historical role of architectural aesthetics.     
Architectural Aesthetic History:   
As mentioned, an interesting twist seems to occur as we 
begin to apply aesthetic dialogue directly toward 
architecture.  While it is agreed the analytic aesthetics 
induced by Kant proliferates, it is only G.W.F. Hegel who 
has anything sustained to say about architecture; Plato, 
Aristotle, Hume, and Kant are almost entirely silent on the 
subject. (Graham 2003)  Gordon Graham, in his article 
entitled Architecture, alludes to two plausible causes for 
one such neglect.  Number one, is that „the aesthetic‟ 
conception in architectural philosophy is heavily dependent 
upon a distinction that came to be expressly drawn only in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: namely the 
distinction between „mechanical‟ and „fine‟ arts.  The other 
is that the idea of „the architect,‟ who self-consciously 
adopts a style, and therefore can be regarded as a species 
of artist, is to be found emerging in Alberti‟s De Re 
Aedificatoria of 1450. (Graham 2003)  Therefore, without 
these conceptions, a discussion about the aesthetics of 
architecture cannot conceivably exist.  Graham, broadly 
interpreting architectural categories, further allies 
classicism – the doctrine that beauty in construction and 
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appearance is what puts building into the class of 
architecture – with aestheticism. (Graham 2003)  However 
true, this aesthetic misappropriation is quite unfortunate, 
if not even detrimental for our content purposes.   
Furthermore, most of the styles originating in post-
renaissance Europe can be described as classical 
architecture.  “The dominance of classical architecture was 
challenged in the nineteenth century by the revival of other 
forms, notably the Romanesque, and above all the Gothic.” 
(Graham 2003)  “The neo-gothic movement came to be 
identified, both in the popular mind and among architects 
themselves, as primarily a concern with appearance.” (Graham 
2003)  “So it was that a host of ornamental styles broke out 
– Romanesque, Early Christian, Byzantine, neo-Baroque, even 
Indian and Moorish, until, as Haldane remarks, „architecture 
had become a style-book design service.‟” (Graham 2003)  
Buildings are often judged as if they were sculpture and 
painting; that is to say, externally and superficially as 
purely plastic phenomena. (Zevi 1957)  The lingering 
ramifications of this type of aesthetic understanding in 
architecture cannot be understated as it still pervades our 
general perception of architecture.  It is under the 
analytic ideology that the term „aesthetic‟ – among most in 
the architectural profession – is often misconstrued in a 
spiritually and architecturally disadvantageous manner.  
Their contentions of aesthetics in architecture surround 
characteristics such as the façade and ornamentation of a 
building; perceiving architecture as one might perceive fine 
art, and therefore largely neglecting a large part of what 
architecture is about; its utility or function.  We have 
already witnessed Dewey‟s objections to such a aesthetic 
misappropriation.  It was architectural historian and critic 
Nicholas Pevsner who, in 1963 in his Outline of European 
Architecture, famously said that, “A bicycle shed is a 
building; Lincoln Cathedral is a piece of architecture.” 
(Pevsner 1963)  He thereby directed architectural focus 
directly, and solely, onto the appearance of a building.   
Furthermore, in analytic aesthetics, which pertain 
primarily to fine-arts such as painting and music there is a 
strict restriction of an aesthetic experience to the „distal 
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senses‟ of sight and hearing.  Architecture, by its 
affiliation with humankind and humankind‟s affiliation with 
their everyday environment, can – and should – additionally 
encompass the „proximal senses‟ of taste, smell, and touch 
in their understanding of the aesthetic.  Additionally, part 
of the task for architectural aesthetics should be to ensure 
that the architectural discourse becomes a discourse about 
life and the aesthetics of everyday real environments.  
Birgit Cold, in Aesthetics, Well-being, and Health, points 
out that the origin of the word aesthetic is derived from 
its opposite „anesthetic‟ or being „anaesthetized.‟  The 
implication being that it is positive, necessary, and 
pleasurable to be aware with all senses alert.  Therefore, 
humanity should not only survive, but enjoy life and the 
environment sensuously. (Cold 2001)  I further believe that 
humanity should not only enjoy life and the environment 
sensuously, but also spiritually.   
In addition, there are also those individuals whom 
half-hazardly interchange the word „aesthetics‟ with the 
word „ambiance‟ or „atmosphere.‟  Although this misuse of 
the word aesthetics is more in tune with the brand of 
aesthetics we will be speaking of pertaining to architecture 
and spirituality – it nonetheless undermines what aesthetics 
is all about.  For instance, ambiance speaks to a mood 
created by a particular environment, thereby denoting 
feelings, and acknowledging the fact that all the individual 
pieces contribute to the formation of the greater whole.  
Nevertheless, there is no field of study called 
„ambiancetics‟ and one cannot be an „atmospheretician.‟  
Therefore, the field of aesthetics must afford a particular 
avenue into the investigation of architecture.  While 
ambiance simply acknowledges the character of an environment 
aesthetics concerns itself with guiding experience in 
matters of imaginative sensibility.  We will see just how, 
and why, that is shortly.   
At this point it is useful to make another important 
distinction; one put forth by Roger Scruton in his book The 
Aesthetics of Architecture.  In a somewhat Deweyan notion 
Scruton believes that, “The only interesting philosophical 
account of aesthetic experience is the account which shows 
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its importance…” (Scruton 1979)  He also believes it is 
essential to distinguish between „architectural aesthetics‟ 
and „architectural theory.‟  “Architectural theory,” says 
Scruton, “consists in the attempt to formulate the maxims, 
rules and precepts which govern, or ought to govern, the 
practice of the builder.  For example, the classical theory 
of the Orders, as it is found in the great treaties of 
Vitruvius, Alberti, Serlio and Vignola, which lays down 
rules for the systematic combination and ornamentation of 
the parts of a building, belongs to theory; so too do most 
of the precepts contained in Ruskin‟s The Stones of Venice 
and Seven Lamps.  Such precepts assume that we already know 
what we are seeking to achieve: the nature of architectural 
success is not at issue; the question is, rather, how best 
to achieve it.  A theory of architecture impinges on 
aesthetics only if it claims a universal validity, for then 
it must aim to capture the essence, and not the accidents, 
of architectural beauty.” (Scruton 1979)  Additionally, 
somewhere in the scheme of things, lies the „criticism‟ of 
architecture. (Holgate 1992)  In this document we are 
definitely not aiming to criticize, nor do we hope to merely 
theorize.  The aim is to philosophize to gain objective 
validity.   
Scruton also distinguishes between the „philosophy of 
mind‟ (the certain mental capacities necessary for 
experience and judgment), and „empirical psychology.‟  He 
believes that, “a philosopher‟s prime concern is with the 
nature of our interest in architecture, and if he sometimes 
talks, as a psychologist would, of its causes, then this is 
only because he thinks of these causes as casting light on 
the aesthetic experience.” (Scruton 1979)  “The philosopher 
wishes to describe aesthetic experience in its most general 
terms, so as to discover its precise location in the human 
mind, its relation, for example, to sensation, to emotion 
and to judgment.” (Scruton 1979)  “Psychology is too 
concerned with the nature of experience, and not only with 
its causes.” (Scruton 1979)  “Psychology investigates facts, 
while philosophy studies concepts.” (Scruton 1979)  Herein, 
we also do not aim to conduct a psychological investigation, 
but – again – a philosophical study.  So too, a failure to 
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make this distinction would contradict with pragmatist 
aesthetic aims.   
For example, Ralf Weber, in his book On the Aesthetics 
of Architecture, proposes five principles of figural 
segregation for three-dimensional configurations: 
centricity; concavity; closure and peripheral density; 
uniformity and coherence of boundaries; and internal 
division of space and spatial density.  Additionally, the 
organization of individual spatial units within larger 
spatial wholes can be described as coordinate or 
subordinate, thus acquiring different perceptual dominance 
allowing persons to distinguish between primary and 
ancillary spaces. (R. Weber 1995)  The perceivers 
positioning within such a hierarchy of spaces ultimately 
reflects upon their relationship with the space, thus 
effecting the nature of their experience, and ultimately 
their perception.  However, as we have just seen, the 
important notion is not acknowledging what formal 
characteristics contribute to perception as the 
possibilities are endless, but acknowledging the manner in 
which this perception occurs as to understand the universal 
processural nature of an architectural experience.   
Ralph Weber himself recognizes the shortcoming of a 
psychological investigation by noting that, “Architectural 
space is always „experienced‟ space in that it enhances and 
constrains human activities.  Thus, the perception of 
architectural space is never a homogeneous or faithful 
recording of geometric characteristics and dimensions.  
Rather, every location and direction possesses a different 
value depending on use and meaning assigned by the 
inhabitants.  One might also note that architectural space 
is always experienced synaesthetically – that is, as a 
compendium of sensations involving light, sound, touch, 
smell, temperature, and, of course, movement.  And this 
quality also adds to its potentially „distorted‟ character.” 
(R. Weber 1995)  Furthermore, visual space is „unisotropic‟; 
it has different properties in different directions and 
features a host of dynamic characteristics depending on the 
location, articulation and massing of elements which 
generate it. (R. Weber 1995)  As such, discussing 
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architectonic space as topological, geometrical and 
arithmetical properties which represent space as a matter of 
dimensions, angles, axes, adjacent parts, so on and so forth 
is not the primary aim of this document.   
Similarly, Roger Scruton in perhaps the most seminal 
book on aesthetics and architecture written to date, 
examines the intellectual basis of the thought behind other 
varying architectural doctrines: functionalism, the „space‟ 
theory, and the philosophies of Kunstgeschichte and 
proportion.  He concludes that they all try to arrive at 
abstract principles of architectural success before giving a 
proper description of the experience which it qualifies. 
(Scruton 1979)  “Clearly,” says Scruton, “if we are to think 
of the analysis of the object as casting a light on the 
nature of appreciation, then we must consider the object 
only under its widest possible description.” (Scruton 1979)  
He rightly discerns that none of the theories discussed 
provides a „formal‟ description, for each ignores some 
feature of architecture that is both intentional and 
centrally significant.  Moreover, that each pretends an a 
priori status that it cannot justify, pretends, that is, to 
characterize the essence of architecture, and the core of 
our experience. (Scruton 1979)  In contrast, Dewey believes 
that “„the conception that objects have fixed and 
unalterable values is precisely the prejudice from which art 
emancipates us,‟ since with „the work of art the proof of 
the pudding is decidedly in the eating‟ rather than in any 
„a priori rule‟ or critical principle.” (Shusterman 2000)   
Scruton rightly titles a chapter in his book 
“Experiencing Architecture.”  However, he chooses to focus 
his discussion on what he finds particular to architecture 
which is not the experience, but the enjoyment that depends 
on it. (Scruton 1979)  “Thus,” says Scruton, “someone might 
say that the fundamental form of architectural enjoyment is 
simply pleasure in the appearance of something, and that the 
architect‟s task is to construct something which is both 
pleasing to look at and at the same time functional.  The 
actual experience is not in question; what is in question is 
the pleasure which it engenders.” (Scruton 1979)  I believe 
Scruton seems to be slightly mistaken; perhaps, due in part, 
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to a blinding of the analytic aesthetic.  He is still 
limiting himself to viewing architecture and beauty in a 
fine-artistic sense; and in doing so limits the possible 
value of experience to a mere generation of pleasure.   
In further contrast to Scruton, Nelson Goodman, in his 
essay How Buildings Mean, believes that the, “excellence of 
a work is a matter of enlightenment rather than pleasure.” 
(Goodman 1985)  He contends that, “A building, more than 
most works, alters our environment physically; but moreover 
as a work of art it may through avenues of meaning, inform 
and reorganize our entire experience.  Like other works of 
art – and scientific theories – it can give new insight, 
advance understanding, participate in our continual remaking 
of the world.” (Goodman 1985)  A discussion about the 
aesthetics of buildings is a discussion about the 
perceptions which buildings prompt us to have (which may or 
may not be pleasurable) and an analysis of why it is that we 
have them. (Ballantyne 2002)  Therefore, as one can see, an 
aesthetic melioration apposite to our spiritual life becomes 
necessary.  We have yet to receive a satisfactory 
„universal‟ understanding for aesthetic architectural 
experience.  We only know that aesthetic experience is of a 
„distorted character,‟ and has to do with way more than 
pleasure derived from the perception of beauty.  It is my 
belief that John Dewey pragmatist aesthetics provides us 
with one such understanding, and the ability to experience 
architectural aesthetics on a spiritual level.   
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Spiritual Aesthetic Background: 
 
hus far, as one can see from the general historical 
aesthetic introduction, the notion of „the aesthetic‟ 
in architecture deserves a great deal of elucidation 
as it can be understood to have a multifaceted character.  
Herein, we have addressed only the history and partial usage 
of „the aesthetic‟ as it pertains to philosophy and 
architecture in general.  We have recognized that we will be 
shying away from the analytical hegemony of aesthetics in 
favor of Dewey‟s pragmatist aesthetics.  Now, we must turn 
to implicating „the aesthetic‟ as it pertains specifically 
to architecture and the realization of spirituality.  
Generally, when it comes to a discussion of aesthetics in 
architecture which specifically pertain to some form of 
spirituality architects - by and large - adhere to one of 
two paths.  These paths I am referring to as the „analytic-
aesthetic path‟ and the „oriental-aesthetic path.‟  Neither 
of which, as I am arguing, is the most beneficial or 
universal to spiritual perception, and therefore I have 
proposed a third – the „pragmatic path‟ – in my hypothesis.  
It is useful to gain an understanding of these first two 
aesthetic philosophies, and their shortcomings, in order to 
vindicate the third.   
The Analytical Aesthetic Path: 
In the first spiritual-architectural-aesthetic path, we 
look no farther than the West largely through the 
aforementioned precepts of analytic aesthetics.  In doing so 
I believe we succumb to Max Weber‟s blinding and Dewey‟s 
impoverished aesthetic lives through general atrophy by 
assuming a rather complacent – ultimately deficient – 
aesthetic understanding.  Our eyes can‟t see the forest for 
the trees so to speak.  Karsten Harries, in the book The 
Ethical Function of Architecture, also believes that 
Enlightenment thinking “engenders and sustains” and with the 
Enlightenment comes the aesthetic approach to architecture. 
(Harries 1997)  He further states that, “After the 
Enlightenment has done its work art can furnish no more than 
occasions for aesthetic enjoyment, offering something like a 
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vacation from the serious business of life, unless for 
pedagogical reasons we find it useful to wrap independently 
established moral maxims in an artistic dress.” (Harries 
1997)  Harries, like Hegel and Dewey, believes we demand 
more of art, demand that it grant insight into what is and 
what matters. (Harries 1997)  So too, this is the aim of 
this project through the art of architecture.  Yet, even 
more so, the demand is to grant us insight to spiritual 
realization.   
As we have seen, this prominent occidental form of 
aesthetic understating primarily speaks of the perceivable 
side of architecture through the senses; the nature of 
beauty in architecture; and/or the theoretical and 
philosophical theories of aesthetic criticism in the 
formation of architecture.  This form of aestheticism allies 
architecture with the fine arts where a beautiful appearance 
is the crucial aspect that converts „mere‟ building into 
architecture. (Graham 2003)  “Beauty in architecture, 
however, has its own distinctive variables – proportion 
(wall space to window space, for instance), ornamentation 
(tracery, carvings, capitals), shape (dome, pitched roof) 
and so on.  All these give occasion for „aesthetic 
appreciation,‟ just as paintings and pieces of music do.  In 
this way the aesthetic conception of architecture explains 
both its connection with other fine arts, and its 
distinguishing features.” (Graham 2003)  That notion is 
further reinforced by the way the term „architecture‟ can 
refer to the style or fashion of a building.  Therefore, 
when one thinks of „architecture‟ it is often with regards 
to the material composition of an edifice in an artistic 
sense; its concrete, tangible, and corporal aspects.   
This analytic form of aesthetic understanding 
essentially undermines everything architecture is about if 
it stops at beauty, and does not conceptualize in a more 
profound context.  What about the space and the experience 
derived from the perception of the materiality?  Even Kant, 
in his fleeting account of architecture in the Critique of 
Judgment said, “What is essential in a work of architecture 
is the product‟s adequacy for a certain use.  On the other 
hand, a mere piece of sculpture, made solely to be looked at 
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is meant to be liked on its own account.” (Kant 1987)  The 
only type of spiritual experience afforded by this form of 
aesthetic appreciation is steeped in theological 
underpinnings, and – for reasons yet to be disclosed - is 
therefore to be discounted.  It should not be necessary for 
the perceiver to have an understanding for Christianity to 
allow the domes or spirals of cathedrals to manifest 
spirituality.  Nor should it be necessary for the perceiver 
to have an understanding for Daoism to allow for the 
manifestation of spirituality via the hierarchal or 
figurative floor plans of temples.  This form of 
aestheticism is simply too far removed from providing us 
with any philosophical grounding; also, too far removed from 
our everyday life.  Dewey also believes that “the 
compartmentalization and spiritualization of art as an 
elevated „separate realm‟ set „upon a far-off pedestal,‟ 
divorced from the materials and aims of other human effort, 
has removed art form the lives of most of us, and thus has 
impoverished the aesthetic quality of our lives.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  It has also impoverished the spiritual 
quality of our lives. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned, Alexander Gottleib 
Baumgarten, the “originator of modern aesthetics,” believed 
the understanding of beauty in nature was the concern of 
aesthetics, and it lied in the perfection of sensory 
awareness. (Light and Smith 2005)  “These are preeminently 
sensory, embracing the full range of perceptual experience 
in all its modalities, not only by means of the senses but 
also in the sensory aspects of experiences that are 
imaginative, that involve recollection, or that may even be 
predominately cognitive.  So understood perception is broad, 
indeed, and necessarily so, since it is important to 
recognize how completely and thoroughly sensation pervades 
all experience.” (Light and Smith 2005)  More strictly 
speaking the arts, and certain aspects of nature, are the 
province of aesthetics. (Light and Smith 2005)  So too, we 
will see that spirituality falls under the province of 
aesthetics as a heightened sensory awareness allowing one to 
understand the beauty of nature, life, and the full range of 
perceptual experience.   
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Arthur Schopenhauer ranked the several arts in a 
hierarchy, with literary and dramatic arts at the top, music 
soaring in a separate even higher heaven, and architecture 
sinking to the ground under the weight of beams and bricks 
and mortar. (Magee 1983)  The governing principle seems to 
be some measure of spirituality, with architecture ranking 
lowest by vice of being grossly material. (Goodman 1985)  
Bruno Zevi, in his book Architecture and Space, reiterated 
that “„to construct in space,‟ as Vitale writes, „is the aim 
and end of architecture; but space is anti-spirit; it is 
pure extension, absolute and complete realization, while 
spirit is pure and continuous tension, the everlasting 
condition of becoming.  Thus, for modern thought, 
architecture really seems something too closely tied to the 
material and is quasi-extraneous and hostile to spirit.  It 
is an inferior form of art that can acquire dignity only 
through its spiritualization with the lapse of time (as in 
ruins, archeological remains and ancient monuments), when it 
becomes a document of human life inserted into the course of 
history.‟” (Zevi 1957)  “„Vitale continues that in contrast 
to the movement of a drama or symphony, it is the static, 
immobile character of architecture – which does not lend 
itself to continual renovation, interpretation in time or 
realization according to the state of mind of the moment – 
that keeps it from appealing to modern sensibilities.‟  
Vitale quotes Foscolo‟s definition of architecture: „Most 
unfortunate of the arts, precisely because it is conceived 
and constrained to remain exactly what it is.‟” (Zevi 1957)  
I believe Dewey would argue that this analytic critique 
couldn‟t be farther from the truth.  With Dewey art, or 
architecture, gets defined as “a quality of experience” 
rather than a collection of objects or a substantive essence 
shared only by such objects, and aesthetic experience thus 
becomes the cornerstone of the philosophy of art. 
(Shusterman 2000)  Nevertheless, they were correct in their 
misguided attempt to include the historical-temporal 
dimension of architecture.   
Still, the shortcomings of the above views on 
„architecture‟ as an „art‟ should be obvious.  They are 
completely misinterpreting the existential dimension of 
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architecture – the space – which is not an „absolute or 
complete realization‟ or „conceived and constrained to 
remain exactly what it is‟ as Vitale might lead us to 
believe.  Furthermore, the abovementioned use of 
spirituality was also – as we well come to see – skewed in a 
unfavorable manner.  Architecture is like a great hollowed-
out sculpture which man enters and apprehends by moving 
about within it.  Internal space cannot be completely 
represented in any form.  It can be grasped and felt only 
through direct experience.  It is the protagonist of 
architecture.  Space communicates the value of architecture.  
“The intangible content in „things,‟ though not materially 
manifested is regarded as something REAL.” (Chang 1956)  The 
question then becomes, aesthetically, how to address the 
nature of space?  Dewey‟s aesthetic pragmatism has already 
been escorting us in that direction.   
In 1957 Bruno Zevi wrote that, “A satisfactory history 
of architecture has not yet been written, because we are 
still not accustomed to thinking in terms of space, and 
because historians of architecture have failed to apply a 
coherent method of studying buildings from a spatial point 
of view.” (Zevi 1957)  Unfortunately, that tendency largely 
continues today.  However, we will see the notions, beliefs, 
and proponents for architecture to be something more than 
static, fulfilled, and lifeless.  For vitality to manifest 
liveliness always needs the potential of becoming; as such, 
it is the intangible elements – the negative – in 
architectonic forms which makes them come alive, become 
human, naturally harmonize with one another, and enable us 
to experience them with human sensibility. (Chang 1956)  The 
key then, to an aesthetic understanding of space, lies in 
the nature of the experience.  Although Zevi, like Scruton, 
was more or less on the right track, they were still 
limiting themselves in their analytic conceptions.   
As we will see, I believe that the tangible type of 
spirituality (i.e. natural spirituality) manifest in the 
intangible architectonic forms (i.e. voids and spaces).  
Intangibility leaves an almost unbounded possibility for 
change and further development, and is therefore the 
existential catalyst.  Spiritually, space makes a building 
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vital.  “Since every architectural volume, every structure 
of walls, constitutes a boundary, a pause in the continuity 
of space, it is clear that every building functions in the 
creation of two kinds of space: its internal space, 
completely defined by the building itself, and its external 
or urban space, defined by that building and the others 
around it.” (Zevi 1957)  “The experience of architecture can 
be said to encompass both the experience of tangible and 
visible objects, and the relationships between them that 
segregate, bound and articulate space.” (R. Weber 1995)  
Buildings are further perceived ambulatorily, in a sequence 
of successive perceptions of different locations that need 
to be fused into a single cognitive image. (R. Weber 1995) 
This is just the tip of the aesthetic iceberg, but from it 
we can conclude that the analytic aesthetic path does not 
provide the most advantageous path for the realization of 
spirituality via architecture as it does not fully account 
for the space; for the experience.  It is too set on 
deriving meaning from physical appearance of objects.   
The Oriental Aesthetic Path: 
In the second spiritual-architectural-aesthetic path, 
we look to the East, which – in the context of this subject 
matter – primarily means Japan, and maybe even India or 
China.  While Japan does afford a significantly differing 
set of possibilities for aesthetic understanding – more in 
tune with everyday life and the spiritual possibilities it 
can afford through architecture – I will argue it is not the 
fullest universal accessible understanding conceivable.  It 
is still largely dependent upon a specialized understanding, 
or belief, lost on many of us in the West – and perhaps the 
East as well.  Later, we will learn of the disadvantageous 
spiritual connotations contained within the word „belief.‟  
As for now, by and large, oriental aesthetics is no 
different than the aforementioned analytic aesthetic for a 
spiritual understanding for our purposes.  “Oriental 
theories of art are deeply permeated with a philosophy of 
religious mysticism which is largely unacceptable to 
naturalistic thinkers in the West.” (Munro 1965)  
Nevertheless, as Thomas Munro points out in his book 
Oriental Aesthetics, they also contain much wise 
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generalization on the arts which is based on long empirical 
and practical experience.  This can be separated from its 
mystical context, and considered in its own right. (Munro 
1965)  To me, much pragmatist and phenomenologist philosophy 
seems akin to oriental philosophy void of theology, 
religious mysticism, or abstract principles.  In fact, we 
will illustrate this phenomenon as we address our contention 
for spirituality and architecture in the ensuing sections.   
Interestingly enough, Hegel was the first Western 
writer to include an account of Oriental art in a 
philosophic history of world civilization.  However, that 
account was ill-informed and lacking in appreciation.  It 
could hardly have been otherwise in Europe at the time in 
which he wrote. (Munro 1965)  Fast forward to present times 
and we, in the West, have long had exposure to oriental art 
and architecture.  As in the West, oriental aestheticians 
regarded such arts as drama and poetry as having a didactic, 
moral, and social purpose, but as in all parts of the world, 
long experience with didactic art showed that high moral 
aims were not enough; aesthetic power was also necessary. 
(Munro 1965)  The truth of the matter is that all the non-
western cultures offer intriguing insight into aesthetic 
perception through their unique cultural outlets.  Perhaps 
most importantly for us in this project is the manner in 
which oriental aesthetics pays much attention to the 
artist‟s inner attitudes and mental processes, with advice 
as to how he can best attain a state of mind which is 
favorable to creation and perception. (Munro 1965)  In 
short, I will begin to refer to this as the „subjective 
emphasis in oriental aesthetics.‟  One which I elaborated 
upon in the preceding section entitled “The Subject/Object 
Dialectic.”  One to which Dewey also subscribes.   
Thomas Munro cites Harold Rugg, a psychologist and 
educator, whom contrast Eastern and Western roads to 
creativity.  Generally, he believes, in the West the 
training of an artist is often largely restricted to overt, 
external techniques, the use of materials and instruments.  
It is commonly felt that aesthetic aims and inner attitudes 
are personal matters which can be left to each artist; if 
not regulated, they will take care of themselves.  In 
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oriental aesthetics, as in Plato‟s, the emphasis is more the 
other way around.  Techniques and materials are not 
neglected, but neither are the mental and emotional parts of 
the artistic process. (Munro 1965)  As to artistic 
appreciation the scenario is the same. (Munro 1965)  As we 
have seen, we in the West again emphasize the objective 
aspects.  We will come to understand how this is spiritually 
detrimental in the ensuing sections.  For now we will 
conclude in that neither analytic aesthetics nor oriental 
aesthetics alone afford us the avenue necessary for a 
universal spiritual understanding via architecture.   
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Spiritual Scientific Background: 
 
erhaps, even after all the above discussion about 
aesthetics, the question still remains, “Why not 
address architecture as a science to associate it with 
spirituality?”  After all, architecture – by definition – is 
neither a science nor an art, and is therefore an 
amalgamation of the two.  In addition, artistically 
speaking, one of the difficulties with associating 
architecture with spirituality is that the word 
„architecture‟ unfavorably lends itself toward a non-
spiritually biased definition more akin to knowledge of the 
sciences (i.e. engineering).  The word “architect” 
originated from the Greek word arkhitekton by which tekton 
means builder. (Random House Dictionary 2009)  While, as we 
will see, the notion of a „builder‟ is synonymous with 
„spirituality‟ the word „architecture‟ often means the 
action or process of building (construction), or an orderly 
arrangement of parts (structure).  All of these notions 
imply a direct relationship with materials, materiality, and 
science.  Later we will come to understand the spiritual 
importance of materials more in accord with oriental 
aesthetics, and not in the scientific sense one might 
imagine.   
In concert with the trend thus far, the proceeding 
documentation will conceive of architecture largely as an 
art, and address it through aesthetic discourse.  This will 
afford the most beneficial avenue with which to associate 
architecture with spirituality.  Conceiving of architecture 
as a science does not completely distance it from 
spirituality, but does provide some notable obstacles, and 
as such is not the most advantageous avenue for pursuit.  
Therefore, I will briefly address architecture as a science 
here in the onset to hopefully make this position a little 
clearer.  In doing so, I intend to justify my position and 
approach to realizing the association between architecture 
and spirituality.  We should understand that “the demand for 
modern science arose from the wish to release personal 
initiative from tradition; and has been confirmed to such an 
extent that metaphysics has virtually been superseded by 
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science in our outlook.  The aesthetics of antiquity 
reflected the exaltation of the metaphysical background.  
Modern aesthetics shows interest in scientific method as the 
means of transforming the human foreground to enrich the 
life of the individual and of society.” (V. M. Ames, The 
Function and Value of Aesthetics 1941)  Again, that is 
precisely our aim for utilizing pragmatist aesthetics in the 
realization of spirituality via architecture.   
Insomuch as architecture is a science Max Weber 
believes that science is, in one sense, destined to be 
profoundly different from artistic practice.  “Scientific 
work is harnessed to the course of progress.  In art, 
however, there is no progress in this sense;” stating that a 
work of art from a period which has worked out a new 
technique is no greater, in an artistic sense, than a work 
of art which lacks all knowledge of such techniques.  “A 
work of art which involves genuine „fulfillment‟ can never 
be surpassed; it will never be out of date;” it can never be 
rendered „obsolete.‟”  This concept of „fulfillment‟ in art 
– as portrayed by Weber – contrast severely with the concept 
of „fulfillment‟ in science.  Weber believes that, “every 
scientific „fulfillment‟ means new „questions‟; it ask to be 
„surpassed‟ and made obsolete.”  To be overtaken in science 
is not only a scientist fate, but their common goal.  (M. 
Weber 1989)  Artist, while not opposed to the advancement of 
techniques, simply does not take as their basis the same set 
of „fulfillment‟ standards.   
Later, with the help of John Dewey, we will see that 
art – like science – does have „fulfillment‟ as consummate 
aesthetic experience, which does beg to be – at the least 
duplicated – if not completely expanded upon through the 
continuous act of creation.  Nevertheless, Dewey also 
believes that the scientific purpose is in contrast with the 
aesthetic purpose.  The difference is one of the place where 
emphasis falls in the constant rhythm that marks the 
interaction of the live creature with his surroundings. 
(Dewey 1934)  “The scientific man is interested in problems, 
in situations wherein tension between the matter of 
observation and of thought is marked.  Of course he cares 
for their resolution.  But he does not rest in it; he passes 
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on to another problem using an attained solution only as a 
stepping stone from which to set on foot further inquiries.” 
(Dewey 1934)  Again, Dewey also implicates artist as being 
more sincere in their resolve.  More passionate than 
scientist to not only take on and get to the bottom of 
problems of the organism and their environment, but return 
these observations legitimately to everyday experience.   
Perhaps, more in line with Weber‟s notion of 
„fulfillment‟ is that, in one sense, architecture does try 
to „progress‟ as a science through the evolution of building 
systems, building materials, construction techniques, 
sustainable techniques, and the like.  While rightly so, we 
will come to understand the spiritual implications of this 
type of progress, if not properly obtained, in the case 
studies.  Nonetheless, as an art, a modern or post-modern 
building is by no means greater than a classical building 
from antiquity, or vice versa.  As Weber says of a piece of 
art, “an individual may judge its importance for him 
personally in different ways.  But nobody will ever be able 
to say a work which involves genuine „fulfillment‟ in an 
artistic sense that it has been made „obsolete‟ by another 
work of equal „fulfillment.‟” (M. Weber 1989)  This notion 
bears great significance into the act of aesthetic 
perception.  Additionally, architects are forced to walk 
Weber‟s dividing line of „fulfillment‟ between the two 
disciplines, and therefore undertake the complex juggling 
act of catering to the concerns of each.   
As such, an architect must critically examine what he 
is building; what he is building with; what he is building 
for, and then seek to optimize these relationships in time.  
Just as in “any scientific work [where] the validity of the 
rules of logic and method, those general foundations of our 
orientation of the world, are presupposed;” so too 
architecture can only be interpreted with reference to its 
ultimate meaning, which one must accept or reject according 
to one‟s ultimate attitudes toward life. (M. Weber 1989)  
Insofar as architecture is a science it should presuppose 
that what is produced should be important in the sense of 
„being worth knowing.‟  That is to say it has a moral 
obligation over a natural science or medical science to 
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account for meaningfulness in the lives of the humans it 
shelters.  We will come to understand just how important the 
need to experience „meaningfulness‟ in our lives is, and how 
this effects the realization of spirituality, in the 
„Spirituality‟ and „Dwelling‟ documentation that is to come.   
Weber then asks, “What is the vocation of science 
within the totality of human life and what is its value?” 
(M. Weber 1989)  Dispelling notions that the meaning of 
science as a vocation is – „the way to the true being‟, „the 
true way to art‟, „the way to true nature‟, or „the way to 
the true God.‟  “What of positive use does science actually 
contribute to practical and personal „life‟?” (M. Weber 
1989)  Weber ultimately believes a contribution of science 
is to help one gain objective clarity via the concept of 
Weltanschauung – or world-view.  Thereby solidifying a 
position to arrive at a meaningful conclusion, or an end.  
Put in the context of this project a branch of science, such 
as architecture, should serve to help one solidify their 
world view.  This must entail their conception of 
spirituality.  The same emphasis on the realization of 
objective clarity is also stressed by Dewey.   
Regrettably, science does have an unfortunate effect on 
the manifestation of „spirituality‟ which art does not have.  
Weber continues with his train of thought and – with the 
help of Count Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy (also known as Leo 
Tolstoy) – essentially concludes that life is meaningless as 
a result of scientific progression.  For “scientific 
progress is a fraction, indeed the most important fraction, 
of that process of intellectualization which we have been 
undergoing for millennia and which is generally judged in 
such an extraordinary negative fashion nowadays.” (M. Weber 
1989)  Such progress is in principle infinite, and – for 
Weber – here we come to the problem of the meaning of 
science.  This intellectual rationalization through science 
and scientific technology equates to a disenchantment of the 
world.  It means that, “if one only wanted to, one could 
find out anytime; that there are in principle no mysterious, 
incalculable powers at work, but rather that one could in 
principle master everything through calculation.” (M. Weber 
1989)  Indeed, as we will see, a disenchantment of the world 
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is not favorable to the manifestation of spirituality, but I 
don‟t think science is necessarily as harmful as Weber might 
lead us to believe.     
Tolstoy, then takes Weber‟s notion of disenchantment of 
the world beyond the practical and technical qualities of 
science and asks whether or not death was a meaningful 
occurrence.  For a civilized being, the answer for Tolstoy 
was “no,” because when the individuals life is inserted into 
„progress‟ and „infinity‟ he can snatch only something 
provisional, rather than final, thus death for him is a 
meaningless occurrence; and so too is civilized life as 
such.  Civilized life in this case is a term used in 
contrast to „savage‟ life.  Weber believed that „savaged‟ 
individuals are those who know incomparably more about their 
tools of life compared to a civilized individual.  Dewey 
might try to reconcile this nihilistic viewpoint by stating 
that “„science itself is but a central art auxiliary to the 
generation and utilization of other arts,‟ and that both 
science and philosophy can afford their practitioners 
aesthetic experience.” (Shusterman 2000)  The aesthetic in 
scientific work is the “„satisfying emotional quality … 
[emerging from] internal integration and fulfillment reached 
through ordered and organized movement‟ involving all our 
human faculties.” (Shusterman 2000)  If one views science in 
this manner perhaps life can be injected with a little more 
meaning?  It is also worth noting here that Dewey insists, 
“Neither the savage nor the civilized man is what he is by 
native constitution but by the culture in which he 
participates.” (Dewey 1934)  So while Tolstoy seems to be 
advocating the savage life as more meaningful than the 
civilized; Dewey reminds us neither the savage nor the 
civilized being is unaffected by culture in which they 
participate.   
In Weber and Tolstoy‟s respect science is doing the 
exact opposite of what it should be doing, and that is 
merging with spirituality as a means of engaging us with our 
world.  I would concur with Robert Solomon in his book 
Spirituality for the Skeptic; the Thoughtful Love of Life, 
in that spirituality and science at their best are kindred 
spirits and not at all opposed.  However, I would also like 
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to agree with Weber that science, which manifest as 
technology, can also oppose spirituality through the 
flattening of the world and the dulling of senses.  These 
concepts cannot be understated with regard to spirituality; 
especially in regard to „religion‟?  Religion and science 
are largely about belief in a religious-supernatural-
spiritual context, and as such there is inevitably a clash 
between the two.  Therefore, it is important to de-emphasize 
the role of belief in spirituality and religion to undermine 
the false and often tragic battle between science and 
religion.  “Spirituality, in its effort to embrace the 
world, naturally seeks to know more about the world it 
embraces;” and so does (or should) the science of 
architecture. (Solomon 2002)  
There is one more important distinction to make of 
architecture as a science versus architecture as an art.  
Making this distinction further justifies choosing the 
latter over the former as a means of spiritual pursuit.  
Katya Mandoki, in her book Everyday Aesthetics; Prosaics, 
the Play of Culture, and Social Identities, stresses the 
interdisciplinary (i.e. philosophical, social, symbolic, 
communicative, political, historical, anthropological, 
neurological, and pedagogical) quandary of aesthetics.  She 
also summarizes some key concepts one should bear in mind 
pertaining to aesthetics that is worth quoting at length: 
…the field of aesthetics can never become a 
science in the strict sense of the term, since it 
is totally bound to subjectivity not only as its 
object of inquiry, but also as its place of 
enunciation, interpretation and analysis.  If the 
principle of verifiability of science requires of 
any observer to corroborate a phenomenon under the 
same conditions, in studying aesthetic observations 
vary depending upon the matricial location of the 
subject.  This does not condemn us to sheer 
solipsism, as there will be coincidences with other 
observers given the shared interpretative 
communities and overlapping matrixes in which we 
stand.  Thus, I invite readers to look at everyday 
life focusing upon aspects not previously 
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considered as related to the aesthetic, and to 
explore from their own matricial configuration of 
the fascinating manifold of the aesthetic 
activities.”   
Mandoki continues in a later passage, “… it is 
not only possible but indispensable to open up 
aesthetics towards the wealth and complexity of 
everyday life in its different manifestations.” 
(Mandoki 2007)   
Last, but definitely not least, it should be noted that 
“analytic aesthetics, pursued under the ideal of science, 
tended to shirk issues of evaluation and reform.  The aim 
was to analyze and clarify the established concepts and 
practices of art criticism, not to revise them; to give a 
true account of our concept of art, not to change it. (Dewey 
1934)  In vivid contrast, Deweyan aesthetics is interested 
not in truth for truth's sake, but in achieving richer and 
more satisfying experience.  For Dewey's pragmatism, 
experience - not truth - is the final standard.  The 
ultimate aim of all inquiry, scientific or aesthetic, is not 
knowledge itself, but better experience or experienced 
value; and Dewey insists on „the immediacy of aesthetic 
experience‟ and its experienced value.” (Shusterman 2000)  
By now, it should be evident, that the manifestation of 
spirituality cannot conceivably be duplicated or 
corroborated with any principle of scientific verifiability.  
Also that aesthetics „experience‟ surpasses – in many 
regards - sciences „truth.‟   
Section III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  
Spirituality  
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Spirituality; a ‘Naturalized’ Conception: 
s mentioned, there are many varied conceptions of 
spirituality; perhaps ever more so in this day and 
age.  However, most important is to acknowledge that 
no culture is void of some contention for spirituality and 
it‟s engagement with everyday life.  This is especially true 
in the case of humankinds relationship to architecture; as 
architecture is often a prominent medium for the spiritual 
expression of any particular culture, in particular epoch.  
We have already established our parameters for addressing 
architectures association with spirituality through the 
aesthetic, a pragmatist aesthetic at that, which is itself a 
naturalized conception of its more analytic counterpart.  As 
with the aesthetic, in the context of this paper, special 
care must be taken in addressing those contentions of 
spirituality which must be disbanded, and greater 
clarification must be given as to why.  The following will 
provide greater insight into the form of spirituality this 
paper has been, and will continue to, advocate and why.  
Just as the aesthetic is „universal‟ so too should be the 
spirituality.  Therefore, what I am implicating is loosely a 
„naturalized‟ form of spirituality in cohort with pragmatist 
ideology.  This understanding aims to re-appreciate and re-
enchant everyday life through spiritual and architectural 
experience.   
Spirituality Naturalized: 
Spirituality, in its essence, is a metaphysical concept 
implying the quality or condition of being „spiritual.‟  
Which begs the subsequent question, “How can one be 
„spiritual‟?”  Being spiritual – par Encarta Dictionary‟s 
definition – implies a relation to the „soul‟ or „spirit;‟ 
to the „religious‟ or „sacred;‟ and all at the expense of 
material and worldly things. (Dictionary, Encarta 2007)  
Already, the aforementioned definitions are digressing from 
what I believe to be the most central conceptions of 
spirituality.  Without going directly into the theological 
implications associated with such terms as „soul,‟ 
„religious,‟ or „sacred‟ – and their ensuing prejudices and 
A 
 47 
The Spirituality 
dogmas – I would firstly like to stick with the current 
chain of etymological dissection and isolate the term 
„spirit‟ from the definition for „spiritual‟ and 
„spirituality.‟  More specifically, I believe it is 
beneficial here to define what the „human spirit‟ is. 
„Spirit‟ – again, par Encarta Dictionaries definition – 
can mean the vital force that characterizes a human being as 
being alive; the will or sense of self; enthusiasm and 
energy; personality or temperament; attitude or state of 
mind; enthusiasm and loyalty that someone feels in belonging 
to a group; somebody or something that is divine, inspiring, 
or animating influence; the intention behind something such 
as a rule or decree; the prevailing mood or outlook 
characteristic of a place or time; somebody who displays a 
particular quality; in some beliefs, somebody‟s soul, 
especially that of a dead person; a supernatural being that 
does not have a physical body; a strong alcoholic liquor 
made by distillation; any liquid produced by distillation; 
and a solution of essence or volatile substance in alcohol. 
(Dictionary, Encarta 2007)  Additionally, for Robert C. 
Solomon in is his book Spirituality for the Skeptic, the 
word „spirit‟ firstly evokes „spirited;‟ being enthusiastic, 
passionate, and/or devoted.  He continues, “More generally, 
it refers to states of mind, „being in good spirits‟ or 
„needing one‟s spirits raised.‟” (Solomon 2002)  Spirit, as 
one can clearly see, is a multifaceted word with wide range 
of applications.   
Solomon then alludes to the extent which spirit, in its 
most dramatic employment, refers to the realm that is 
supernatural; the realm I think we most commonly (at least 
in the West) associate with the term spirit.  That is to say 
an incorporeal, intangible, transcendental, ubiquitous, non-
quantifiable substance or energy with the implications of a 
divine or holy source.  At its farthermost point and 
greatest amplitude it can mean the absolute, the infinite, 
and the eternal. (Comte-Sponville 2006)  Furthermore, 
spirituality can often be conflated with mysticism such as 
in the Orient.  Schopenhauer‟s stated „Man is a metaphysical 
animal,‟ to which Comte-Sponville induced therefore “a 
spiritual animal as well.” (Comte-Sponville 2006)  However 
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true, I would like to deviate from metaphysics, and the 
dramatic amplitude the term „spirit‟ can reach for 
“metaphysics means thinking about these things; 
„spirituality‟ means experiencing them, exercising them, 
living them.” (Comte-Sponville 2006)  So too, the aesthetic 
also emphasizes notion of the living experience.   
Solomon‟s convictions on „spirituality,‟ while 
ultimately his own, are admittingly influenced by two 
primary sources: Hegel and Nietzsche.  These two held 
similar views as their philosophies pertain to spirituality.  
Solomon believed both Hegel and Nietzsche tried to 
naturalize spirituality, to get away from „other worldly‟ 
religions and philosophies, and – like the pragmatist 
aesthetic – re-appreciate or „re-enchant‟ everyday life. 
(Solomon 2002)  “Both Hegel and Nietzsche rejected a concept 
of soul that was anything other than this-worldly and 
natural, but neither could tolerate a soul-less world, a 
world without spirit and spirituality.” (Solomon 2002)  
Herein, the aforementioned use of „soul‟ is a direct concept 
of Judeo-Christian-Islamic theology.  In addition to the 
aforesaid, all three of them share the belief that the net 
of spirituality is to be cast as widely as possible so that, 
whatever spirituality may be, it cannot only involve 
humanity; „spirituality‟ is all-embracing, including much 
(if not all) of Nature and the natural world. (Solomon 2002)  
As one can see, there is a huge pull to return spirituality 
to the nature of everyday life.  It is also worth re-
mentioning that Hegel and Nietzsche held similar aesthetic 
philosophies as well.   
Thomas Munro maintains that the term „naturalism‟ is 
highly ambiguous today. (Munro 1965)  He believes that, “In 
the West, philosophic naturalism under one name or another 
has been a major tradition since Democritus, Epicurus, and 
Lucretius.  Aristotle was in some respects a naturalist, 
especially as to art.  After centuries of dormancy in 
Christian Rome and the Middle Ages, naturalism revived in 
Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
Incomplete and groping in the theories of Hobbes, Gassendi, 
La Mettrie, and some of the Encyclopedists, it has revived 
increasing support from science up to the present time; 
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especially from Darwinian evolution and physiological 
psychology.  It received support from the empiricism of 
Francis Bacon, Locke, and Hume, even though these men were 
not complete naturalist.  It achieved some fullness of 
statement in Spencer, Dewey, Russell, and Santayana.” (Munro 
1965)  Under the banner of aesthetics, we will turn our 
focus to John Dewey‟s spiritual naturalism shortly.  Herein, 
we have just seen how Dewey is one of the foremost 
proponents of naturalism.   
I think it is important to stress that while denying 
the divine inspiration of the artist, and the supernatural 
status of his power, naturalism is quite ready to accept the 
phenomenal reality of the various kinds of mystic, ecstatic, 
and intuitive experience which are cultivated so assiduously 
in the orient. (Munro 1965)  Munro also gives a rather 
succinct definition of naturalistic spiritual values which 
is worth quoting at length:  
Philosophic naturalist doubt or deny the 
existence of „spirit‟ as an entity or substance, 
especially in the form of incorporeal spirits 
having power to live, think, and act independently 
of material bodies.  They doubt or deny the 
existence of incorporeal gods, angles, devils, 
demons, fairies, ghosts or disembodied souls of 
the dead, and the like.  They do not deny the 
existence of „spiritual activities‟ or „spiritual 
experience‟ if it is defined in a naturalistic 
way.  „Spiritual‟ in this sense refers to the more 
highly developed aesthetic, intellectual, and 
moral types of thought and experience: those which 
are broadly philosophical, humanitarian, or 
universal in range and interest as opposed to the 
narrowly selfish satisfaction of bodily appetites 
ad activities devoted thereto.” (Munro 1965)   
An understanding for what is meant by „naturalized 
spirituality‟ is essential to bridging between Heidegger‟s 
phenomenology, Dewey‟s aesthetic pragmatism, and 
architecture.  In an attempt to summarize – as concisely as 
possible – our definition for „spirituality‟ thus far I 
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would impart with Solomon that I am providing a definition 
which is non-religious, non-institutional, non-theological, 
non-scriptural, and in a non-exclusive sense.  One which is 
not based on Belief, which is not dogmatic, which is not 
other-worldly, and which is not uncritical or cultist. 
(Solomon 2002)  Moreover, a „naturalized‟ spirituality which 
allows for the re-appreciation or re-enchantment everyday 
life, and therefore manifest in the human experience as 
being corporeal, tangible, natural, and this-worldly; as 
opposed to incorporeal, intangible, supernatural, or 
transcendental.  As such, it is omnipresent, but requires 
thoughtful engagement through the recognition of meaning of 
that which is most obligatory to properly emerge and 
manifest.  Most importantly, it is partial to the 
architectural aesthetic.  As mentioned, John Dewey can now 
spread greater light into the nature of one such spiritual 
conception.  Lastly, my aim is not to under mind, or take 
from, in the more traditional conceptions of spirituality.  
If one feels that way I would merely implore them to view 
this dissertation as a supplementation of sorts, and test 
its effectiveness.   
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Spirituality; a Social/Self Conception: 
ncarta Dictionary – in their aforementioned definition 
for „sprit‟ – alluded to another very important 
quality for „spirituality,‟ that deserves some 
elucidation; especially with regards to architecture.  That 
is the extent to which „spirituality‟ manifest as a sense of 
belonging to a group, and as a sense of self.  So too, 
architecture – given its public stature – can be seen as 
belonging to a group in the figurative sense.  Yet, 
architecture has an individualistic nature as well.  Solomon 
also makes this important distinction of „spirit,‟ and that 
is the extent to which it can be a shared passion or social 
conception; as witnessed in the expressions “team spirit” 
and the “spirit of the times.”  Drawing upon Hegel‟s 
philosophy he depicts how spirit “represents our sense of 
participation and membership in a humanity and a world much 
larger than our individual selves.” (Solomon 2002)  George 
Mead accounts of the self as acquired by the biologic 
individual through taking the roles of others, in a process 
of stimulus and response.  The “I” of Mead's original 
impulsive individual would correspond with the psyche as the 
less influenced part of the self; whereas the “me” would 
correspond to spirit, though much more social in being based 
on the roles or attitudes of others. (V. M. Ames, Mead and 
Husserl on the Self 1955)  Therefore, we can derive that 
without social interaction there would be no “I” or “me;” 
without humanity there would be no spirituality.  The same 
social interaction can be seen to influence our 
architecture.   
Social Conception: 
 “Rooted intellectually in Hegelian dialectics and 
process philosophy Mead, like Dewey, developed a more 
materialist process philosophy that was based upon human 
action and specifically communicative action.  Human 
activity is, in a pragmatic sense, the criterion of truth, 
and through human activity meaning is made.  Joint activity, 
including communicative activity, is the means through which 
our sense of self is constituted.  The essence of Mead's 
E 
 52 
The Spirituality 
social behaviorism is that mind is not a substance located 
in some transcendent realm, nor is it merely a series of 
events that takes place within the human physiological 
structure.  This approach opposed the traditional view of 
the mind as separate from the body.” (Various n.d.)  The 
emergence of mind is contingent upon interaction between the 
human organism and its social environment; it is through 
participation in the social act of communication that the 
individual realizes their potential for significantly 
symbolic behavior, that is, thought and therefore 
spirituality. (Various n.d.)  The interaction between the 
human organism and its architectural environment also 
inheres in his naturalized spirituality.   
 Mead‟s concept of the social act is relevant, not only 
to his theory of mind, but to all facets of his social 
philosophy. His theory of “mind, self, and society” is, in 
effect, a philosophy of the act from the standpoint of a 
social process involving the interaction of many 
individuals, just as his theory of knowledge and value is a 
philosophy of the act from the standpoint of the 
experiencing individual in interaction with an environment. 
(Cronk 2005)  Mead argued that we are objects first to other 
people, and secondarily we become objects to ourselves by 
taking the perspective of other people. (Various n.d.)  
Again emphasizing the importance of „other people‟ and 
therefore making social interaction, and the environment 
central to the concept of the manifestation of 
„spirituality.‟  “Dewey further insist that even so-called 
private mental experiences is always more than 
psychologistic privacy.  For experience is always the 
„interaction of an organism [itself always more than a 
mental subject] with its environment, an environment that is 
human as well as physical, that includes the materials of 
tradition and institutions as well as local surroundings.‟  
Our most private thoughts are always in a language that is 
shared and public, just as our sensory experience is to some 
extent shared since it rests on a physiological but 
linguistically and culturally inflected „constitution [more 
or less] common to all normal individuals‟ in the culture.” 
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(Shusterman 2000)  Our materialized environment then, in 
conjunction with culture, inheres in our experiences.   
 In order to better understand what Mead means perhaps 
it‟s helpful to know more about Mead.  Dewey, a fellow 
pragmatic philosopher, said of Mead: “There was no division 
in his philosophy between doing, reflection and feeling, 
because there was none in himself.  The individual mind, the 
conscious self, was to him the world of nature first taken 
up into social relations and then dissolved to form a new 
self which then went forth to recreate the world of nature 
and social institutions.  He would never have felt this idea 
so deeply and so centrally if it had not been such a 
complete embodiment of the depth and fullness of his own 
personality in all its human and social relations to others.  
The integrity and the continuing development of George 
Mead's philosophy is the natural and unforced expression of 
his own native being.” (Dewey, George Herbert Mead 1931)  
Here Dewey portrays Mead in a manner that appears to 
exemplify an important aspect of a „spiritual‟ individual.   
 Correspondingly, the Chinese have a similar 
understanding in their concept of self as a social 
construction.  In Confucianism, self is determined by 
„sustained effort‟ (zhong) in „deferential transactions‟ 
(shu) guided by „ritually structured roles and relations‟ 
(li) that protect one‟s person outward into society and into 
culture.  Such a person becomes a focus of the „community‟s 
deference‟ (junzi) and a source of its „spirituality‟ 
(shen). (Ames and Hall 2004)  Similarly, “the central focus 
of the Daoist way of thinking is the decisive role of 
deference in the establishment and preservation of 
relationships.” (Ames and Hall 2004)  As we have seen, this 
social conceptualization can also be likened to the course 
of oriental aesthetics in general.  Later, we will use this 
knowledge to understand „religious‟ and „sacred‟ 
architecture.   
These abovementioned modes of thinking about the social 
conception of spirituality through social interaction and 
relationships bear some significance into the idea of a 
„citizen.‟  I believe the concept of citizen has a spiritual 
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undertone.  In ancient Greece to be a citizen ultimately 
meant to belong to a polis – a city.  It is worth noting 
that the term polis denotes the tangible presence of 
edifices as much as it does a political agency.  To be truly 
human, one had to be an active citizen to the community, 
which Aristotle famously expressed: “To take no part in the 
running of the community's affairs is to be either a beast 
or a god!”  A citizen should work towards the betterment of 
their community through economic participation, public 
service, volunteer work, and other such efforts to improve 
life for all citizens. (Various n.d.)  If one to epitomize 
the concept of a citizen then surely they must want to be a 
citizen.  Therefore, one must experience a certain social 
conception of self, a binding with others, and meaning.  If 
they do, I think they will be inspired to give back to the 
greater whole; therein, spirituality can manifest.  Citizens 
here are more than merely tax payers, or consumers, as are 
the majority of „citizens‟ in our modern age.  The emphasis 
on „place‟ here will also bear grave importance into our 
phenomenological foundation.   
Self Conception: 
Lastly, in so much as spirituality is a personal, 
inward facing endeavor.  Hegel insists on the 
“strenuousness” of the realization of spirit.  Just as with 
the aesthetic, spirituality is a process.  The „self‟ is a 
process, and „spirituality‟ is the process of transforming 
the self – self-consciously – via the thoughtfulness of 
self-reflection.  Likewise, Mead believes, “the self is 
something which has a development; it is not initially 
there, at birth, but arises in the process of social 
experience and activity, that is, develops in the given 
individual as a result of his relations to that process as a 
whole and to other individuals within that process.” (Mead 
1944)  He believes the self is a reflective process, and 
thereby denotes the passage of time.  If time passes mustn‟t 
one dwell for the duration?  Wouldn‟t the character of this 
environment then influence the „self‟ which transpires?  
Winston Churchill is accredited with making the all-too-
familiar statement that we shape our buildings; thereafter 
they shape us.  We will address this phenomenon, and its 
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implications on naturalized spirituality in greater depth, 
in the ensuing section on “Dwelling.”   
As you may recall, in the abstract I stated that I 
believed that the issues of spirituality and architecture 
had wide-ranging influence.  Not only internalized in the 
individual, but all the way to the environment at large.  
The Daodejing, a Chinese canon, illustrates why the 
addressing of self is so crucial to the successful 
realization of spirituality quite succinctly:   
Cultivate it in your person, 
And the character you develop will be 
genuine; 
 
Cultivate it in your family, 
And its character will be abundant; 
 
Cultivate it in your village, 
And its character will be enduring; 
 
Cultivate it in the state, 
And its character will flourish; 
 
Cultivate it in the world, 
And its character will be all-pervading.   
 
       - Daodejing; Chapter 54 
       (Ames & Hall Translation) 
 The Daodejing, in speaking of the cultivation of 
personal character extending through social and political 
institutions, alludes to an important notion worth 
expounding upon nevertheless.  Interpreting this passage 
broadly (as a Daoist would advocate) it tells me that 
effective cultivation of one‟s personal disposition 
encourages growth, and has the potential for enduring 
consequences.  Therefore, in turn, we could conclude that a 
failure to do such would have disadvantageous results; both 
on the individual, and the world at large.  As such, one who 
chooses to pursue the vocation of architecture 
unquestionably has an immense responsibility upon their 
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shoulders.  Herein, I am specifically advocating for the 
spiritual cultivation of the architect in their personal 
character, but the same cultivation is also achievable in 
the character of the buildings they design with the same 
lingering ramifications.  A house is more than a home to a 
family; its character will be „all-pervading.‟ 
Spiritual cultivation, especially for an architect, is 
none other than a cultivation in the aesthetic perception.  
Similar to my objective, the Daodejing enjoins us to 
cultivate those habits of awareness that allow us to plumb 
and appreciate the magic of the ordinary and the everyday. 
(Ames and Hall 2004)  It endorses an awareness; a 
comprehensive, processual view of experience that requires a 
full understanding of the larger picture. (Ames and Hall 
2004)  Likewise, it also advocates the cultivation of 
personal excellence as the starting point in world-making 
and in enhancing the ethos of the cosmos. (Ames and Hall 
2004)  Similarly, Dewey also advocates aesthetic cultivation 
with a comparable sense of holism.  I believe that these are 
the essential keys to the manifestation of spirituality and 
formation of spiritually conducive architecture.   
Yet, the Daodejing addresses cultivation as personal 
excellence on a variety of fronts, and doesn‟t specifically 
focus its content on the perception of the experience 
afforded by the aesthetic parse.  I am only interested in 
cultivation in the aesthetic perception, and for this reason 
the Daodejing is not the best resource.  John Dewey‟s 
aesthetic pragmatism in Art as Experience does provide us 
with the insight necessary to capitalize upon a spiritual 
experience in these regards.  Interestingly enough, Dewey‟s 
aesthetic pragmatism does bear a striking resemblance to 
some aspects of the Daodejing for I believe Dewey‟s notion 
of “an experience” is analogous to the Chinese notion of 
Dao.  Furthermore, it is also likened to another oriental 
tenet, and that is Zen in Japan.  However so, it should be 
noted that Zen, Dao, and pragmatism, Eastern and Western 
aesthetics, are many-sided.  Each contains diverse, and 
sometimes contrary attitudes.  Much depends on which 
interpreters of each theory one reads.  So too, much depends 
on the individuals conception.    
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Spirituality; Varied Ideological Conceptions: 
hus far we have not addressed spirituality and 
architecture in all too much detail pertaining to 
theological contentions.  We only briefly mentioned 
the oriental theology which is so central to oriental 
aesthetic conceptions which I believe are most prominent to 
our conception of „spiritual architecture.‟  What about 
Western theology and its aesthetic conceptions?  We can now 
discern that the theological ornament which religious 
architecture relies heavily upon to ascertain its spiritual 
effect is none other than the subjects perception invested 
in that object through their unique experience of it.  
Furthermore, we can guesstimate that theology might 
contradict with naturalized spirituality, but just how so?  
“Henry Adams made it clear that the theology of the middle 
ages is a construction of the same intent as that which 
wrought the cathedrals.” (Dewey 1934)  Even Nietzsche 
believes “if men had never built houses for gods, 
architecture would still be in its infancy.  Task self-
imposed on the strength of false assumptions (e.g. soul 
separable from body) have given rise to the highest forms of 
culture.  „Truths‟ lack the power to motivate in this way.” 
(Nietzsche 1980)   
John Dewey continues in that, “this middle age, 
popularly deemed to express the acme of Christian faith in 
the western world, is a demonstration of the power of sense 
to absorb the most highly spiritualized ideas.” (Dewey 1934)  
Architecture, as all arts, were handmaidens of religion, as 
much as were science and scholarship.  “The arts hardly had 
a being outside of the church, and the rites and ceremonies 
of the church were arts enacted under conditions that gave 
them the maximum possible of emotional and imaginative 
appeal.” (Dewey 1934)  Dewey wonders what manifestation of 
the arts could provide a more poignant surrender than the 
conviction that they were informed with the necessary means 
of eternal glory and bliss.  “The elevation of the ideal 
above and beyond immediate sense has operated not only to 
make it pallid and bloodless, but it has acted, like a 
conspirator with the sensual mind, to impoverish and degrade 
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all things of direct experience.” (Dewey 1934)  As such, 
theology can be seen as a true detriment to our 
„naturalized‟ conception of spirituality.   
Theological Conception: 
Max Weber also weighs in on „spirituality,‟ and the 
dialectic between the dogma of theology and the unabridged 
engagement of this life.  He states that theology goes 
further than the basic assumption that the world is 
meaningful, and through revelations as facts relevant to 
salvation serve as information for conditions and actions 
which then enables one to lead a religiously meaningful 
life.  It seems that for Weber one can than go one of two 
routes.  One can sacrifice the intellect to reconcile the 
tensions between the spheres of the value of science and of 
the theology of religion to become a positively religious 
man in the transcendental realm of the mystical life; or one 
can reengage the world via the brotherhood of immediate 
personal relationships between individuals and the knowledge 
that it contributes something which cannot be lost to a 
realm above the personal whose worth is no more greater with 
the inclusion of religious interpretations. (M. Weber 1989)  
Therefore, like Dewey, Weber‟s advocating a „natural‟ self-
fulfilling manner of „religious‟ participation over some 
form of transcendental mystical „religious‟ participation.   
Religious Conception: 
Religion, similar to spirituality, also has different 
degrees of employment ranging from peoples beliefs and 
opinions concerning the existence, nature and worship of 
God, a god, or gods, and divine involvement in the universe 
and human life; to simply a set of strongly-held attitudes 
that somebody lives by. (Encarta Dictionary 2009)  
Additionally, religion, according to popular etymology among 
the later Western ancients (and many modern writers) 
connects with religare; “to bind fast” (see rely), via the 
notion of to “place an obligation on.” (Harper 2001)  I 
believe it is the first „divine‟ utilization of the 
aforesaid definition for religion which we often refer too – 
say if, someone were to ask, “Are you religious?”  However, 
 59 
The Spirituality 
I will be leaning toward the latter of the two in that 
religion is not dependent upon the existence of a God or 
gods, but manifest as a binding of objects – be they animate 
or inanimate – so long as their status is befitting of the 
assumption of obligation.  William James defined religion 
simply as “the feelings, acts, and experiences of 
individuals in their solitude, so far as they apprehend 
themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may 
consider the divine.” (James 2010)  We will come to 
understand what in architecture is befitting of obligation, 
and what is not in the ensuing sections.  I am thereby 
petitioning for spiritualities manifestation as more of an 
act in the here-and-now, rather than a supernatural 
forsaking of the material and worldly.  Equally important is 
the notion of the „obligation‟ placed upon experiences which 
thereby inspire them to be enthusiastic, passionate, 
devoted, and furthermore motivation to aspire; but above 
all, embody meaning.   
What I find problematic with the assertion of a 
religion as a type of divine worship is that religion then 
bares the additional burdens and unfortunate byproducts of 
various theological institutions; that is to say dogmatism, 
obscurantism, fundamentalism, and even fanaticism. (Comte-
Sponville 2006)  Max Weber believes that we, in the West, 
are blind to everyday life by a thousand years of 
orientation towards the sublime pathos of the Christian 
ethic.  Stating that “what is difficult for modern man, and 
most difficult of all for the younger generation, is to meet 
the demands of such an everyday life.  All hunting for 
„experience‟ stems from this weakness, for not to be able to 
look the destiny of the time full in the face is a 
weakness.” (M. Weber 1989)  I would have to concur in that 
the capacity of our act should emphasize the everyday.  
“„Spirituality‟ is a much broader concept than the rather 
specialized notion of „religion.‟  Despite the glib 
exclusivity of too many religious demagogues who insist that 
spirituality is synonymous with their (and only their) 
religion or sect, there are many meanings as well as modes 
of „spirituality‟ and no „religion‟ has an exclusive or even 
a special right to consider itself the true path to 
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spirituality.” (Solomon 2002)  Or as André Comte-Sponville 
so eloquently put it, “The human spirit is far too important 
a matter to be left up to priests, mullahs, or 
spiritualists.” (Comte-Sponville 2006) 
Sacred Conception: 
In order to further distance „naturalized spirituality‟ 
from the fully amplified notion of „religion,‟ and to better 
understand spiritualities association with architecture, I 
don‟t want to further digress into the exceedingly complex 
notions and debates on „religion‟ or „religious 
architecture.‟  As such, one last association – or rather 
disassociation – I should make in the onset is between 
spiritual architecture and sacred architecture.  It is 
imperative I make this distinction as these two terms are 
perhaps the most commonly interchanged terms with respects 
to architecture, and in being such are also the most 
commonly misunderstood.  Therefore, this will hopefully 
paint a clearer picture of what spiritual architecture is, 
or more so – is not – about.  The foremost differentiation 
between these two is their relationship – and un-
relationship – with religion.  Simply put, where sacred 
architecture ceases to permeate our lives; spiritual 
architecture does not.  Spiritual architecture can be 
witnessed in a cathedral insomuch as it can be witnessed in 
a house.  The following will illustrate this concept.  
Jeanne Halgren Kilde, in her book Sacred Power, Sacred 
Space; An Introduction to Christian Architecture and 
Worship, mentions that “religious space is dynamic space.  
Religious spaces house religious ritual, of course, but they 
do far more than simply provide the setting within which 
ritual takes place.  They contribute in important ways to 
the very meaning of ritual practices and to the shape and 
content of religious systems themselves.” (Kilde 2008)  She 
couldn‟t be more right of “religious space”, and this is 
precisely where the separation between sacred architecture 
and spiritual architecture occurs for both have „religious 
space,‟ but sacred architecture takes it one step too far in 
the theological direction for our purposes.   
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However, if I wanted to bring her definition toward the 
spiritual, I would substitute the word „ritual‟ for the word 
„tradition;‟ thereby taking the activity within the space 
away from a more established formal behavior (commonly 
associated with theological dogma) to simply a custom or 
belief (commonly associated with long-established actions of 
a community, group of people, family, or even individual).  
I could also substitute the word „ritual‟ for the Chinese 
word li which would in fact be closer to spirituality than 
is „tradition‟.  “The Chinese notion of li beautifully 
defines this notion of ritual.  Ritual is not merely 
something one does (that is, just going through the motions) 
but rather something one lives, and involves everyday 
actions and not only special services and sacraments.” 
(Solomon 2002)  Here we can see the connection with the 
aesthetic.  Furthermore, this differentiation between 
“ritual” and “tradition” also bares some meaning to the 
differentiation between “sacred” and “spiritual” 
respectively.   
Jeanne Kilde then continues with the definition of 
“religious space” by using the example of a Christian 
Church:  
Church buildings influence worship 
practices, facilitating some activities and 
impeding others. They focus the attention of 
believers on the divine, and they frequently 
mediate the relationship between the individual 
and God. They change with religious activities 
over time. They contribute to the formation and 
maintenance of internal relationships within 
congregations. They designate hierarchy and they 
demarcate community, serving a multiplicity of 
users with a host of objectives. They teach 
insiders and outsiders about Christianity, and 
they convey messages about the religious group 
housed in the building to the community at 
large. Indeed, church buildings are dynamic 
agents in the construction, development, and 
persistence of Christianity itself. (Kilde 2008)   
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Now without getting into topics such as how successful 
Church buildings are in doing such, or even the complex 
motives preceding their formation; she is right, “this 
dynamic character renders religious space a particularly 
complex subject.” (Kilde 2008)  Although, we have already 
learned that it is not the buildings that convey, but the 
people who do.  Thus she says, “The diversity among types of 
church buildings; their multiple functions and various 
users; their embedded layers of religious, social, and 
cultural meaning; and their tendency to change dramatically 
over time create real challenges for those who wish to 
augment their understanding…” (Kilde 2008)   
Dewey believes that “the shift from compartmentally 
isolated and independent objects to their role and their 
history in experience provides a better base for 
accommodating the complex socio-historical contextuality of 
art.  Since the work cannot be logically severed either from 
its original generation in the experience world of its 
creator or from its varied and changing reception in the 
experience of others, both its original socio-historical 
conditioning and the subsequent mutations of its 
interpretation and evaluation become pertinent to its 
meaning and value.  Thus the work‟s meaning and value can 
indeed change with the changing realities and practices that 
condition our experience of it.” (Shusterman 2000)  We only 
need note that everything Klide speaks of is at the far most 
remove from „universal,‟ and therefore a „naturalized‟ 
conception of spirituality.  According to Weber “all 
theology is the intellectual rationalization of the 
possession of what is sacred.”  Theology goes further than 
the basic assumption that the world is meaningful and 
through revelations as facts relevant to salvation serve as 
information for conditions and actions which then enables 
one to lead a religiously meaningful life. (M. Weber 1989)  
Herein, we witness the theological/natural divide.   
„Sacred architecture‟ bears one more great distinction 
from „spiritual architecture,‟ and that is its association 
with the worlds organized religions which I have been 
persistently distancing „spirituality‟ from.  That is to say 
spiritual architecture can be akin to, but doesn‟t have to 
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be, sacred architecture.  Holm and Bowker, in their book 
Sacred Architecture, point out that among the most visible 
aspects of religions are those sacred edifices either built 
as ritual arenas, or by association with history and myths 
or a religion.  They believe there is a religious tendency 
of „sacralizing‟ historical sites where the faithful engage 
in a kind of participation with the past as part of worship 
itself, an imaginative involvement. (Holm and Bowker 1994)  
Sacred architecture involves political issues, and other 
aspects of competition for power among religious groups. 
(Holm and Bowker 1994)  They also share the fact of 
stressing links with their founder, or other important 
figure in the history of their religion; such as association 
with the belief in appearances of religious personalities. 
(Holm and Bowker 1994)  Furthermore, they are even said to 
represent the center of the universe as „meeting points 
between heaven and earth,‟ „a point of junction between 
earth, heaven, and hell, the navel of earth, a meeting place 
for the tree cosmic regions,‟ etc…  (Holm and Bowker 1994)  
Sacred architecture also serves as tools in spreading faith 
in missionary movements; often replacing local sacred places 
belonging to earlier and indigenous religious traditions. 
(Holm and Bowker 1994)  Herein, sacred architecture, in its 
„birthing‟ and „intentions,‟ couldn‟t be further from 
naturalized spiritual architecture.   
Nevertheless, sacred architectures dissociation from 
spirituality is not lost on everyone.  Douglas Daves also 
points out in the book Sacred Architecture that religions 
aren‟t always happy with the consequences of possessing 
sacred places.  “In fact there is a very real tension 
present in many religious traditions, deploring the fact 
that devotees may place more emphasis on the physical place 
than upon its spiritual significance.  A clear Sikh example 
comes in the writings of Guru Nanak.  In his own day he 
decried the use of pilgrimages to sacred places, arguing 
that genuine pilgrimage was a kind of internal journey, a 
matter of the heart.  Daves highlights a very similar 
picture already existed in Buddhism where the Buddha 
deplored pilgrimage as a worthless activity.” (Holm and 
Bowker 1994)  This statement begs the question, “What is a 
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places spiritual significance?”  Daves begins to allude to a 
truly „spiritual‟ answer by saying, “In terms of religious 
studies one of the advantages of central sacred sites of 
pilgrimage is that they lead to a mixing of the many 
cultural diversities among devotees…” (Holm and Bowker 1994)  
Thereby, Daves actually reinforces one of the important 
aspects of naturalized spirituality, and that is the social 
dimension.    
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Spirituality; a Deweyan Conception: 
hus far I have minimized my inclusion of John Dewey‟s 
conceptions of religion and spirituality into my 
discussion of spirituality.  As I am sure is evident 
by now I have not excluded Dewey because his beliefs do not 
rival mine, rather because introducing them now will serve 
to further reinforce my positioning, and our bridging of 
spirituality with pragmatist aesthetics.  Furthermore, 
Michael Eldridge in his book Transforming Experience; 
Dewey’s Cultural Instrumentalism, points out that Dewey did 
not attach much importance to religion as a philosophical 
problem, nor did he reject the religious in experience 
completely.  He found something of value within the cultural 
heritage of his audience, and attempted to build on this in 
ways that accorded with his own secular, or naturalistic, 
approach. (Eldridge 1998)  It also seems to me that Dewey 
conceived of religion from a mildly reactionary stance.  By 
that I mean Dewey addressed religion, and its associated 
concepts and terms, with a motive to dispel his beliefs as 
situated through a disposition largely influenced by the 
context in which he wrote, and his upbringing.  Therefore, 
more important that dispelling Dewey‟s notions on religion 
as a formal doctrine, is gaining a deeper understanding for 
his general religious attitude which has the most bearing on 
his pragmatist aestheticism.   
Spirituality Deweyized:   
As we have already mentioned, “One of the most central 
features of Dewey‟s aesthetics is its somatic naturalism.  
The first chapter of Art as Experience is entitled „The Live 
Creature‟; and like all the subsequent chapters, it is 
dedicated to rooting aesthetics in the natural needs, 
constitution, and activities of the human organism.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  Dewey aims at, “recovering the continuity 
of esthetic experience with normal process of living.” 
(Dewey 1934)  Although Dewey may disagree about the use of 
labels, I believe his „religious attitude‟ is highly 
synonymous with my notion of „naturalized spirituality.‟  As 
such, Dewey becomes an excellent source for providing 
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further clarification into what constitutes a „spiritual 
experience‟ by building upon his notion of „an experience.‟  
This is not only due to the similarities between our two 
approaches, but also because Dewey elaborates upon the 
notion of experience in general, and thereby provides us 
with a universal notion of the aesthetic.   
 Eldridge emphasizes that Dewey was insistent that his 
„religious attitude‟ was talking about the quality of 
experience rather than a separable experience. (Eldridge 
1998)  “Unlike the religious liberals, who „hold to the 
notion that there is a definite kind of experience which is 
itself religious,‟ one „that is marked off form experience 
as aesthetic, scientific, moral, political,‟ Dewey held that 
the „religious‟ is „a quality of experience‟ that „signifies 
something that may belong to all these experiences.  It is 
the polar opposite of some type of experience that can exist 
by itself.‟” (Eldridge 1998)  In Dewey‟s proposal the 
„religious‟ is a quality of these various sorts of 
activities, and a certain way or manner in which one 
conducts oneself. (Eldridge 1998)  “For Dewey, art is a 
qualitative mode of experience rather than a substantive 
kind or compartmental category of experience.  „Art is a 
quality that permeates an experience; it is not, save by a 
figure of speech, the experience itself.‟  Dewey just as 
often speaks of art as „a quality of action‟ or „a quality 
of activity.‟” (Shusterman 2000)  To put Dewey‟s proposal in 
the context of „naturalized spirituality‟ it implicates a 
particular quality to a „mode of being.‟   
 “Dewey was very clear about what distinguished a 
religious practice or attitude from a nonreligious one.  The 
religious was the pervasive adjustment of the self and 
environment.” (Eldridge 1998)  Dewey spoke of “faith” rather 
than “spirituality,” avoiding the otherworldly connotations 
of the latter term. (Eldridge 1998)  Dewey also believed 
spirituality was prospective. (Eldridge 1998)  I, however, 
do not believe spirituality to be so limited as to address 
only potential occurrences, and neither would Dewey if 
asked.  I have already gone through painstaking lengths to 
address a particular form of „naturalized spirituality‟ 
which would remedy Dewey‟s hesitation to use the term.  As 
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such, it is mostly important to reinforce that for Dewey the 
religious involved a proper appreciation of one‟s place in 
the universe, as well as a self-transforming commitment to 
inclusive ideals, and that the unreligious attitude is that 
which attributes human purpose to man in isolation from the 
world of physical nature and his fellows. (Eldridge 1998)  
This emphasis on contextual understanding is a partial 
characterization of the religious. (Eldridge 1998)  It is 
also a characterization of the spiritual-aesthetic 
experience.  Furthermore, the religious for Dewey – as 
spirituality for me – occurs in the heightened, widened way 
one goes about living. (Eldridge 1998)  The case studies 
will shed light on this aspect of living through their 
varied architectonic forms and characteristics.   
 Dewey explicitly connected art and religion. (Eldridge 
1998)  Eldridge sites two passages in Art as Experience 
where Dewey discusses “the unified pervasive quality of an 
experience … that … binds together all the defined elements, 
the objects of which we are focally aware, making them 
whole.”  It is this “sense of an extensive and underlying 
whole” that provides coherence, yet the setting for any 
particular experience is at its outer edges “indeterminate.” 
(Eldridge 1998)  “A work of art elicits and accentuates this 
quality of being a whole and of belonging to the larger, 
all-inclusive, whole which is the universe in which we 
live.” (Eldridge 1998)  At times of “intense esthetic 
perception,” Dewey thought, this sense of a whole can be a 
“religious feeling”:  “We are, as it were, introduced into a 
world beyond this world which is nevertheless the deeper 
reality of the world in which we live in our ordinary 
experiences.  We are carried out beyond ourselves to find 
ourselves.” (Eldridge 1998)  Indeed, our sanity depends on 
this sense of connectedness, “for the mad, the insane, thing 
to us is that which is torn from the common context and 
which stands alone and isolated, as anything must which 
occurs in a world totally different from ours.” (Eldridge 
1998)  As we will see with phenomenology in the “Dwelling” 
section „identification‟ which hinders „gathering‟ is 
counter conductive to „dwelling;‟ in short, isolation breeds 
alienation.   
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 Dewey believed art is the extension of the power of 
rites and ceremonies to unite men, through a shared 
celebration, to all incidents and scenes of life.  Art weds 
man and nature and renders men aware of their union with one 
another in origin and destiny. (Dewey 1934)  Dewey seems to 
have almost completely transferred the religious function to 
the aesthetic. (Eldridge 1998)  For Dewey the religious is 
not a distinct experience.  It functions as a condition 
within intelligent behavior to sustain those who would 
“foresee and regulate future objects.” (Dewey 1934)  “To be 
religious is to persist and grow in one‟s intelligent 
actions by the means of an awareness of a very wide 
context.” (Eldridge 1998)  I believe Dewey‟s notion of the 
religiousness that can be found in the quality of an 
experience when the contextual connectedness accentuates a 
sense of wholeness through intense aesthetic perception 
exemplifies our notion of naturalized spirituality.  
Furthermore, Dewey‟s pragmatist aesthetic experience 
provides an excellent avenue to begin addressing a 
spirituality, and its association with an experience of 
architecture.   
 “Experience,” Dewey tells us, “is emotional but there 
are no separate things called emotions in it.”  (Jackson 
1998)  As we have seen the realization of spirituality too 
is also one part emotional.  Emotions are qualities, when 
they are significant, of a complex experience that moves and 
changes. (Jackson 1998)  We never experience an emotion 
divorced from its context.  We undergo each emotion in 
connection with particular circumstances. (Jackson 1998)  
Dewey tells us that emotion becomes so impregnated with the 
uniqueness that is each and every situation that it in fact 
becomes ineffable.  More importantly, though emotions 
fluctuate in response to changed conditions, they also serve 
to unify experience. (Jackson 1998)  “Dewey wants us to 
understand that emotional unity is fundamentally aesthetic.  
It gives experience an aesthetic quality even when the tenor 
of the experience is not predominately aesthetic.  Thus, all 
normally complete experiences may be said to have aesthetic 
quality.” (Jackson 1998)  “Without the emotional cement 
about caring for outcomes, without that sense of engagement, 
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the experience would lack unity and would fail to be an 
experience in the fullest sense of the term.” (Jackson 1998)  
Dewey points out, “even a crude experience, if authentically 
an experience, is more fit to give a clue to the intrinsic 
nature of esthetic experiences than is an object already set 
apart from any other mode of experience.” (Dewey 1934)  
Furthermore, “the introduction of emotional satisfaction 
does not render an experience necessarily private or 
entirely subjective.  Indeed, such heightened experiences 
are frequently remembered not only as shared but because 
they are shared.” (Shusterman 2000)  He further reinforces 
our socio-spiritual conceptions.   
Van Meter Ames, a proponent of Dewey‟s, gives an 
accurate assessment of Dewey which is worth quoting at 
length for he too believes harm comes when the attempt is 
made to put art (or architecture) on a metaphysical level to 
deny art (and architectures) honest basis in human toil and 
aspiration.  Then art (and architecture) is cut off from 
morality and responsibility; the role of art (and 
architecture) is deleted from the complex drama of human 
progress. (V. M. Ames, John Dewey as Aesthetician 1953): 
  For Dewey, the incompleteness and evil of the 
world does not imply a superior Absolute realm; but 
the opportunity and freedom, as well as need, to 
live and grow in the kind of experience which can 
become aesthetic; because our world leaves room for 
creative activity, and permits the kind of 
satisfaction that takes time and effort, with the 
chance of failure. Dewey would agree that ignorance 
accounts for much of man's trouble; but not 
ignorance of an Absolute; rather, of the relative 
nature of the only reality experienced. His whole 
effort has been pitted against the cleavage in our 
culture, between actual life and its supposed 
antithesis in an Absolute where true wisdom and 
happiness reside.  For Dewey wholeness and coherence 
are the human achievement of aesthetic experience. 
Their extension to the universe is illegitimate, 
unless as an act of imagination whereby the universe 
itself is regarded as if it were a man-made whole, a 
 70 
The Spirituality 
work of art. Then to turn back and depreciate an 
earthly situation by comparison, is to delude 
oneself. Instead of trying to measure morality and 
well-being “in terms of proximity to the Absolute,” 
…, Dewey would gauge them according to criteria 
found within the shifting human scene; where we 
learn, by doing, to improve our ways of cooking, of 
making, of thinking and living together, as best we 
can. (V. M. Ames, John Dewey as Aesthetician 1953)   
Dewey believed that “the esthetic is no intruder in 
experience from without, whether by way of idle luxury or 
transcendent ideality, but that it is the clarified and 
intensified development of traits that belong to every 
normally complete experience.”(Dewey 1934)  “These qualities 
are most clearly seen in the esthetic experience, but they 
are not confined to that.  Indeed, the point is that we can 
have these „consummatory‟ experiences at many times and 
places in our lives.  They are not confined to special 
realms or moments, nor do they originate in other worlds.  
They come within life as we live it.” (Eldridge 1998)  “This 
is the sort of experience that Dewey thought we value – and 
is possible here and now without divine intervention or 
special states of consciousness.” (Eldridge 1998)  Dewey 
also believed that understanding fine art in terms of vivid 
experience rather than static objects does better justice to 
the dynamic power and moving spirit which makes art so 
captivatingly alive and enlivening for aesthetic experience, 
even of the contemplation of so-called static arts, is 
always a temporally moving process of doing and undergoing 
where experience is developed cumulatively and brought to 
fulfillment; and where the perceiver, like the creative 
artist, is captured and pushed forward to that fulfillment 
through his own engaged, contributing energies which find 
satisfaction and increases vitality through being so engaged 
and absorbed. (Shusterman 2000)  Now, through the “Dwelling” 
and “Study” sections we will see just how a „Deweyan 
conception‟ of naturalized spirituality is evermore 
obtainable in, and about, architecture.   
Section IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  
Dwelling  
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Architecture & Spirituality;  
a Phenomenological Foundation:   
lthough John Dewey and his pragmatist aesthetic 
philosophy may evade architectural discourse a 
philosopher often recognized by architectural theorist 
is continental phenomenologist Martin Heidegger, and so to 
Heidegger we turn.  In doing so I hope to effectively bridge 
from Heidegger‟s phenomenology to Dewey‟s pragmatist 
aesthetics as I believe they have a great deal in common.  
While Heidegger had no bearing on pragmatist philosophy he 
did come under scrutiny from the analytic philosophers, and 
thereby – through the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend” – becomes an important resource in this project.  It 
is fitting to begin with Martin Heidegger, and his 
conception of dwelling, for a few important reasons.  Fore 
mostly, he elaborates upon what it is to dwell; which so 
happens to be one of the most utilized, and subsequently 
misconstrued words in current architectural dialogue.  
Heidegger‟s implication of dwelling then begins to open the 
door toward an ideological avenue for the addressing of 
architectures association with naturalized spirituality, and 
John Dewey‟s pragmatist aesthetics.  Lastly, the conception 
of dwelling will have some implications onto the case 
studies.  Furthermore, it should also be noted that 
Heidegger‟s philosophy was deeply rooted in rural German 
culture (the Black Forest to be exact), and thereby we come 
to another important notion ingrained in Heidegger‟s 
philosophy which bears a direct relationship with 
naturalized spirituality; and that is the emphasis on the 
importance of „place.‟   
The Plight of Dwelling: 
Martin Heidegger wrote his essay Building Dwelling 
Thinking from a time (1951) when Europe was in ruins 
undergoing post-war reconstruction.  Baring that in mind, he 
concludes his essay in asking, “What is the state of 
dwelling in our precarious age?” (Heidegger 1954)  He 
concedes that while the architectural enterprise – and with 
good reason – was addressing the housing shortage by 
A 
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promoting the building of houses that the “real plight of 
dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses.  The real 
plight of dwelling is indeed older than the world wars with 
their destruction, older also than the increase of the 
earth's population and the condition of the industrial 
workers.  The real dwelling plight lies in this, that 
mortals ever search anew for the nature of dwelling, that 
they must ever learn to dwell.” (Heidegger 1954)  “What if,” 
ask Heidegger, “man's homelessness consisted in this, that 
man still does not even think of the real plight of dwelling 
as the plight?  Yet as soon as man gives thought to his 
homelessness, it is a misery no longer.  Rightly considered 
and kept well in mind, it is the sole summons that calls 
mortals into their dwelling.  But how else can mortals 
answer this summons than by trying on their part, on their 
own, to bring dwelling to the fullness of its nature?  This 
they accomplish when they build out of dwelling, and think 
for the sake of dwelling.” (Heidegger 1954)  Therein, 
Heidegger alludes to some fundamental concepts for the idea 
of dwelling that will inevitably bear great significance 
upon of the association of naturalized spirituality with 
architecture.   
Similarly, Karsten Harries, in more recent times, also 
addresses the „plight of dwelling;‟ albeit in a somewhat 
varied manner.  He believes that, “architecture will have a 
future only if the place once occupied by temple and church 
can in some sense be reoccupied.” (Harries 1997)  Harries 
also draws on Heidegger and confers that, “the problem of 
dwelling is not architectural but ethical.”  The term 
„ethical‟ does not signal the „tainted‟ sort of moralism, 
but is used with the meaning it has in the Hegelian 
expression „ethical life.‟ (Graham 2003)  “Architecture does 
have an ethical function, but on its own it cannot supply 
radical cultural deficiency.  In the end, the ethical life 
it expresses and represents is not its own, but that of the 
society in which it functions.” (Graham 2003)  This belief 
can find is reverent in the subject/object dialectic and 
socio-spiritual conceptions.  Dewey further insists that the 
final measure of the quality of culture is the arts which 
flourish, while for analytic philosophers the ideal and 
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paradigm of human achievement was, as we have seen, science. 
(Shusterman 2000)   
Furthermore, “Harries does not think the prospects for 
modernity are especially bright; monument and theatre, 
possibly the shopping mall – „each of these building task 
holds some promise, but not one of them nor all together can 
take the place of the temple and church.” (Graham 2003)  
“With good reason we have learned to be suspicious of all 
architecture that confidently embraces architecture‟s 
traditional ethic function.  Any architect who today wants 
to address that function has to be aware that he does so 
without any authority, that he is a bit like the fool who 
says what he thinks needs to be said but can only hope that 
others will listen.” (Harries 1997)  In these last two 
paragraphs both Harries, Heidegger, and Dewey are, in their 
own way, focusing on how humans – cognizant beings in the 
environment – have failed to dwell.  How, essentially, 
dwelling has not all too much to do with physical 
structures, but a particular thought process.  They each 
place the ball in the dwellers court – so to speak.  A 
deficiency of dwelling cannot be surmounted by building 
alone.  The notion of dwelling is much more profound and 
bears a great similarity to the realization of naturalized 
spirituality and the culture which it represents.   
Christian Norberg-Schulz, in his seminal book Genius 
Loci; Toward a Phenomenology of Architecture, was perhaps 
the first individual to bring Heidegger‟s phenomenology to 
the forefront of architectural discourse.  In doing so, 
Noreberg-Schulz also provides us with a solid foundation 
with which to base subsequent documentation.  Similar to 
myself and Dewey, he also did not believe that his prior 
theoretical works, which analyzed art and architecture 
“scientifically,” provided him with the most illuminating 
insight into architecture.  He said that, “When we treat 
architecture analytically, we miss the concrete 
environmental character, that is, the very quality which is 
the object of man's identification, and which may give him a 
sense of existential foothold.” (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  In 
short, he believes that the conception of the work of art is 
a “concretization” of a life-situation, and it is one of the 
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basic needs of man to experience his life-situations as 
meaningful, and the purpose of the work of art is to “keep” 
and transmit meanings. (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  This is 
important to bear in mind for it holds a striking 
resemblance to John Dewey‟s contentions of art in Art as 
Experience.  Through these two sources we can realize the 
nature of the association between architecture and 
spirituality.   
The word dwell has many meanings, but perhaps its most 
important definition as it relates to spirituality is that 
offered by Heidegger; again in Building Dwelling Thinking.  
He points out that the Old English and High German word for 
building, baun, meant to dwell, and that it is intimately 
related to the verb to be.  What then does ich bin mean?  
The old word bauen, to which the bin belongs, answers: ich 
bin, do bist, mean: I dwell, you dwell.  The way in which 
you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on 
earth, is baun, dwelling. (Heidegger 1954)  Therefore, 
through Heidegger we can conclude that dwelling, like 
spirituality, is something that exists within – and is 
fundamental to – the human condition.  These two concepts – 
dwelling and spirituality – are in fact interrelated; both 
in their plights, and in their concretized architectural 
manifestations.   
If dwelling is “the manner in which we humans are on 
earth;” what then defines that manner?  Heidegger further 
deduces etymologically and concludes that, “man‟s relation 
to locations, and through locations to spaces, inheres in 
his dwelling.  The relationship between man and space is 
none other than dwelling, strictly thought and spoken.” 
(Heidegger 1954)  “The nature of building is letting dwell.  
Building accomplishes its nature in the raising of locations 
by the joining of their spaces.  Only if we are capable of 
dwelling, only then can we build.” (Heidegger 1954)  
Essentially, Heidegger discerns that one dwells when one is 
properly engaged with one‟s place in the world; which to him 
meant having a sense of the heavens and the earth, gods and 
mortals.  We have to stress that dwelling, above all, 
presupposes identification with the environment. (C. 
Norberg-Schulz 1979)  We have seen how the realization of 
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naturalized spirituality via aesthetics presupposes this 
same identification with the environment; an identification 
with the space.   
The Genius Loci: 
Noreberg-Schulz claims that his conception of an 
“existential foothold” and Martin Heidegger‟s conception of 
“dwelling” are synonyms, and “dwelling,” in an existential 
sense, is the purpose of architecture.  “Man dwells when he 
can orientate himself within and identify himself with an 
environment, or, in short, when he experiences the 
environment as meaningful.” (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  
Dwelling therefore implies something more than “shelter.” 
(C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  The tangible, static concept of 
shelter gives way to the dynamic concept of sheltering. 
(Knowles 2006)  Most importantly, it implies that the spaces 
where life occurs are places, in the true sense of the word, 
and a place is a space which has a distinct character. (C. 
Norberg-Schulz 1979)  Hence, the title of his book “Genius 
Loci,” which translates as “spirit of place.”  Therefore, to 
Norberg-Schulz, architecture means to visualize the genius 
loci, and the task of the architect is to create meaningful 
places, whereby he helps man to dwell. (C. Norberg-Schulz 
1979)  Experiencing meaning derived from the environment is 
also a precursor for naturalized spirituality.  Noreberg-
Schulz further stresses that in creating meaningful places 
the architect cannot forsake the way “similar” functions, 
even the most basic ones such as sleeping and eating, take 
place in very different ways, and demand places with 
different properties, in accordance with different cultural 
traditions and different environmental conditions. (C. 
Norberg-Schulz 1979)  Therefore, the aforementioned 
„binding‟ of the more naturalized version of religion must 
be accounted for in both environment and culture.   
Similarly, Dewey insisted that “art and the aesthetic 
cannot be understood without full appreciation of their 
socio-historical dimensions, an emphasis which reflects his 
Hegelian historicist holism and which aligns his thought 
with the Marxian tradition in continental aesthetics.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  “Dewey then goes on to argue how 
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international capitalism and industrialization have helped 
change art‟s production and reception so as to make are a 
cloistered world of its own.  „The mobility of trade and of 
populations, due to the economic system, has wreaked or 
destroyed the connection between works of art and the genius 
loci of which they were once natural expression.  As works 
of art have lost their indigenous status, they have acquired 
a new one – that of being specimens of fine art and nothing 
else … [which] are now produced, like other articles, for 
sale in the market.‟” (Shusterman 2000)  “Artistic 
production is abandoned to „the impersonality of a world 
market‟ and deprived of „intimate social connection‟ with 
(or even knowledge of) its public.  Hence the artist is 
increasingly marginalized and isolated from „the normal 
flow‟ of society and driven to call attention to her work by 
emphasizing its unique particularity.  Moreover, since our 
society is dominated by mercenary profit, she may well 
regard social isolation as essential for her art and 
necessarily expressed in it.  Art thus becomes still more 
compartmentally specialized, remote, and „esoteric.‟” 
(Shusterman 2000)  Dewey, in speaking of his disdain for the 
effect of capitalism and industrialization on art, has 
placed equal importance upon the preservation of the genius 
loci; one that will reemerge in a very compelling manner in 
the ensuing “Study” section.   
Space & Character: 
Noreberg-Schulz concludes that the phenomenon of place 
need be addressed under the structure of place in terms of 
“landscape” and “settlement,” and analyzed by means of the 
categories “space” and “character.” (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  
For our purposes it is not necessary to reiterate the 
phenomenological implications of the terms “landscape” and 
“settlement.”  They are important to us as they reinforce 
the existential purpose of building (architecture); that is 
to make a site become a place, that is, to uncover the 
meanings potentially present in the given environment. (C. 
Norberg-Schulz 1979)  A concrete term for environment is 
place, and an existential term is lebenswelt - or life-
world.  Place is more than an abstract or static location.  
It is a totality of concrete things having material 
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substance, shape, texture and colour.  Together these things 
determine an “environmental character,” which is the essence 
of place.  A place is a qualitative “total” phenomenon. (C. 
Norberg-Schulz 1979)  Architecture‟s task then is to 
properly account for this „environmental character.‟   
“Space” and “character,” on the other hand, do bear 
great significance into this project.  As we have seen, 
“space” can be – and has been – conceptualized in vastly 
different manners throughout the history of architectural 
aesthetics.  The most important lesson to derive from 
Noreberg-Schulz is that spaces, as Heidegger said, “receive 
their being from locations and not from „space.‟” (C. 
Norberg-Schulz 1979)  “„Character‟ is at the same time a 
more general and a more concrete concept than „space.‟  On 
one hand it denotes a general comprehensive atmosphere, and 
on the other a the concrete form and substance of the space-
defining elements.  Any real presence is intimately linked 
with a character.” (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  Herein, „space‟ 
and „character‟ become two very important tools for the 
realization of spirituality via architectural manifestations 
for if these aren‟t respected properly it will be hard to 
generate meaning; let alone spirituality.   
All places have character, and Noreberg-Schulz further 
identifies this character as being “given” or “made.”  To 
understand a building from a “given” phenomenological point 
of view we have to consider how it rest on the ground and 
how it rises toward the sky.  The “given” character is 
determined by the material and formal constitution of the 
place.  After all, phenomenology was conceived as a “return 
to things.”  Thus Heidegger said: “A thing gathers world.”  
The word “thing” originally meant a gathering, and the 
meaning of anything consists in what it gathers. (C. 
Norberg-Schulz 1979)  In Heidegger's words: “The thing 
things world,” where “thinging” is used in the original 
sense of "gathering", and further: “Only what conjoins 
itself out of world becomes a thing.” (Heidegger, Poetry, 
Language, Thought 1971)  The “made” character is that which 
is determined by technical realization (“building”).  
Heidegger points out that the Greek word techne meant a 
creative “re-vealing” (Entbergen) of truth, and belonged to 
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poiesis, that is, “making.” (Heidegger, Die Frage nach der 
Technik 1954)  What interest us at this stage is not the 
basic modes of construction, and their relationship to 
formal articulation; although we will see this is important 
to understand if we‟re to form a relationship to Dewey‟s 
conditions of aesthetic form, but rather the type of 
aesthetic experience afforded by the manifestation of 
environmental totalities which compromise the aspects of 
character and space.  Ultimately, this is the only avenue to 
realize the association between spirituality and 
architecture as these elements influence the ensuing 
experience and perception derived from it.  Dewey provides 
us with these tools.  They are called the conditions of 
aesthetic form, and they can be realized through the 
architecture-centered aesthetic experience.   
Meaning & Essence: 
Noreberg-Schulz leaves us with an interesting point of 
phenomenological departure with which to continue addressing 
the nature of an aesthetic experience of architecture.  In 
doing so he also reinforces the importance of art, and the 
centrality of meaning.  He says that man dwells when he is 
able to concretize the world in buildings and things.  
“Concretization” is the function of the work of art, as 
opposed to the “abstraction” of science. (C. Norberg-Schulz 
1979)  “Works of art concretize what remains „between‟ the 
pure objects of science.  Our everyday life-world consists 
of such „intermediary‟ objects, and we understand that the 
fundamental function of art is to gather the contradictions 
and complexities of the life-world.  Being an imago mundi, 
the work of art helps man to dwell.” (C. Norberg-Schulz 
1979)  Similarly, Noreberg-Schulz believes that The 
existential dimension (“truth”) becomes manifest in history, 
but its meanings transcend the historical situation.  
History, on the other hand, only becomes meaningful if it 
represents new concretizations of the existential dimension.  
In general the concretization of the existential dimension 
depends on how things are made, that is, it depends on form 
and technology. (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  Likewise, Dewey 
believes that “our concept of art needs to be reformed as 
part and parcel of the reform of our society, whose 
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dominating institutions, hierarchical distinctions, and 
class divisions have significantly shaped this concept and 
have been, to some extent, reciprocally reinforced by it.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  This observation will be exceedingly 
helpful to analyze our case studies and implicate the role 
of form and technology.   
Noreberg-Schulz further agrees with Hölderlin who said: 
„Full of merit, yet poetically, man dwells on this earth.‟  
This means: man's merits do not count much if he is unable 
to dwell poetically.  Thus Heidegger says: “Poetry does not 
fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and 
hover over it. Poetry is what first brings man into the 
earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him into 
dwelling.” (Heidegger 1954)  “Only poetry in all its forms 
(also as the “art of living”) makes human existence 
meaningful, and meaning is the fundamental human need.” (C. 
Norberg-Schulz 1979)  Aristotle also spoke of poetry and 
nature.  He says, “Imitation, then, is one instinct of our 
nature.  Next, there is the instinct for „harmony‟ and 
rhythm, meters being manifestly sections of rhythm.  
Persons, therefore, starting with this natural gift 
developed by degrees their special aptitudes, till their 
rude improvisations gave birth to Poetry.” (Aristotle 2004)  
So too, John Dewey‟s implicit claim is that even the most 
mundane and routine of our doings could become more infused 
with significance, and therefore more meaningful to us, if 
crafted in a manner that roughly parallels the making of an 
art object. (Dewey 1934)  Dewey believed that the arts, 
above all, teach us something about what it means to undergo 
an experience.  The quality of experience which a work of 
art provides through its meaning is the authentic 
realization of a form of naturalized aptitudes; that is to 
say aptitudes that derive from nature themselves.   
As we saw with Heidegger the existence of meaning in 
architecture is central toward a successful manifestation of 
spirituality, and “meaning either grows or dies.  If it 
grows, it must connect with other meanings in order to 
establish its own relevance in the world.  If it dies, it 
will be replaced by yet another meaning.” (V. M. Ames, The 
Function and Value of Aesthetics 1941)  Van Meter Ames 
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believes that meaning is therefore brought about by changes 
in the interrelations between patterned connections that 
make up situations.  He said there is a quantitative and a 
qualitative aspect to this emergence of meaning.  It can be 
stated simply in this way: the more numerous and varied the 
relations expressing themselves in a particular experience, 
the more qualitatively intense and integrated are the 
possible values in that situation, and thus the more 
authentic that situation becomes.  I say „possible‟ because 
it is the agents within the situation that will decide the 
fate of growth of meaning in every experience.  To do, in a 
Deweyan universe, is to establish such connections and 
patterns of relations in an intense, integrated, holistic, 
and deep way.  When growth in meaning occurs, a new force 
emerges out of the welter of experience. (V. M. Ames, The 
Function and Value of Aesthetics 1941)  So too, the task of 
architecture is to orchestrate the most qualitatively 
intense and integrated values in a situation.   
Additionally, the total meaning of a building lies in 
its manifold relationship, and not physical function alone.  
A large part of which, as Heidegger thought us, stems from 
the place.  “The meaning of a new building suggestively 
manifested by others will grow in time from nothingness to 
something of its own.  Physically, the meagerness of its 
service contributing to a broader purpose gives it the 
potential of its functional meaning; psychologically, its 
visual non-being of anything else leaves it the possibility 
of becoming something in itself.” (Chang 1956)  “A new 
formalism may flourish and what used to be pure and 
expressive becomes a dead end and no amount of additional 
decoration and symbolism can save it from being monotonous 
and meaningless.” (Chang 1956)  The important concept here 
is that meaning manifest not only as an optimization of 
relationships – a gathering – as was previously stated, but 
as subsequent growth reliant upon the authenticity of the 
building.   
Ultimately, the full meaning of existence is beyond the 
power of any manifestation.  Amos Ih Tiao Chang, in his book 
The Tao of Architecture, believes that what appears 
tangible, architectural or natural, is only means to suggest 
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that which is lacking in appearance and existing in man‟s 
intangible understanding and aesthetic feeling.  Unlike 
other visual arts, architecture is an art of life itself 
expressed in life-size scale. (Chang 1956)  Because of this 
power of insufficiency, diminution of symbolic indication in 
a form will not necessarily reduce its power of expression.  
Instead, its vitality as a meaningful being is strongly 
intensified by its ability to induce the mind‟s growing 
experiences of the breadth or the depth of physical 
association.  Herein Amos points to the primary difference 
between imitational and original expression of the character 
of a building.  The former presents itself immediately, 
gives imposition and leaves no room for human experience in 
time.  The latter, through devoid of visual elements for 
abrupt association, has its suggestive content allowing for 
man‟s persuasive mind to grasp and to digest for itself. 
(Chang 1956)  Similarly, existentialist writers put their 
emphasis upon art as an activity rather than an object; and 
upon the artist's finding his way beyond anything that was, 
or that he could have had in mind when he launched out.  So 
too architecture is not all about its intended function, but 
uses that arise as a result of its actual inhabitation.   
John Dewey, in speaking of art, makes an observation 
applicable to architecture.  In this regard buildings can be 
said to have instrumental meaning (its explicit usefulness) 
and expressive meaning (its uniqueness awaiting our 
perception of its character distinct by emphasis).  The more 
we know about a building, the more we discover about its 
connections with other things, the richer its meaning 
becomes.  Aspects of meaning are reflectively attained, and 
we perceive buildings as possessing those meanings that 
experience has added on.  Buildings also have extrinsic and 
intrinsic meaning.  Extrinsic meaning (likewise, 
significance or value) refers to what a building signifies.  
It has to do with its subservient and instrumental role that 
the building plays in the attainment of some end.  The 
intrinsic meaning (likewise, significance or value) inheres 
within the building itself.  It intrinsically characterizes 
the thing experienced, and serves to enrich the immediacy of 
subsequent experience.  Intrinsic meaning is consummatory 
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and final.  It is meaning enjoyed for its own sake, as 
opposed to having a practical or utilitarian force.  It is 
also expressive.  Those experiences in which such meaning 
predominates Dewey calls aesthetic.  All conscious 
experience has of necessity some degree of imaginative 
quality, and in the aesthetic experience the imaginative 
element predominates.  Intrinsic meaning thereby carries the 
spirituality in architecture.   
Temporality & Movement: 
Dewey, in Art as Experience, also focuses on the 
temporality or movement of an aesthetic experience which we 
have already addressed as a „processural nature.‟  He refers 
to the way an experience unfolds over time, as well as to 
the way it relates to past, present, and future events.  
Architecture also has a temporal dimension worth 
understanding and respecting.  Architecture consists in 
working with a three-dimensional vocabulary which includes 
man.  „Architecture,‟ like „spirituality,‟ also has the 
temporal dimension of time.  While it may be true that 
„architecture‟ does acquire a certain „dignity‟ with the 
lapse of time; especially those edifices that are able to 
weather the test of time for hundreds, if not thousands of 
years.  That‟s not to say a certain „dignity‟ cannot 
manifest through the passage of a season, a day or even an 
hour.  Additionally, physically man – an ever-changing being 
– lives in space, psychologically he lives along the 
dimension of time. (Chang 1956)  Time cannot be forsaken as, 
naturalized spirituality and the existential dimension are 
also reliant upon the passage of time.   
Dewey (as do the phenomenologist) believes that 
“moments and places, despite physical limitation and narrow 
localization, are charged with accumulations of long-
gathering energy.”  As such, “to see, to perceive, is more 
than to recognize.  It does not identify something present 
in terms of a past disconnected from it.  The past is 
carried into the present so as to expand and deepen the 
content of the latter.” (Dewey 1934)  Thus Dewey just 
illustrated the “vital order and organization of 
experience.”  That process of „building‟ which is so 
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inseparable from „spirituality‟ and „architecture.‟  “Time, 
although intangible, is more intimate to man because it is 
more sensible within the human organism itself, and 
primarily makes up the continuity of life.  Consequently, 
with or without conscious consideration, architectural 
composition is based on the time factor for both physical 
function and psychological experience.  With time as the 
main factor of organization architecture could be defined as 
„spatial expression of human life and experience in time.‟” 
(Chang 1956)  Therefore, an attempt to disband or disregard 
the passage of time in the manifestation architecture would 
prove spiritually detrimental.  We will see some instances 
of this in the following “Study” section.   
Spiritually speaking, one must ask themselves am I 
„filling the hours,‟ or am I „killing time‟ as I inhabit 
this space?  The difference being a sense of purpose vs. 
indifference.  “Dewey calls the universe‟s drive toward 
novelty „experience.‟” (V. M. Ames, John Dewey as 
Aesthetician 1953)  An experience must have a deeply 
satisfying component.  Unless an emotional level is reached, 
the willingness to perform an arduous task over and over 
again would surely fade.  The feelings of satisfaction 
necessary to reinvigorate our commitment to a world that 
demands a continual wrestling with experience arise within 
what Dewey calls „consummatory‟ experiences.” (Dewey 1934)  
Aesthetics is the domain within which such „consummatory‟ 
experiences take place.  Both spirituality and novelty are 
in perpetual states of emergence.  The concept of the 
perpetual emergence of spirituality and novelty is the 
outcome of taking time seriously.  Time is the happening of 
a difference; otherwise nothing could separate past, 
present, and future.  There is the possibility of real 
change, and hence real difference when time is seen as an 
organic component of nature‟s processes.  Now this emergence 
of the different is also to be understood as the coming-to-
be of value.  Value is measured by the intensity of the 
differences expressing themselves as nature evolves.  Thus, 
nature is the outcome of the differences made by emergent 
forms of value as they contribute to the onrush of process. 
(V. M. Ames, John Dewey as Aesthetician 1953)  Therefore, we 
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can assume that one should aim to optimize the „value‟ of 
„consummatory‟ experience to capitalize on the feelings of 
satisfaction and „spiritual‟ gratification. 
Socio-Conditions:   
Both Martin Heidegger and Christian Norberg-Schulz 
depict and emphasize the centrality of dwelling to the 
nature of the human experience.  They also, in an 
existential sense, see it as the purpose of architecture in 
regulating the relations between man and his environment 
through the creation of meaning.  Noreberg-Schulz maintains 
that the existential dimension is not “determined” by the 
socio-economical conditions, although they may facilitate or 
impede the (self-) realization of certain existential 
structures.  He says that the socio-economical conditions 
are like a picture-frame; they offer a certain “space” for 
life to take place, but do not determine its existential 
meanings.  The existential meanings have deeper roots.  They 
are determined by the structures of our being-in-the-world, 
which have been analyzed by Heidegger. (C. Norberg-Schulz 
1979)  Nevertheless, the importance of socio-conditions 
cannot be underestimated, and pragmatism seems to exhibit 
that fact.   
Heidegger offers one more clue to the nature of 
dwelling that will further conjoin it with spirituality, and 
that is through his particular word for the human „being‟: 
Dasien, which was formed from the more general „Being‟ or 
Sein.  “Whereas Sein straightforwardly translates into 
English as „Being‟, Dasien has no direct one-word 
equivalent, but translates as „being-there,‟ having in it an 
idea of place – so Dasien has connotations of being-in-the-
world, of having been culturally shaped and being in 
society, being in position, being at home, dwelling.” 
(Ballantyne 2002)  Dewey also believes that “analytic 
aesthetics must pay attention to the ineliminable socio-
historical dimension of our appreciation of art.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  “Dewey uses historic-political and socio-
economic and socio-historical genealogy to extricate the 
rift between the practical and aesthetic.  That which 
engender and entrenched the museum conception of art.” 
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(Shusterman 2000)  In the “Study” section we will see how 
architecture further plays into the socio-, historic-, 
political-, economic- matrix of ideologies and the spiritual 
ramifications of doing such.   
Here I believe it is worth noting a particular instance 
of ancient Greece as both Dewey and Heidegger‟s 
philosophical roots can be traced – in part – back Greece‟s 
more aesthetically integrated society.  Dewey believes that 
the traditional analytic fear is psychologism: that any 
concept of experience must be so completely tainted with the 
private subjectivity of the experiencing subject that to 
think of art in terms of aesthetic experience is necessarily 
to render it solipsistically private, and thus deprive it of 
any real communicability or collaborative criticism. 
(Shusterman 2000)  “Dewey‟s effective response is that such 
fear stems from identifying experience with but one narrow 
philosophical conception of it: as essentially subjective, 
atomistic sensation or feeling.  This conception, whose 
roots he traces to empiricism and the romanticist advocacy 
of the inner life, is not only historically parochial and 
philosophically narrow, but empirically false.” (Shusterman 
2000)  “Dewey thought we experienced whole things and their 
relations, not merely individual, independent sensations 
which were then related and synthesized into objects through 
some additional mental faculty.” (Shusterman 2000)  Dewey 
believed that, “To the Greeks, experience was the outcome of 
accumulation of practical acts, sufferings, and perception 
gradually built up into … skill … There was nothing merely 
personal or subjective about it.” (Shusterman 2000)  
Shusterman further notes that this notion still survives 
today, and indeed forms the heart of perhaps our most common 
conception of experience outside of technical philosophy.   
Heidegger had his own intensely involved romantic idea 
of Greece, and he held a close knowledge of Greek 
philosophy. (Ballantyne 2002)  We can never know the thing 
which is purely „the building in itself,‟ because we 
approach it by way of the mental apparatus which we already 
have established and which we bring to bear on it. 
(Ballantyne 2002)  Dasien is always inflected by the 
circumstances of its acculturation. (Ballantyne 2002)  “The 
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sense of primordial „oneness‟ – the sense of the 
connectedness of every part of life, of which Heidegger 
speaks, and which he associated with ancient Greece – is 
deeply satisfying, and was first drawn into aesthetics by 
Winckelmann in his rapturous appreciation of every aspect of 
the life and art of ancient Greece, when (he imagined) 
educated men lived in close daily contact with nature.” 
(Ballantyne 2002)  It seems as though Heidegger shared 
Dewey‟s vision of the unity of art and life.  “Heidegger 
hardly ever traveled outside his own region, but supposed 
that the ancient Greeks had similar feelings to his own in 
response to their landscape.” (Ballantyne 2002)  As 
Ballantyne points out, the Greek temple plays an important 
role in his essay The Origin of the Work of Art, in which it 
is seen as instrumental in shaping experience of the world 
(being-in-the-world, Dasien): 
The temple, in its standing there, first 
gives to things their look and to men their 
outlook on themselves.  This view remains as long 
as the work is a work, as long as the god has not 
fled from it.  It is the same with the sculpture 
of the god, votive offering of the victor in the 
athletic games.  It is not a portrait whose 
purpose is to make it easier to realize how the 
god looks; rather, it is a work that lets the god 
himself be present and this is the god himself. 
(Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought 1950)   
Dewey, also speaking of a Greek temple, further 
wonders, “Why is there repulsion when the high achievements 
of fine art are brought into connection with common life, 
the life that we share with all living creatures?” (Dewey 
1934)  Architecturally speaking, Dell Upton wonders why the 
everyday has the tendency to comprise „seemingly unimportant 
activities‟ which „remain after one has eliminated all 
specialized activities.‟  Believing that the „everyday‟ in 
architecture is better defined by what it is not, than what 
it is. (Upton 2002)  We have already witnessed; however, 
that „spirituality‟ manifest in the common life of the 
everyday experience.  Dewey continues to state that there is 
a “hostile reaction to a conception of art that connects 
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with the activates of a live creature in its environment,” 
whilst that is precisely the essence of architecture.  In an 
attempt to make this concept even clearer I am going to cite 
a passage where Dewey spoke of the Parthenon.  The 
Parthenon, by common consent, is a great work of art...   
Yet it is esthetic standing only as the work 
becomes an experience for the human being.  And, if 
one is to go beyond personal enjoyment into the 
formation of a theory about that large republic of 
art of which the building is one member one has to 
be willing at some point in his reflections to turn 
from it to the bustling, arguing, acutely sensitive 
Athenian citizens, with civic sense identified with 
a civic religion, of whose experience the temple was 
an expression, and who built it not as a work of art 
but as a civic commemoration.  The turning to them 
is as human beings who had needs that were a demand 
for the building and such as might be carried on by 
a sociologist in search for material relevant to his 
purpose.  The one who sets out to theorize about the 
esthetic experience embodied in the Parthenon must 
realize in thought what the people into whose lives 
it entered had in common, as creators and as those 
who were satisfied with it, with people in our own 
homes and on our own streets. (Dewey 1934) 
Bruno Zevi also makes an astute observation about the 
Parthenon and Greek civilization, but one more in accord 
with analytic aesthetics for comparison with Dewey‟s 
pragmatist viewpoint.  He calls its conception of 
architectural space a horrible example of non-architecture.  
Yet, believes whoever views it as a giant piece of sculpture 
must be impressed by it.  He mentions that the cella, which 
in the Archaic period constituted the sole nucleus of the 
structure, had an internal space which was never developed 
creatively because it had no social function.  “The cella 
was not merely an enclosed, but literally a closed, space 
and a closed or sealed internal space is exactly 
characteristic of sculpture.  The Greek temple was not 
conceived as a house of worship, but as the impenetrable 
sanctuary of the gods.  Religious rites took place in the 
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open, around the temple, and thus all the skill and fervor 
of the sculptor-architect were devoted to transforming the 
supports into sublime works of plastic art and to covering 
the beams, raking cornices and walls with matchless bas-
reliefs.” (Zevi 1957)  Herein we can see the difference in 
aesthetic ideologies between Dewey and Zevi as Zevi is 
addressing the Parthenon primarily as a piece of fine art; 
yet, he still can‟t resist mentioning the Athenian citizens.  
Most importantly Zevi continues: 
Just as Greek thought remained remote from the 
psychological probing and introspection which were 
to become the motive force of Christian preaching 
and which found their first architectural expression 
in the dark silence of the catacombs, similarly 
Greek civilization was centered in out-of-doors 
activities, not within four walls and a roof or 
within the internal space of homes and temples, but 
in sacred precincts, on acropolises, in open-air 
theatres.  The architectural history of the 
acropolis is essentially a history of urbanism, 
supreme in its human scale and in its unsurpassed 
works of serene and Apollonian sculptural grace, 
complete in its abstraction, remote from social 
problems, self contained in its contemplative 
fascination and full of spiritual dignity never 
again achieved. (Zevi 1957) 
Lastly, Nietzsche also has something to say of ancient 
Greece as he believed that all that is Greek is quite 
foreign to us.  “Oriental or modern, Asiatic or European: in 
relation to Greek art, all these share a language of the 
sublime based on massiveness, on the enjoyment of 
quantitatively great masses; whereas at Paestum, Pompeii, 
and Athens, and with all Greek architecture, one is 
astonished at the smallness of the masses with which the 
Greeks contrive and love to express the sublime.  And again: 
how simple people were in Greece, to themselves, in their 
own minds!  How far we excel them in our knowledge of human 
nature!  But also how labyrinthine our souls and our notions 
of the soul appear in contrast with theirs!  Had we but will 
and daring enough for an architecture to match our own souls 
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(we are too cowardly for that!) – then our prototype should 
be the labyrinth!  This can be divined from the music that 
is truly ours and expresses what we are!  (For in music 
people let themselves go, in the belief that no one can 
perceive them beneath their music).” (Nietzsche 1980)  
Somewhat like Nietzsche, but perhaps not so dramatically, we 
will have seen that pragmatism also calls for an 
architecture daring enough to match our own „souls‟ in that 
it must aid us in dwelling.   
Dwelling & Spirituality: 
I believe Heidegger‟s concept of Dasien is synonymous 
with the concept of naturalized spirituality.  In order to 
further direct the discussion toward John Dewey it is useful 
to site Thomas Alexander in his discussion of Dewey‟s 
aesthetics as he likens it with Zen.  Although, as we have 
seen, this paper does not defer to theology for any notion 
of spirituality, he does make one interesting connection 
worth noting here in our discussion of Heidegger‟s Dasien.  
“Central to Dewey‟s view, Alexander argues, is the notion of 
„living in the present as process.‟  He continues: One is 
connected to the world in the living moment.  To be so 
totally integrated in the moment is just what the Zen 
Buddhist call „enlightenment.‟  It is simply „being-there’ – 
that instant of complete awareness which subject and object 
disappear, in which one doesn‟t so much see the Buddha as 
become him.‟” (Sartwell 1995)  Remove the theological 
implications from the above likening with Dewey, and you are 
left with – like Heidegger – an irrefutable emphasis on 
centrality of „being-there‟ – Dasien – in the human 
condition as a realization of naturalized spirituality.  
One, where the distinction between self and object are so 
fully integrated each disappear.   
For instance, Robert C. Solomon, in his book 
Spirituality for the Skeptic, believes „spirit‟ ultimately 
signifies „spirituality;‟ a property, an aspect, a state of 
mind, a mode of being. (Solomon 2002)  Also, like dwelling, 
spirituality requires, and is largely dependent upon, the 
act of thought.  André Comte-Sponville, in his book The 
Little Book of Atheist Spirituality, begins to immerse the 
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„human spirit‟ into the human sensibility by quoting 
Descartes as saying the „spirit‟ is, “A thing that thinks…  
that is to say, that doubts, affirms, denies, that knows a 
few things, that is ignorant of many, that wills, that 
desires, that also imagines and perceives,” to which Comte-
Sponville elaborated further adding “a thing that loves, 
that does not love, that contemplates, that remembers, that 
mocks or jokes…”  Moreover, „spirit‟ is the power to think 
insofar as it gives us access to truth, universality, or 
laughter.  The „spirit‟ is not a substance.  Rather, it is a 
function, a capacity, an act. (Comte-Sponville 2006)  For 
more information on spirit defer to the “Spirituality” 
section of the documentation.   
Most importantly Solomon, similar with Descartes and 
Comte-Sponville, maintains that „spirituality‟ is a human 
phenomenon and requires not only feeling, but thought; and 
thought requires concepts.  For Solomon, if „spirituality‟ 
means one thing, it means „thoughtfulness.‟  “Spirit,” says 
George Santayana, “is an awareness natural to animals, 
revealing the world and themselves in it.  Spirit is only 
that inner light of… attention which floods all life… It is 
roughly the same as feeling and thought.” (Santayana 1942)  
So too the aesthetic is contingent upon emotion and thought.  
“To experience this world in terms of something more than 
immediate stimuli is already on the way to spirituality.” 
(Solomon 2002)  “It requires a recognition of death, and 
consequently of the contingency and preciousness of life.  
It requires an awareness of the tragic, of the awful 
possibilities that face and eventually befall us.  It 
requires a keen conception of self, not just consciousness 
or mere awareness but self-consciousness and self-
reflection, the impulse toward „an examined life.‟” (Solomon 
2002)  In this light, the successful act of dwelling can be 
seen as the solidification of the foundation from which 
spirituality can flourish.  Neither dwelling nor 
spirituality is a given; both require a thoughtful being 
ready to embrace both the good and bad experiences of life.   
John Dewey also helps us to realize this.  “For Dewey 
thinking was not an end in itself, but a means of 
transforming problematic situations into more satisfying 
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ones.” (Eldridge 1998)  “He thought one should always be 
aware of the origins of one‟s thinking in actual experience 
and the effects of one‟s thinking on experience.  This he 
recognized in calling his philosophy „instrumentalism.‟” 
(Eldridge 1998)  Instrumentalism is the awareness that one‟s 
ideas are mental products drawn from life, and also the 
commitment on the part of the inquirer to return them to 
everyday experience. (Eldridge 1998)  “Instrumentalism is 
the opposite of the decontextualized thinking that Dewey 
deplored.” (Eldridge 1998)  “The point is to live well.  
Dewey thought we can do this best by developing the 
intelligent elements within our personal and collective 
experience in such a way that our practices and institutions 
become more fulfilling.  We can modify who we are and what 
we do in such a way that we increase our satisfactions and 
create the conditions for future satisfactions.  Being 
intelligent is not an end in itself; living well – or 
dwelling – is the point.  But intelligence is the best way 
to enhance our practices and institutions so that we might 
live well.” (Eldridge 1998)  Simply put, for Dewey 
“intelligence is grasping the relation between aims, 
conditions, and consequences, then acting in a deliberate 
way on this knowledge (with an awareness of alternatives) to 
accomplish one‟s aims.” (Eldridge 1998)  Aims such as 
dwelling.   
I believe intelligence, in this context, is synonymous 
with the thoughtfulness required for the realization of 
spirituality.  For Dewey it is the task of the artist to 
exercise a supreme act of intelligence upon his already 
sensitive experience in such a way as to perceive the 
relationship between what has already been done and what 
must be done next, and to express this unity of 
relationships through a technical mastery of symbols.  This 
essentially summarizes the task of the architect.  As a 
matter of fact, Dewey asserts that since the artist must be 
conscious of the way he manipulates his material, genuine 
art probably demands more intelligence than does most of the 
so-called thinking that goes on among those who pride 
themselves on being „intellectuals.‟ (Dewey 1934)  This is 
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very important to understand if one is to be genuine to the 
manifestation of spirituality via architecture.   
As one can see, in addressing the association between 
humans, architecture and spirituality requires that we 
address each in a particular manner as each has a task to 
fulfill.  This is important to understand as we have just 
witnessed a glimpse of how naturalized spirituality 
permeates the whole of human experience, and through 
architecture is akin to dwelling.  Now, to make this 
clearer, it is important to venture away from a 
phenomenological foundation and address the nature of 
experience.  In doing so we can gain a distinct 
understanding for the association between humans, 
architecture, and spirituality that is unambiguous.  This 
discerning account will remove all extraneous obstructions 
which hinder us in gaining a holistic understanding of this 
complex association; one that can become applicable to our 
everyday life, to our being-in-the-world.    
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An  Architecture-Centered Aesthetic Experience: 
 
ohn Dewey, in Art as Experience, helps us to begin 
thinking of aesthetics in a different manner than the 
traditional notions already discussed in the 
“Aesthetic” section.  One that is evermore obtainable to the 
masses who are born, eat, sleep, and die amid the milieu of 
our built environment everyday; those whom, as we have also 
seen, aim to dwell.  Moreover, those who through dwelling, 
aim to manifest spirituality.  Architecture, being the 
enabler for our dwelling, epitomizes useful art.  Van Meter 
Ames points out that Dewey says to be useful is to fulfill 
need, and – like Norberg-Schulz – believes the 
characteristic human need is for possession and appreciation 
of the meaning of things.  This need is ignored and 
unsatisfied in the traditional notion of the useful.  So 
aestheticians have ruled out the useful from art and beauty, 
but not Plato or Aristotle, and not Dewey.  For them use and 
beauty and meaning are found together in what gives freedom 
to life, what makes it more worth living, and makes men more 
aware of what it is to live. (V. M. Ames, John Dewey as 
Aesthetician 1953)  We have already implicated how this 
vital aesthetic experience of meaning might occur in 
architecture, but it is worth extricating further.   
An Experience: 
The aesthetic is not only about the ontological status 
of artworks or beauty, but a complex dimension that cuts 
across social life in a manner similar to the political, 
economic, technological or semiotic. (Mandoki 2007)  “The 
reason why art and aesthetic experience outgrew the ancient 
limits of beauty is that since the Renaissance, the 
Reformation, the French Revolution and the Industrial 
Revolution, man has become less an onlooker and more a 
participant in the universe.” (V. M. Ames, The Function and 
Value of Aesthetics 1941)  John Dewey sees the arts as doing 
more than providing us with fleeting moments of elation and 
delight.  “Our interactions with art objects epitomize what 
it means to undergo an experience, a term with a very 
special meaning for Dewey.” (Jackson 1998)  What constitutes 
J 
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the core of Dewey‟s aesthetic experience is a sense of 
„experience‟ which refers to a memorable and ultimately 
satisfying episode of living one that stands out from the 
humdrum flow of life as “an experience” by its “internal 
integration and fulfillment” reached through a developing 
organization of meanings and energies with affords “a 
satisfying emotional quality” of some sort. (Shusterman 
2000)  “Distinctively aesthetic experience, for Dewey, is 
simply when the satisfying factors and qualities of „an 
experience are lifted high above the threshold of 
perception‟ and appreciated „for their own sake.‟” 
(Shusterman 2000)  Herein, aesthetic experience is indeed 
akin to an experience of naturalized spirituality.   
Again, Dewey also believes that analytic aesthetics 
misconstrues the value and function of art.  Arts expand our 
horizons.  “They contribute meaning and value to future 
experiences.  They modify our way of perceiving the world, 
thus leaving us and the world itself irrevocably changed.” 
(Jackson 1998)  As we have seen naturalized spirituality 
does much the same thing, and the associations do not stop 
there.  Dewey believes that, “The world we have experienced 
becomes an integral part of the self that acts and is acted 
upon in further experience.  In their physical occurrence, 
things and events experienced pass and are gone.  But 
something of their meaning and value is retained as an 
integral part of the self.” (Dewey 1934)  “The arts refresh 
our sensibilities.  They aid in the reconstruction of old 
habits.  They teach us new ways of thinking, feeling, and 
perceiving.” (Jackson 1998)  So too, architecture teaches us 
how to think, feel, and perceive as the most important of 
all arts when it comes to our being-in-the-world.   
 Dewey provides us with a unique perspective of art as 
an aesthetic experience.  His goal is to reveal “what a work 
of art is as an experience: the kind of experience which 
constitutes it.” (Dewey 1934)  As Philip W. Jackson points 
out, in John Dewey and the Lessons of Art, there are two 
major domains of application for one such lesson of art.  
“One pertains directly to the arts, the other to life in 
general.” (Jackson 1998)  This is alludes precisely to an 
understanding I was hoping to gain by the association of 
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architecture, naturalized spirituality, and pragmatist 
aesthetics.  With respect to the architecture, Dewey leads 
me to believe becoming acquainted with the generic 
properties of an aesthetic experience promises to enrich our 
future encounters with individual works of architecture.  
“The same criteria can be applied to experience in general.  
Once we have identified the distinguishing characteristics 
of an experience centered on an outstanding work of art, we 
can inquire into the presence or absence of the same 
properties in ordinary experience.  We then may proceed to 
ask how such properties might be brought into being where 
and when we find them missing.” (Jackson 1998)  Therefore, 
the architect must think critically of those properties 
inherent in an aesthetic experience of architecture, and how 
to capitalize upon them for the betterment of experience; 
the deepening of perception.   
 Philip Jackson further takes the liberty to make 
another important distinction of Dewey‟s aesthetic 
experience.  Jackson believes that Dewey “seems to take its 
application for granted through Art as Experience.  It is 
the distinction between aesthetic experiences that have 
nothing to do with art objects of any kind and those that 
are specifically focused on such objects.” (Jackson 1998)  I 
find this distinction to be exceedingly helpful in 
correlating an aesthetic experience with architecture.  
Jackson believes those involving art objects (such as 
architecture) entail purposeful design.  “The enjoyment 
derived from them, on the part of either their creators or 
others, is intimately connected with that design.  So, too, 
is the extension of meaning and value that eventuates from 
the experience,” (Jackson 1998) and so too must be the 
spirituality that manifest.  Jackson refers to the 
experiences that focus on art objects as art-centered 
aesthetic experiences. (Jackson 1998)  I will refer to the 
experiences that focus on architecture as architecture-
centered aesthetic experiences, or simply architecture-
centered experiences.  In the ensuing section we will come 
to further divulge characteristics natural to a spiritual 
experience of architecture.   
Section V 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  
Study  
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Introduction: 
iven the aesthetic nature of this documents content 
matter, and the philosophic nature of the 
aesthetic, I believe the most fruitful avenue for a 
case study is one that provides us with a means to apply 
Dewey‟s aesthetic contentions in a „hindsight manner.‟  
I believe this is true because hindsight vision is 
20/20; while speculative design is not, therefore we can 
derive more final conclusions.  We need to be able to 
look at concretized edifices to discern their spiritual 
conduciveness using the philosophical understanding we 
have gained thus far.  Therefore, through the 
analyzation of the formal characteristics of various 
materialized architectural designs we can discern which 
instances are more conducive to the manifestation of 
spirituality through the architecture-centered aesthetic 
experience, and which are not.  In doing such, we can 
deem certain designs more successful in that they embody 
the fullest potential to manifest spirituality in the 
perceiver based off of the aesthetic information 
derived.  We have to allow, given the nature of this 
content, that neither is – nor can be – ultimately a 
sure thing, but that in fact some will prove more vital 
on certain fronts.  As we have just seen, outside of an 
individual‟s subjective experience there must be some 
form of objective vitality in buildings, and this 
vitality comes in certain forms.  Dewey understood this, 
Heidegger understood this, and therefore using their 
contentions we can effectively scrutinize architecture 
in a hindsight manner to discern its spiritual 
potential.   
I am proposing to utilize the seminal „dwellings‟ 
of two world renown architects who have had profound 
influence on the vocation of architecture: Le Corbusier 
and Frank Lloyd Wright.  I have chosen these two for a 
variety of reasons.  Firstly, these two had a great 
amount in common, but nevertheless each had fundamental 
differences in their philosophical and architectural 
theories.  Le Corbusier can be viewed as being toward 
G 
 99 
The Study 
the more analytic end of the philosophical spectrum, and 
Wright can be viewed as being more toward the pragmatic 
side of the spectrum.  Moreover, each dwelling can be 
seen as embodying the most stereotypical versions of 
their respective ideologies.  This is important to note 
because although these dwellings may have been conceived 
centuries ago, the philosophies and theories in which 
they were envisaged became encapsulated in their 
designs.  These ideologies still linger and propagate 
today; just as they did then, and as whey will continue 
to do in the future.  In that sense they are in fact 
timeless.   
Also bringing a greater degree of clarity to these 
studies is the fact that each wrote extensively about 
their architectural theories and personal philosophies.  
They therefore have graced us with a great knowledge 
bank with which to access the root of their design 
motives.  This is useful in that their personal 
contentions undoubtedly manifested into their 
architectural structures through the concretization of 
varied forms.  Additionally, not only did they both 
write, but they were both written about; as was the 
ultimate success or failure of their design 
methodologies, architectural theories, and personal 
philosophies.  Both of these architects were also 
working from an identical time in history which allows 
us to keep the extraneous stipulations behind their 
chosen designs relatively constant.  Thereby we can 
evaluate them purely off of their designs content 
unhindered by uncontrollable forces.   
The aim here is not to depict the entire history 
behind either of these two architects careers; or modern 
architectural history in general; or even the totality 
of ideas encapsulated within these two dwellings 
designs; rather, to isolate those instances most central 
to the content of this project (i.e. the quality of 
experience), and implications of their philosophical 
contentions.  Nevertheless, it is still necessary to 
disclose some general information to better reinforce my 
case, or „set the stage‟ - so to speak.  In doing so I 
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hope to accurately portray the context within which 
these two architects conceived their dwellings; chiefly 
focusing on the prevailing philosophies, theories, and 
contentions of their era.  Specifically the ones which 
they held most dear.  This information will serve to lay 
the common foundation, both literally and figuratively, 
with which one can then begin to analyze the subsequent 
divide between these two architects designs.  
Additionally, and in accord with aestheticism, we can 
analyze their artistic interest to further reinforce our 
case.  All of this background information will also 
serve to further reinforce my position as I cross-
reference these „spiritual dwelling hopefuls‟ with John 
Dewey‟s conditions of aesthetic form. 
It is my belief, that through the examination of 
these case studies, we will find Frank Lloyd Wrights 
design of Fallingwater to be more in tune with Dewey‟s 
conditions of aesthetic form, and Heidegger‟s conditions 
of dwelling and existential foothold, than Le 
Corbusier‟s Villa Savoye.  In drawing this conclusion I 
will be implicating the „spiritual manifestation 
success‟ of one architect and dwelling over the other.  
I will also be associating recognized design 
philosophies with spiritual potential.  This point will 
be further reinforced by success their architectural 
edifices have incurred through the passage of time; as 
well as, the extent to which their design philosophies 
have flourished amid the vocation of architecture.  It 
is my belief then, that the precepts of the modern 
movement – largely attributed to Le Corbusier (although 
Frank Lloyd Wright was an instrumental player) – is 
considered a failure largely due impart to the neglect 
of dwelling precursors, an understanding for aesthetic 
experience, and a general lack of spiritual 
manifestation.   
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Case Studies at Glance: 
Architect:  Le Corbusier 
 
 
 
Architect:  Frank Lloyd Wright 
 
 
 
Nationality:  Swiss/French Nationality:  American 
Design Style:  International Design Style:  Organic 
Life:  October 6, 1887 – August 27, 1965  
(Age 77) 
Life:  June 8, 1867 – April 9, 1959  
(Age 91) 
Project:  Villa Savoye; 1929 
 
 
 
Project:  Fallingwater, 1937 
 
 
 
Architectural Movement:  Modern  Architectural Movement:  Modern  
Location:  Rural Paris, France Location:  Rural Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
Function:  Country house Function:  Country house 
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Philosophical Foundations:   
e Corbusier‟s Villa Savoye and Frank Lloyd Wright‟s 
Fallingwater were completed eight years apart; 
respectively, in 1929 and 1937.  Each edifice can be 
said to exude the design and personal philosophies 
characteristic to these two architects; which as I am 
arguing is really one and the same.  These two dwellings can 
be acknowledged as their most seminal dwelling works, if not 
even most influential works period.  Given the philosophical 
nature of this projects content I believe it is briefly 
worth implicating what may have been going on in the minds 
of these two architects around the time of these dwelling‟s 
conceptions.  In doing so, we may come to better understand 
the rationale behind their designs, and their design 
methodologies.  We can then compare this information with 
what we have already divulged about the pragmatist 
aestheticism of John Dewey and naturalized spirituality.  
Furthermore, we can also discern the importance of having a 
well thought out personal and architectural philosophy if 
one intends to practice as an architect.  For I believe 
practicing under an eclectic philosophy, or an analytic 
philosophy, could ultimately be more detrimental – to both 
the architecture and the architect – then not holding a 
philosophy at all.   
For a chronological 
comparison, it is worth noting 
in the onset that John Dewey‟s 
Art as Experience was published 
in 1934, and is a compilation of 
10 lectures Dewey gave in the 
winter and spring of 1931 at 
Harvard University on the 
Philosophy of Art.  Therefore, 
it is impossible for Le 
Corbusier to have been 
influenced by John Dewey‟s 
aesthetic pragmatism at the time 
of Villa Savoye‟s conception.  
Furthermore, he was unlikely to 
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have been – even if given the chance – due to his deep 
entrenchment, and prominent position, amongst the varied 
European contentions and movements of this time.  
Architects’ Journal even published an article where Le 
Corbusier is said to have refuted knowledge of Wright‟s 
work. (Doremus 1985)  If that is indeed true, it is highly 
unlikely then that he would have any sustained knowledge of 
John Dewey‟s aesthetic pragmatism.  On the other hand Frank 
Lloyd Write – an American architect – could have conceivably 
had access to John Dewey‟s aesthetic pragmatism (and Dewey‟s 
philosophy in general) for years directly preceding the 
realization of Fallingwater.   
Le Corbusier: 
 Firstly, perhaps it is worth mentioning that Le 
Corbusier‟s birth name was “né Charles-Edouard Jeanneret.”  
Hereinafter, I will refer to né Charles-Edouard Jeanneret 
solely as Le Corbusier „the architect,‟ and not Jeanneret 
„the painter‟ (a name he kept until 1928). (Cohen 1999)  
Jean-Louis Cohen, in his article Le Corbusier‟s Nietzschean 
Metaphors, cites a letter from Le Corbusier to Josef Červ in 
1926 where Le Corbusier said, “Le Corbusier is a pseudonym.  
Le Corbusier works exclusively in architecture.  He pursues 
disinterested ideas.  He has no right to compromise himself 
through betrayals and accommodations.  He is an entity freed 
from the weight of the flesh.  He must never (but will he 
manage to?) fail.  Ch. Édouard Jeanneret is the man of the 
flesh who has experienced all the adventures – whether 
thrilling or heartbreaking – of a rather eventful life.” 
(Cohen 1999)  Cohen says that reasons for his choice of the 
pseudonym Le Corbusier have never been clearly established, 
but believes it is legitimate to suspect that Nietzschean 
connotations may be to blame.   
 In fact, Cohen believes Neitzschean philosophy to be at 
the core of much of Le Corbusier‟s motivation.  He also 
believes Le Corbusier was in many ways self-taught, and 
tended to read rather little philosophy.  Nevertheless, in 
his early years he was impressed by Ruskin‟s Seven Lamps of 
Architecture of 1849 and in particular Ruskin‟s theory that 
there were two distinctly different European cultures: the 
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northern, practical and level-headed, and the southern, 
monastic and spiritual. (Frampton 2001)  Kenneth Frampton, 
in his book Le Corbusier, says other writers who had an 
influence upon Le Corbusier around this time were Henri 
Provensal, William Ritter, and Alexandre Cingria-Vaneyre. 
(Frampton 2001)  Between them they shaped his entire 
outlook, not only nurturing his feeling for the vernacular 
but also seeding the neoclassical stance that he would 
adopt. (Frampton 2001)  Ritters‟s influence took a more 
romantic form, serving not only to introduce Le Corbusier to 
the Balkans and the Near East but also to further his 
penchant for the Orient and the spiritually evocative sites 
of the Greek world. (Frampton 2001)  Le Corbusier did in 
fact always have a spiritual conception which was to 
manifest in his architecture, albeit to differing degrees at 
differing times, and in differing forms.   
Le Corbusier was also greatly interested in Ernest 
Renan‟s La vie de Jésus (The Life of Jesus), 1863, and 
especially, in Edouard Schuré‟s Les grands initiés (The 
great initiates), 1889. (Cohen 1999)  Schuré, who had become 
an outspoken opponent of Nietzsche after having translated 
the philosopher‟s writings on Wagner, was a turning point in 
Le Corbusier‟s perception of his artistic destiny. (Cohen 
1999)  Before 1914, Le Corbusier‟s encounter with 
Nietzsche‟s works inspired him in a highly defined ideal of 
the self, namely that of the iconoclastic creator. (Cohen 
1999)  “It convinced him of his prophetic calling and of the 
need to undertake a vast purging of the vestiges of 
eclecticism and the arabesques of Art Nouveau from 
architectural forms.  It also allowed him to define his 
program for the transformation of the world and to 
constitute a new rhetoric.” (Cohen 1999)  Additionally, Le 
Corbusier‟s reading of Nietzsche further lent encouragement 
to his interest (later to crystallize in his purism) in 
Greece and the Mediterranean world. (Cohen 1999)  It seems 
as though nearly everyone mentioned in this documentation 
has derived inspiration from ancient Greece.  Nevertheless, 
this Greek inspiration manifest in significantly varying 
ways dependent upon their individual philosophies.   
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 After 1920 Le 
Corbusier‟s thought was 
grounded in the notion that 
the destroyers will be the 
creators, and his search for 
new architectural principles 
emanating from modern 
construction technologies can 
be seen as an integral part 
of such an approach. (Cohen 
1999)  Cohen further concedes 
with Manfredo Tafuri who 
interpreted Le Corbusier‟s 
“Cinq points d’une 
architecture nouvelle” (Five 
points of a new architecture), 1927, - the same five points 
Le Corbusier manifested in Villa Savoye – as an „expression 
of nihilism.‟ (Cohen 1999)  Le Corbusier noted that he had 
become „weary of the old worlds‟ and starting in the 1920‟s 
he set himself the task of being the prophet of a new 
architecture and of conquering public opinion. (Cohen 1999)  
“His writings of the period reveal, beyond the shadow of a 
doubt, Nietzsche‟s influence in their use of aphorisms and 
oxymorons, not to mention the very rhythm of the paragraphs.  
At the same time, as Stanislaus von Moos has pointed out, he 
constructed a representation of himself as a solitary 
Superman who engaged in self-sacrifice for the love of 
humanity.” (Cohen 1999)  Cohen believes that at some 
decisive moments in Le Corbusier‟s personal history and his 
worldly strategies, he used Nietzsche as a guide I the 
construction of his own personality as a provocative artist 
and poetic theorist. (Cohen 1999)  I believe that Le 
Corbusier – while undoubtedly inspired by Nietzsche – may 
have used Nietzschean philosophy somewhat eclectically; as 
means to justify his ends, and not all too thoroughly 
introspectively or thorough.  Indeed, his perging of the 
past will prove to be a disadvantageous decision.   
Purism: 
While living in Paris, Le Corbusier met Amédée Ozenfant 
who encouraged him to begin painting.  Together they created 
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„Purism‟ an offshoot of Cubism.  Purism abandoned the 
complex structures of analytical cubism to focus on pure, 
pared down geometry and forms.  With an exhibition of their 
work in this new style came the series of commentaries Après 
le cubisme („After Cubism‟) in which Le Corbusier defined 
the movement, stressing a combination of art and science, 
decisiveness and purity. (Kass/Meridian n.d.)  Together, 
with Dadaist poet Paul Dermée they founded the magazine 
L’Espirit Nouveau.  “The Purist Manifesto, Après le cubisme, 
reworked as Le Purisme, would be featured in the fourth 
issue of the magazine in 1920.  Arguing that the techno-
scientific industrial character of the age demanded not the 
mechanical dynamism of the Italian Futurists but a deeper 
cultural response grounded in the universality of 
mathematics, they went on to distinguish between primary and 
secondary sensations, the one being induced by universal 
Platonic forms, the other attaining its aesthetic effect by 
virtue of its significance within a specific cultural 
context.” (Frampton 2001)  It is interesting to note that 
they held mathematics as a „universality‟ as this is 
indicative of analytic ideology.   
Anyhow, R.H.L. Herbert, in his book Modern Artist on 
Art, said “there are secondary sensations, varying with the 
individual because the depend upon his cultural or 
hereditary capital… Primary sensations constitute the bases 
of the plastic language; these are the fixed words of the 
plastic language; it is a fixed, formal, explicit, universal 
language determining subjective reactions of an individual 
order which permit the erection on these raw foundations of 
a sensitive work, rich in emotion… An art that would be 
based only upon primary sensations, using uniquely primary 
elements, would be only a primary art, rich, it is true, in 
geometric aspects, but denuded of all sufficient human 
resonance: it would be an ornamental art.  An art that would 
be based only upon the use of secondary sensations (an art 
of allusions) would be an art without a plastic base.” 
(Frampton 2001)  I believe that a pragmatist aesthetician 
would argue that these two sensations are not so distinctly 
separable as Herbert leads us to believe; nor is it 
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aesthetically advantageous to attempt to make one such 
distinction.   
Le Corbusier even said, “Part of every day of my life 
has been devoted to drawing. I have never stopped drawing 
and painting, looking wherever I could for the secrets of 
form. You don‟t have to look any further than this for the 
key to my work and research....” (Arcspace 2007)  Therefore, 
for Le Corbusier, a canonical canvas like Nature Morte à la 
Pile d’Assiettes (Still-Life with a Stack of Plates) of 1920 
was not only a demonstration of the interaction between 
primary and secondary forms: it was also intended to serve 
as an iconic evocation of a totally new way of life. 
(Frampton 2001)  
Purism 
emphasized 
precision of 
contour, 
cleanness of 
line, volumetric 
representation, 
flattening in 
the overlaying 
of planes, 
overall ordering 
of objects and 
contours, and 
Cartesian 
rationalization.  
Its colors tended toward the cool grays and cool browns and 
the deeper tones of red and green. (Mallgrave 2005)  Le 
Corbusier restricted Cartesian skepticism to three 
attributes: symmetry, richness of materials, and precision 
of execution. (Frampton 2001)  He also wished to distinguish 
between the primary abstract character of architecture and 
the secondary attributes of ergonomic form, and interplay 
that he saw as the inevitable dialectic of the machine age. 
(Frampton 2001)  While not ill-grounded, he is still 
thinking in terms of isolation.  Lastly, it is worth noting 
that Purism was an alternative to the mid-1920‟s neo-modern 
movements of Beaux Arts and the fashionable Art Deco. 
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Interestingly enough, as Frampton points out, “above 
all, Le Corbusier was one of the first architects of the 
20
th
 century to set such store by the precise photographic 
record of his finished work.  His realized buildings were 
invariably published as Purist set-pieces, pristine, empty, 
luminous spaces, removed from the quotidian contaminations 
of domesticity and the inevitable depredations of time, 
depicted without the furnishings of the occupant and often 
enhanced by certain objects that implied the elective 
affinities of Purism – a trilby hat casually placed on a 
hall table, a lay figure posed on a window sill, and 
electric fan, a coffee pot, a jug and a fish, these last 
four being posted together like a still-life on the table in 
the otherwise deserted kitchen.” (Frampton 2001)  This lack 
of vitality for the sake of the Purist aesthetic contradicts 
the lively notions contained within the precepts of 
naturalized spirituality as well as everything we have 
spoken about pragmatist aesthetics.   
Frank Lloyd Wright:   
Frank Lloyd Wright did not assume an pseudonym as did 
Le Corbusier.  The fact that he is largely recognized as 
“Frank Lloyd Wright” – his name in its entirety – leads me 
to believe that he would have unalterably opposed such a 
disbanding of his „architectural mind‟ from his „lived 
body.‟  Contrary to Le Corbusier, I don‟t think Wright 
pursued „disinterested ideas‟ at all, and – in turn – would 
probably hold the opposite position.  Anyhow, in Wright‟s 
autobiography “A Testament” of 1957, under his Influences 
and Inferences section, he does list John Dewey in his list 
of influential philosophers and poets alongside Emerson, 
Thoreau, Melville, William James, Charles Beard, Mark Twain, 
and Walt Whitman. (Wright, A Testament 2008)  Wright 
continues and says that he, “cared little for the great 
pragmatist in philosophy and less for the Greek sophists.” 
(Wright, A Testament 2008)  If that is indeed true, I find 
it somewhat hard to believe as Wright seems to have much in 
common with pragmatist aesthetics.   
In fact, Wright was well known for his tenacious 
disbanding of any exterior influence upon his work no matter 
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how overtly incriminating the evidence.  Thus, he begins his 
Influences and Inferences section by stating: “To cut 
ambiguity short: there never was exterior influence upon my 
work, either foreign or native, other than that of Lieber 
Meister, Dankmar Alder and John Roebling, Whitman and 
Emerson, and the great poets worldwide.  My work is original 
not only in fact but in spiritual fiber.  No practice by any 
European architect to this day has influenced mine in the 
least. … As for the Incas, the Mayans, even the Japanese – 
all were to me but splendid confirmation.” (Wright, A 
Testament 2008)  In a later passage he speaks of his early 
days as being “thrilled by Mayan, Inca and Egyptian remains, 
loved the Byzantine.  The Persian fire-domed, fire-backed 
structure were beautiful to me.  But never anything Greek 
except the sculpture and the Greek vase – the reward of 
their persistence in search of the elegant solution.” 
(Wright, A Testament 2008)  Herein, Wright seems to vary 
significantly from Le Corbusier, as well as from Nietzsche 
and Dewey, whom all found much inspiration from ancient 
Greece.   
Interestingly enough, Wright does confess Lao Tzu as 
being amongst his inspiration from nature amongst Jesus, 
Dante, Beethoven, Bach, Vivaldi, Palestrina, and Mozart. 
(Wright, A Testament 2008)  I find this particularly 
interesting for two reasons.  One, this reinforces our 
discussion on oriental aesthetics and ideology to a high 
degree.  Two, because while Wright was insisting under 
frequent accusations that neither the art nor the 
architecture of Japan had any direct formal influence on his 
work he explicitly acknowledges a direct link between his 
work and Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu.  Towards the end of 
his career, for example, Wright explained: 
Many people have wondered about an Oriental 
quality these in my work.  I suppose it is true 
that when we speak of organic architecture, we are 
speaking of something that is more Oriental than 
Western.  The answer is: my work is, in that 
deeper philosophical sense, Oriental.  These ideas 
have not been common to the whole people of the 
Orient; but there was Laotse, for instance.  Our 
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society has never known the deeper Taoist mind.  
The Orientals must have had a sense of it, 
whatever may have been their consideration for it, 
and they instinctively built that way.  Their 
instinct was right.  So this gospel of organic 
architecture still has more in sympathy and in 
common with oriental thought than it has with any 
other thing the West has ever confessed.  
… The civilizations of India, Persia, China 
and Japan are all based on the same central source 
of cultural inspiration, chiefly Buddhist… But it 
is not so much the principles of this faith which 
underlie organic 
architecture, as the 
faith of Laotse – the 
Chinese philosopher – his 
annals preserved in 
Tibet.  But I became 
conscious of these only 
after I had found and 
built it for myself… 
… Although Laotse, 
as far as we know, first 
enunciated the 
philosophy, it probably 
preceded him but was 
never built by him or any 
Oriental.  The idea of organic architecture that 
the reality of the building lies I the space 
within to be lived in, the feeling that we must 
not enclose ourselves in an envelope which is the 
building, is not alone Oriental.  Democracy, 
proclaiming the integrity of the individual per 
se, had the feeling if not the words. (F. L. 
Wright 1971)   
Japanism:   
Today, it is now widely accepted that both the 
traditional art and architecture of did in fact have a 
 111 
The Study 
significant formal impact on Wright‟s work, but that they 
actually played a more important role in his career on a 
philosophical, and to some extent psychological level, by 
exemplifying what were perceived as universal social and 
aesthetic ideals. (Nute 1993)  It is also well known that 
Frank Lloyd Write was an avid collector and dealer of 
Japanese woodblock prints, and thus wrote The Japanese 
Print; an Interpretation in 1912, a article in which he 
advocates his deep respect and admiration for nature.  The 
print was to exercise a powerful influence on Wright‟s 
concept of art, and he openly acknowledged that it was 
“something upon which a whole philosophy of Art might be 
constructed.” (Wright 2008)  Wright broadly states that the, 
“first and supreme principle of Japanese aesthetics consist 
in a stringent simplification by elimination of the 
insignificant and a consequent emphasis of reality.  The 
first prerequisite for the successful study of this strange 
art is to fix the fact in mind at the beginning that it is 
the sentiment of Nature alone which concerns the Japanese 
artist; the sentiment of Nature as beheld by him in those 
vital meanings which he alone seems to see and alone 
therefore endeavors to 
portray.” (Wright, The 
Japanese Print: An 
Interpretation 2008)  
Wright goes on to define 
this concept for design in 
general as “pure form, an 
organization into a very 
definite manner of parts or 
elements into a larger 
unity – a vital whole.” 
(Wright, The Japanese 
Print: An Interpretation 
2008)  Seemingly then, in 
description, Purism doesn‟t 
sound all too different 
from Japanism, except 
Japanism embraces nature in 
the same manner as Le 
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Corbusier‟s Purism embraces mathematics.   
Japanese prints had a direct influence upon Wrights 
rendering style.  Wright admitted that the aesthetic 
composition of his renderings was occasionally achieved at 
the expense of the accurate representation of the buildings 
themselves; and he freely acknowledged that it was an 
appreciation of Japanese art which had provided the 
inspiration for this abstract quality in his drawings. (Nute 
1993)  He also believed that not placing something within 
the fame gave the impression of providing a glimpse which 
gives one the sense of a great continuity.  “According to 
Wright, the single most 
important lesson of the 
print was its isolation of 
the formal essence of its 
subject, which he 
characterized as „the 
gospel of the elimination 
of the insignificant.‟  In 
relation to this principle 
simplification, Wright 
suggested that the print 
artist had „the ready 
ability to seize upon 
essentials, which is the 
prime condition of the 
artist‟s creative 
insight.‟” (Nute 1993)  
“The forms, for instance, 
in the pine tree, (as of 
every natural object on the earth), the geometry that 
underlines and constitutes the peculiar pine character of 
the tree – what Plato meant by the eternal idea – he [the 
Japanese artist] knows familiarly.” (Wright 2008)  “„This 
process of elimination of the insignificant we find to be 
their first and most important consideration as artists, 
after the fundamental mathematics of structure… this process 
of simplification is in a sense a dramatization of the 
subject, just as all Japanese ceremonials are the common 
offices and functions of their daily life delicately 
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dramatized.‟  For Wright, then, the „elimination of the 
insignificant‟ and the „conventionalization of forms‟ were 
parts of a single process of creative abstraction, and he 
argued that this process was not confined to material forms 
alone, but applied equally to every legitimate subject of 
art; in other words to all aspects of life itself, as he 
went on to explain: Real civilization means for us, then, a 
right conventionalizing of our original state of nature, 
just such a conventionalizing as the true artist imposes on 
natural forms…  This is the artist‟s contribution to his 
society: truly the creative artist‟s affair.  Our customs, 
costumes, habits, habitations and manners, all are, or 
should be, such abstractions; and made, as such, true to the 
great abstraction we call civilization.” (Nute 1993)  
Herein, Wright also acknowledges the importance of the 
socio-conditions in the formation of art and architecture.   
“Wrights buildings, then, were intended to be less like 
realistic portraits of their programmes, than idealized 
„conventions,‟ encapsulating in simple geometric terms what 
he considered to be the characterizing features of a 
particular client or institution.” (Nute 1993)  “Wright 
appears to have seen his own role as one of providing 
geometric abstractions of the fundamental social forms of 
American life.  Or as Robert Twombly put it: „Behind social 
institutions, Wright insisted, was the artist‟s vision, for 
he alone could translate into structure and form the essence 
of what it meant to be human and live happily with others.‟  
And in practice this meant reducing those institutions to 
their formal essence and then re-presenting their „essential 
forms‟ in terms of a simple geometric unit arranged into a 
mutually interdependent „organic‟ whole.” (Nute 1993)  The 
big idea – how Wright varies most from Le Corbusier – is 
that “when Wright described the print as organic then he 
appears to have meant primarily that it was an internally 
purposive whole, which could be appreciated aesthetically 
regardless of any awareness of its rational content.” (Nute 
1993)  “For Wright, then, the print was organic in at least 
three quite different senses: as an independently pleasing 
aesthetic whole; as an honest use of materials toward 
appropriate ends; and as a democratic expression of ordinary 
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life.  And whilst none of these concepts actually derived 
from the print, for Wright at least, all three were 
exemplified by it.” (Nute 1993)  I believe he viewed his 
architecture in much the same manner as he did the Japanese 
woodblock print.  All of which is in direct accord with 
pragmatic aesthetics.   
Philosophical Summation: 
As we will come to see, and have in part just seen, 
“although Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier are 
universally recognized as pioneers of Modern architecture, 
for as long as critics have been writing about what the 
twentieth century has called Modernism, the two masters have 
been seen in diametric opposition.” (Doremus 1985)  This 
opposition occurs in their philosophical influences, 
artistic endeavors, and ultimately their architecture.  
Thomas Doremus, in his book Frank Lloyd Wright and Le 
Corbusier, does an excellent job of conducting a dialogue 
between these two architects; one that he believes, is not 
frequently performed.  He says, “Followers of Wright have 
denounced almost the entire corpus of twentieth-century 
European architecture as a degenerated misapplication of the 
principles of Organic design.  Followers of Le Corbusier, 
usually associating him closely with the International 
Style, have dismissed Wright‟s work after 1910 as the 
eccentricity of a lone, mad genius.” (Doremus 1985)  The 
1920‟s was the time of a critical acceptance of a universal 
Modernism in architecture, a period when Le Corbusier was in 
his first flourishing and when Wright had dropped, as far as 
production was concerned, to a professional nadir. (Doremus 
1985)  As we will see, the philosophical and theoretical 
distancing between these two architects makes the 
application of Dewey‟s conditions of aesthetic form all the 
more revealing.   
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The Study: 
t this point our discussion of the association 
between architecture and spirituality has brought 
us full circle.  To briefly summarize, we have 
concluded that no specimen of architecture is, nor can 
be, in and of itself embodied with foolproof 
spirituality parse; rather that the realization of 
spirituality is contingent upon one‟s ability to dwell 
and subsequently realize spirituality through the 
architecture-centered aesthetic experience.  Through 
this understanding we are able to identify those 
features central to the spiritual manifestation of 
architecture.  Architecture must concretize an 
existential foothold, and in doing so create meaning 
conducive to an aesthetic experience.  Herein, the terms 
„aesthetic,‟ „experience,‟ and „naturalized 
spirituality‟ each have particular connotations which 
have been expounded upon in specific detail, and are 
important to consistently bear in mind as we proceed.   
To further reinforce his pragmatist aesthetic 
contention John Dewey provides us with conditions of 
aesthetic form common to all aesthetic experiences; as 
well as, other vital characteristics of art‟s importance 
worth implicating if one is to gain a spiritual 
understanding of architecture.  The significant notion 
here being that architecture, and the perception 
afforded through the architecture-centered aesthetic 
experience, is in fact the closest understanding we can 
hope to gain – and should aspire to gain – about the 
association between humans, architecture and 
spirituality.  The aesthetic experience, in exemplifying 
what an experience is as the most integral of all 
experiences, provides the way to an authentically 
spiritual perception of architecture.  “An experience is 
a product, one might almost say a by-product, of 
continuous and cumulative interaction of an organic self 
with the world.  There is no other foundation upon which 
esthetic theory and criticism can build.” (Dewey 1934)  
A 
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There is also no other theory upon which an experience 
of naturalized spirituality via architecture can build.   
Most importantly, we have concluded that art‟s aim 
“is to serve the whole creature in his unified 
vitality.” (Dewey 1934)  As such, “The product of art – 
temple, painting, statue, poem – is not the work of art.  
The work takes place when a human being cooperates with 
the product so that the outcome is an experience that is 
enjoyed because of its liberating and ordered 
properties. (Dewey 1934)  “Since the actual work of art 
is what it does with and in experience ... it is 
necessary to see it as such if we are going to 
understand anything about it.  Esthetically at least, 
„we receive but what we give.‟” (Dewey 1934)  
Existential matters are precisely what artist are 
concerned with. (Dewey 1934)  Qualities as qualities do 
not lend themselves to division.  For quality is 
concrete and existential, and hence varies with 
individuals since it is impregnated with their 
uniqueness. (Dewey 1934)  The fundamental mistake is the 
confusion of the physical product with the esthetic 
object, which is that which is perceived.  The play of 
light on a building with the constant change of shadows, 
intensities, and colors, and shifting reflections proves 
that a building is not “stationary” in perception as it 
is in physical existence. (Dewey 1934)  “For an object 
is perceived by a cumulative series of interactions.” 
(Dewey 1934)  “What is called the inexhaustibility of a 
work of art is a function of this continuity of the 
total act of perceiving.” (Dewey 1934)  In short, the 
product of architecture must be put to work through the 
perception of its qualities if one hopes to experience 
the aesthetic object spirituality.   
Dewey‟s observations, while exceedingly insightful into 
the act of perceiving and production, seems rather 
nihilistic if one intends to pursue architecture as a 
vocation.  Firstly, Dewey does not always distinguish 
between “aesthetic” and “artistic” or even want to; wishing 
he could find a term to fuse them as interacting phases of a 
complete process.  If “artistic” refers to productive 
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activity and “aesthetic” refers to enjoyment, it does not 
mean that one simply follows upon the other; rather that 
both are equally and even simultaneously involved in 
experience that is creative and complete. (V. M. Ames, John 
Dewey as Aesthetician 1953)  As one can see from this 
statement, while Dewey‟s aesthetic philosophy abounds in 
thought provoking information pertinent to the „experiencer‟ 
and how they can manifest spirituality through their 
aesthetic perception of art; its leaves something to be 
desired for the „architect‟ who might hope to orchestrate 
that experience through the manifestation of architecture 
for someone other than him/herself through assuming the role 
of the „architect.‟   
Perhaps an aspect of this deficiency is due, in part, 
to the notion that Dewey was addressing „art‟ in general as 
opposed to architecture specifically; which in fact, might 
be why Dewey evades architectural discourse in the first 
place.  Another reason is perhaps that Dewey was addressing 
„art‟ in opposition to the popular analytic aesthetic 
philosophy of his time, and therefore focused his attention 
primarily on removing „art‟ from its pedestal, so to speak, 
where it had been for quite some time; and thereby seemingly 
neglected to embellish upon the varied aesthetic 
possibilities for the intentions of the artist other than 
providing us with their generic form.  Nevertheless, are we 
– as architects – to believe that the manifestation of 
spirituality at the whim of architecture is entirely 
dependent upon individualized perception alone, and because 
one cannot conceivably control another person‟s perception 
with any degree of certainty that aiming for a spiritual 
reception of any particular architectural design is then 
futile?  I do not believe this is the case, nor do I think 
would Dewey if posed the question.  Just recall the 
phenomenological implications space and character had on 
concretizing an existential foothold.   
Concretization:    
For Dewey any experience becomes aesthetic in becoming 
wholly satisfactory, he holds that an experience does not 
become artistic unless the result has been imagined in the 
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control of a chosen material.  “The true artist sees and 
feels in terms of his medium…” (Dewey 1934)  Architecturally 
speaking, “without external embodiment, an experience 
remains incomplete; physiologically and functionally, sense 
organs are motor organs and are connected, by means of 
distribution of energies in the human body and not merely 
anatomically, with other motor organs.  It is no linguistic 
accident that „building,‟ „construction,‟ „work,‟ designate 
both a process and its finished product.  Without the 
meaning of the verb that of the noun remains blank.” (Dewey 
1934)  As William James observed, “We add both to the 
subject and to the predicate part of reality” to “enhance 
the universe‟s total value.” (James 2000)  Dewey elaborates, 
“even though „spiritual‟ and „material‟ are separated and 
set in opposition to one another, there must be conditions 
through which the ideal is capable of embodiment and 
realization – and this is all, fundamentally, that „matter‟ 
signifies.” (Dewey 1934)  This statement, taken in 
conjunction with the phenomenological implications of place 
tells us – as architects – that material, and the manner in 
which it is built, deserve utmost recognition with respect 
to the spirituality derived from an architecture-centered 
aesthetic experience.   
Dewey further believes that, “Every work of art has a 
particular medium by which, among other things, the 
qualitative pervasive whole is carried.” (Dewey 1934)  Every 
art has a medium of its own.  “„Medium‟ signifies first of 
all an intermediary.  The import of the word „means‟ is the 
same.”  Yet not all means are media.  “Means cease to act 
when the „end‟ is reached; one would be glad, as a rule, to 
get the result without have to employ the means.  They are 
but a scaffolding.” (Dewey 1934)  “But the moment we say 
„media,‟ we refer to means that are incorporated in the 
outcome.  Even bricks and mortar become a part of the house 
they are employed to build; they are not mere means to its 
erection.” (Dewey 1934)  “Esthetic effects belong 
intrinsically to their medium; when another medium is 
substituted, we have a stunt rather than an object of art.” 
(Dewey 1934)  “Sensitivity to a medium as a medium is the 
very heart of all artistic creation and esthetic perception.  
 119 
The Study 
Such sensitiveness does not lug in extraneous material.” 
(Dewey 1934)  I believe it is crucial for an architect to 
take heed of this insight, and account for the true nature 
of buildings through the selection of the „media.‟   
The problem for architecture is identifying the end as 
not being solely a product of economy (as is frequently the 
case), nor in a capricious or routine manner, but to 
identify the end as a purposeful balance between the end and 
the means, and in a efficient manner.  This cannot be 
understated for it is more difficult, and with more profound 
consequences on our actual being, than one might initially 
think.  One must employ means that will bring about the 
desired ends.  One way to do this, and to guard against 
producing undesired ends, is to pay attention to the 
continuity of means and ends.  It is absurd to claim that 
the choice of means is irrelevant to the desired end. 
(Eldridge 1998)  If the desired outcome of building is 
dwelling, if dwelling is the end-in-view, one must figure 
out the factors that are making the project what it is (the 
conditions), project likely solutions (schematic design), 
and select one of these possible solutions (the end-in-view 
with requisite operations), then implement it, paying 
attention to the actual outcome (the consequences).  I feel 
we the typical flaw is a misgauging and forsaking of the 
significant effect means has on the actual outcome, or end.   
Furthermore, “What makes a material a medium is that it 
is used to express a meaning which is other than that which 
it is in virtue of its bare physical existence: the meaning 
not of what it physically is, but of what it expresses.” 
(Dewey 1934)  Architecture expresses the enduring values of 
collective human life.  Dewey believes that it “represents” 
the memories, hopes, fears, purposes, and sacred values of 
those who build in order to shelter a family; provide an 
altar for the gods, establish a place in which to make laws, 
or set up a stronghold against attack.  Just why buildings 
are called palaces, castles, homes, city-halls, forums, is a 
mystery if architecture is not supremely expressive of human 
interest and values. (Dewey 1934)  “Apart from cerebral 
reveries, it is self-evident that every important structure 
is a treasure of storied memories and a monumental 
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registering of cherished expectancies for the future.” 
(Dewey 1934)  As architects, to deny that fact would be 
detrimental to the quality of the „building‟ and thereby the 
architecture-centered aesthetic experience afforded, and 
subsequently, the spirituality which is realized.   
Form: 
Some objects, thought Dewey, take on aesthetic form 
when the material is so arranged and adapted that it serves 
immediately the enrichment of the immediate experience of 
the one whose attentive perception is directed to it. (Dewey 
1934)  Dewey believes such objects have form in a definitive 
sense, and that the form can become aesthetic when the 
object is liberated from limitation to a specialized end to 
serve also the purpose of an immediate and vital experience.  
“Only when the constituent parts of a whole have the unique 
end of contributing to the consummation of a conscious 
experience, do design and shape lose superimposed character 
and become form.” (Dewey 1934)  The interfusion of all 
properties of the medium is necessary if the object in 
question is to serve the whole creature in his unified 
vitality.  Form is better understood in a dynamic sense as 
the coordination and adjustment of the qualities and 
associated meanings that are integrated within the artwork. 
(Field 2005)  It is necessary to divulge what the concept of 
form in the architecture-centered aesthetic experience 
entails.  “In every integral experience there is form 
because there is dynamic organization.” (Dewey 1934)  Dewey 
calls the organization dynamic because it takes time to 
complete it, because it is a growth.  There is inception, 
development, fulfillment.  The form of the whole is present 
in every member.  “Fulfilling, consummating, are continuous 
functions, not mere ends, located at one place only.” (Dewey 
1934)  Similar to phenomenology then, the form can „gather;‟ 
it can gather the „place,‟ whereby one can dwell, it can 
also gather all the other parts of experience.  Spirituality 
can flourish thereafter through the dynamic organization of 
the medium through the attentive perception of the 
„experiencer.‟   
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As one can see, the implications of form do go beyond 
experience toward the object itself.  “The material out of 
which a work of art is composed belongs to the common world 
rather than to the self, and yet there is self-expression in 
[architecture] because the self assimilates that material in 
a distinctive way to reissue it into the public world in a 
form that builds a new object.” (Dewey 1934)  “The enduring 
[architectural]-product may have been, and probably was, 
called forth by something occasional, something having its 
own date and place.  But what was evoked is a substance so 
formed that it can enter into the experiences of others and 
enable them to have more intense and more fully rounded out 
experiences of their own.” (Dewey 1934)  Dewey believes that 
is what it is to have form; that it marks a way of 
envisaging, of feeling, and of presenting experienced matter 
so that it most readily and effectively becomes material for 
the construction of adequate experience on the part of those 
less gifted than the original creator.  The architect 
thereby has the vital duty to properly realize this form in 
buildings.  “The work itself is matter formed into esthetic 
substance.” (Dewey 1934)  However, “The quality of a work of 
art is sui generis because the manner in which general 
material is rendered transforms it into a substance that is 
fresh and vital.”  Dewey believes a work of art is recreated 
every time it is experienced becoming whatever it is in 
virtue of one‟s own vital experience.  Therefore, the 
Parthenon, or whatever, is universal because it can 
continuously inspire new personal relations in experience.   
Conditions of Aesthetic Form: 
In Art as Experience Dewey identifies five formal 
conditions of aesthetic form.  “What standardly 
characterizes aesthetic experience and artistic objects 
is the presence of form.” (Shusterman 2000)  I believe 
that form, especially in architecture, is not the static 
spatial relations, but the dynamic interaction of 
elements displaying the kind of continuity, cumulation, 
tension, conservation, anticipation, and fulfillment 
which, together with emotional intensity, are defining 
features of the aesthetic experience.  Dewey proposed 
the latter five characteristics as aids to the 
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understanding and unfolding of an art-centered aesthetic 
experience.  I think it is important to add the first – 
cumulation – to the list.  “When defined as an 
experience of form, aesthetic experience must thus be 
embedded in all experiences.” (Dewey 1934)  At the same 
time, as we have seen, pure aesthetic judgments cannot 
be based entirely on immediately perceivable properties, 
because the cognitive internalization of a perceived 
object must incorporate the meaning and significance 
which the beholder also assigns to the object. (R. 
Weber, On the Aesthetics of Architecture; A 
Physchological Approach to the Structure and the Order 
of Perceived Architectural Space 1995)  Therein lies the 
usefulness of Dewey‟s conditions of aesthetic form; and 
their ability to reveal the essence of experience.   
As we have seen, “The esthetic experience arises, 
then, from experiencing and perceiving the meaning of 
life's cadenced form - not an artificial order that the 
individual imposes upon either the world or his own 
experience, but a very natural and organic thing, and 
thus artistic form, the expression of this order, is 
rooted deep in the very nature of the world itself.” 
(Musial 1968)  Noreberg-Schulz would say that man is a 
“thing” among “things;” he “uses” them and has to know 
them.  He lives with the “cosmic order;” the course of 
the sun and the cardinal points.  In particular, man is 
related to the “character” of things; there exists a 
übereinstimmung, a correspondence between his own 
psychic states and the “forces” of nature.  Only then he 
may obtain a personal “friendship” with things, and 
experience the environment as meaningful.  Perhaps most 
important of all, man lives with and is tuned by 
“light.”  Thereby he lives with “time,” the rhythms of 
the day and night, with the seasons and history. (C. 
Norberg-Schulz 1979)  This is not an arbitrary 
coincidence, but a deep seeded fact.   
Through Dewey we also learned that art and beauty 
lie in the “basic vital functions,” “the biological 
commonplaces” man shares with “bird and beast.” (Dewey 
1934)  As Thomas J. Musial points out in his article 
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Aesthetics and Pragmatism: John Dewey‟s “Art as 
Experience”, “Dewey enables us to come to a new 
understanding of what Aristotle may have meant when he 
said that art imitates nature; a new understanding of 
why all the great theologies are composed in verse; of 
why Lucretius, Plato and Dante were in principle able to 
achieve the supreme wedding of philosophical didacticism 
and poetical form; of why formal ritual is so important 
in the life of man.  Artistic form is the organic rhythm 
of the reality which it describes.  It thus cannot be 
arbitrary.  Whenever it is, we immediately sense the 
falsity of a contrived form.  An esthetic experience is 
only possible when we experience and perceive the 
relationships among the objects and events of the 
specific kind of world that we have.” (Musial 1968)  
Thus far we have spoken about the centrality of nature 
to spirituality, now we see can begin to realize the 
role of nature in the architectural aesthetic.   
The first, and perhaps most important condition of 
Dewey‟s of aesthetic forms is „continuity.‟  Crudely 
speaking, continuity has chiefly to do with the before and 
after of experience – with its past, in other words, and its 
future.  „Cumulation,‟ „conservation,‟ „tension,‟ 
„anticipation‟ and „fulfillment‟ all have to do with the 
internal dynamics of experience, with what happens during 
its unfolding. (Jackson 1998)  I will firstly address their 
general ideas.  Later, I will seek to elaborate via case 
studies.  We must remember that experience does not just go 
on under the skin, or inside the consciousness, of the 
„experiener.‟  It happens within the world at large.  It 
encompasses the total transaction taking place between the 
organism/subject and its environment/object.  This means 
that the conditions of aesthetic form have physical 
manifestations as well as psychological ones.   
Continuity: 
„Continuity,‟ in its broadest meaning, refers to what 
is stable in experience, to that which continues.  Dewey 
says, “Nature and life manifest not flux but continuity, and 
continuity involves forces and structures that endure 
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through change; at least when they change, they do so more 
slowly than do surface incidents, and thus are, relatively, 
constant.” (Dewey 1934)  “Among the various forces and 
structures that provide continuity to experience, some are 
physical; others, ideational.”  (Jackson 1998)  
Architecturally speaking, physical forces are the materials 
that the architect manipulates to give architecture its 
space and form.  Central among the ideational forces are the 
predilections and proclivities that the architect (and the 
inhabitant) brings to the building in the form of habits, 
attitudes, and dispositions.  Those too constitute materials 
with which the architect works.  “They give stability to 
experience.  They do so by linking present with past and 
past with future.” (Jackson 1998)  Continuity addresses the 
implications of concepts such as habit, reconstruction, and 
growth.  It deals chiefly with relations that link an 
aesthetic experience with circumstances lying outside its 
own boundaries – that is, with resources from the past that 
it draws upon and with the future consequences of the 
changes that it occasions. (Jackson 1998)  It is central if 
there is to be a consummating close (i.e. an experience). 
(Dewey 1934)  So too, Noreberg-Schulz emphasizes abstracting 
a systematic cosmic order from the flux of occurrences as a 
mode of natural understanding. (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  He 
also speaks of a form of continuity necessary for 
„gathering.‟   
Cumulation: 
„Cumulation‟ is the first of the four remaining 
characteristics which all lie within the confines of an 
experience.  It is the buildup that attends the temporal 
unfolding of an aesthetic experience and is evinced in a 
variety of ways depending on perspective and on the 
specifics of the situation. (Jackson 1998)  The increase can 
be experienced emotionally as tension or anticipation or 
intellectually through the internal complexity of the work 
or as a deepening of meaning.  “Regardless of its 
manifestation, cumulation tells us this: Without a buildup 
of some kind, there can be no fulfillment.  And without 
fulfillment there can be no aesthetic experience.” (Jackson 
1998)  Architecturally speaking a building can literally and 
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figuratively „buildup;‟ thereby inducing cumulation.  The 
appreciator can also increase a sense of worth through what 
Dewey calls “a progressive massing of values,” and Heidegger 
would call gathering.  Again, qualitative and quantitative 
aspects emerge.  I believe this is most successfully done 
through the cumulation of experiences pertaining to any one 
particular building or series of buildings.  Heidegger 
taught us that this “gathering” also occurs with regards to 
the history of „place.‟  Dewey makes clear that “there can 
be no movement toward a consummating close unless there is a 
progressive massing of values, a cumulative effect. (Dewey 
1934)  One must then question how to deepen meaning; how to 
mass values; how to cumulate architecturally?  We have seen 
the variety of ways meaning can manifest in buildings.  Just 
a few of these possible instances will be divulged as we 
look at our dwellings.   
Conservation: 
 „Conservation‟ offers two avenues for explanations.  
Dewey speaks of energies that operate within the experience 
as a whole; in the other he emphasizes what happens to 
meaning.  Each calls attention to a different aspect of a 
complex set of conditions.  Dewey insist that each of the 
energies at work in experience (some physical and others 
not) are very real indeed.  The energies are resisting each 
other and the balance of those forces fluctuate; often 
rhythmically.  He describes each opposing force as entailing 
movement.  “Resistance accumulates energy; it institutes 
conservation until release and expansion ensue.” (Dewey 
1934)  What gets conserved is energy itself.  That pent-up 
energy builds to a point where its force exceeds that of its 
opposition.  Then comes its release, or „expression.‟  The 
energy whose resistance has been temporarily overcome has 
been correspondingly conserved.  From the standpoint of 
meaning, what gets conserved is, as Dewey says, “the import 
of what has gone before” summed up and conserved almost 
unconsciously. (Dewey 1934)  Without conservation of meaning 
life could not go on, actions would be meaningless, 
architecture would not exist. (Jackson 1998)  Again, we can 
infer that an architecture-centered aesthetic experience 
meaning is deepened through conservation, and therefore 
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architecture cannot be disconnected from its history; from 
its place; from its milieu.   
Tension: 
 „Tension‟ also has more than one referent for Dewey.  
Most of the time it refers to the opposition of energies 
within the experience as a whole.  The rhythmic interplay 
between compression/intensity and release/extensity that 
give life to experience while moving it forward.  In 
aesthetic experiences the tensions undergone and the 
problems encountered are more immediate.  “They are chiefly 
concerned, in other words, with the integral nature of the 
experience rather than with conditions that lie beyond its 
temporal boundaries.” (Jackson 1998)  Dewey believes tension 
itself can be an energizing force, something we might seek 
rather than try to avoid.  We actually benefit from 
encountering difficulties on our way to either creating, 
understanding, or appreciating a work of architecture, 
provided that those obstructions in the course of either 
activity derive from the work itself, and are not just 
intrusions from the outside. (Dewey 1934)  Architecturally 
speaking, I believe tension manifest largely through the 
varied interactions within, or about, any physical 
structure.  Tension could also manifest as a disposition 
toward building maintenance or construction amongst the 
onslaught of other rhythmic tasks.  Tension can also 
manifest as a dynamicism between physical building 
components.  There is unquantifiable opportunities for 
tension.  Aesthetic experience is a moving, fragile, and 
vanishing, even briefly savored in an experiential flux rife 
with energies of tension and disorder which it momentarily 
masters. (Shusterman 2000)  Art requires the challenge of 
tension and disruptive novelty and the rhythmic struggle of 
achievement and breakdown of order.  “Since the artist cares 
in a peculiar way for the phase of experience in which union 
is achieved, he does not shun moments of resistance and 
tension.  He rather cultivates them, not for their own sake, 
but for their potentialities”; for transformation into a 
unified experience. (Dewey 1934)   
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Anticipation: 
 „Anticipation‟ divides into two temporal phases.  The 
first occurs before the experience has formally begun.  The 
second characterizes what goes on during the experience.  
Dewey says little of anticipation beyond acknowledging its 
place as a formal characteristic of aesthetic experiences.  
I believe anticipation as an architectural-centered 
experience is often prevalent.  We acknowledge that we are 
going to such-and-such „place‟ which often assumes the 
physicality of a architectural building.  Furthermore, we 
either favor or dread this engagement by intentionally 
seeking to go, or reluctantly conceding.  We commonly 
approach such architectural experiences in an anticipatory 
mood.  The second stage grows out of the emerging conditions 
of the experience and ensue as a matter of course.  The 
ensuing consequences of disappointment, or unexpected 
pleasure, reveal the dynamic interplay between what we bring 
to an experience and the quality of the experience itself.  
When what we bring includes an anticipation of what the 
experience will be like as an experience, the stage is set 
for a judgment to be made. (Shusterman 2000)  Amongst other 
things, the individual can judge the degree of fulfillment 
perceived from their experience.   
Fulfillment: 
 I believe Dewey‟s „fulfillment‟ is akin to what I would 
consider to be the experience of „naturalized spirituality.‟  
Fulfillment rest at the consummation (not cessation) of an 
aesthetic experience.  However, if taken solely in Deweyan 
context fulfillment is not necessarily identical to 
naturalized spirituality.  One must be cognizant of all the 
other issues we have talked about pertaining to naturalized 
spirituality.  Particularly, fulfillment signifies the 
experience of meaning to a particular quality.  We have 
already come to understand fulfillment as being key to the 
dynamic organization of aesthetic form.  “That which 
distinguishes an experience as esthetic is conversion of 
resistance and tensions, of excitations that in themselves 
are temptations to diversion, into movement toward an 
inclusive and fulfilling close.” (Dewey 1934)  This pertains 
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to both experiencing and the object.  If individual 
experiences „continuity,‟ „cumulation,‟ „conservation,‟ 
„tension,‟ and „anticipation‟ in both the object, and their 
experience of the object, to a heightened level of aesthetic 
perception, based upon the principles of „naturalized 
spirituality,‟ they will then come to perceive the 
architecture-centered aesthetic experience.   
 Aesthetic experience is as much a disturbance toward 
the new as an achieved ordering of the old.  Dewey is very 
clear on this point.  He says that “in the process of 
living, attainment of a period of equilibrium is at the same 
time the initiation of a new relation to the environment, 
one that brings with it potency of new adjustments to be 
made though struggle.  The time of consummation is also one 
of beginning anew.  Any attempt to perpetuate beyond its 
term the enjoyment attending the time of fulfillment and 
harmony constitutes withdrawal from the world.  Hence it 
marks the lowering and loss of vitality.” (Dewey 1934)  The 
developing, decomposing, and hence provoking unity of 
aesthetic experience which Dewey sees as emerging from the 
rhythms of organic life: “To overpass the limits that are 
set is destruction and death, out of which, however, new 
rhythms are built up.” (Dewey 1934)  “Aesthetic experience 
shines as living beauty, not only because it is surrounded 
by the death of disorder and monotonous routine, but because 
its own sparkling career projects the process of its dying 
as it lives.” (Shusterman 2000)  Herein we witness 
naturalism, and a spirituality that is accessible 
immediately, everyday, here, and now.   
Modernism, Dwelling, Spirituality: 
 Understanding architecture in terms of vivid experience 
rather than static objects does better justice to the 
dynamic power and moving spirit which makes art so 
captivatingly alive and enlivening. (Dewey 1934) “For 
aesthetic experience, even of the contemplation of so-called 
static arts, is always a temporally moving process of doing 
and undergoing where experience is developed cumulatively 
and brought to fulfillment; and where the perceiver, like 
the creative artist, is captured and pushed forward to that 
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fulfillment through his own engaged, contributing energies 
which find satisfaction and increases vitality through being 
so engaged and absorbed.” (Shusterman 2000)  Now we will 
turn back to our case study dwellings to access the success 
of a few, of the insurmountable possibilities, for 
architecture to manifest Dewey‟s conditions of aesthetic 
form, and Heidegger‟s concretization of an existential 
foothold, so that it might be perceived through the 
architectural-centered aesthetic experience.  In doing so, 
we will better realize how pragmatist aestheticism is most 
beneficial to naturalized spiritually; more so than any one 
of its oppositional choices.   
Being “modern” means being up to date, but being a 
Modernist is an affirmation of faith in the tradition of the 
new. (Weston 1996)  “Modernism developed out of a 
bewildering array of movements and theories ranging from 
Cubism to Constructivism, abstraction to atonality.  
Starting out more as an attitude of mind than a conscious 
style, Modernism was a response to the need for the new and 
the different which was felt in the early twentieth century 
by intellectuals and artist throughout Europe.” (Weston 
1996)  It became a phenomenon which was familiar to many but 
remained the reserve of the few, with such giants as Le 
Corbusier, Miles van der Rohe and Walter Gropius; much 
activity centered around the Bauhaus as a focus of ideas in 
the 1920‟s. (Weston 1996)  Ultimately, as we will see, 
Wright was rejected and Le Corbusier was exalted in the 
critical establishment of a universal Modern architecture. 
(Doremus 1985) At the root of the modern movement, as 
defined by Le Corbusier, was the wish to help alienated 
modern man to regain a true and meaningful existence.  (C. 
Norberg-Schulz 1979)  “To achieve this he needed „freedom‟ 
as well as „identity.‟  „Freedom‟ meant primarily liberation 
from the absolutist systems of the Baroque age and their 
successors, that is, a new right to choose and participate.  
„Identity‟ meant to bring man back to what is original and 
essential.  The modern movement, in fact, used the slogan 
Neue Sachlichkeit which ought to be translated as „back to 
things‟ rather than „new rationalism‟”. (C. Norberg-Schulz 
1979)  However, ironically enough, we will see that – from a 
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spiritual point of view – Le Corbusier‟s modernism 
exacerbated the very condition he was trying to stop, and in 
fact, did not „return to things.‟  A loss of identification 
results in alienation; it hinders „gathering,‟ and therefore 
the ability to freely identify is key.   
One of Modernisms central objectives was assisting the 
European avant-garde in breaking from the past.  The 
generation of architects practicing just after World War I 
in Europe undertook the responsibility for addressing all 
the technological, social, political, economic, and 
aesthetic changes that they saw occurring in the world, 
changes that were so great when considered in total that 
nothing less than a complete rethinking of the construction 
of the built environment was deemed appropriate as a 
response. (Doremus 1985)  For several hundred years before 
World War I, a traditional architecture of one type or 
another had predominated in Western Culture; as did 
particular theological contentions for spirituality.  “The 
basis of meaning for all such architectures was a 
confirmation of the unity of culture in society through 
reference to is sources: ancient Greece and Rome or medieval 
France.  What the first generation of twentieth-century 
European architects was calling for, on the other hand, was 
not a confirmation of the past, or even really of the 
present, but a prediction of the future.  They demanded that 
architecture look new, and their adoption of a factory or 
machine esthetic could be justified only by a total 
rejection of all that had come before.” (Doremus 1985)  This 
disbanding of history is to have spirituality detrimental 
results in its execution.   
In America, Frank Lloyd Wright had represented a 
similar spirit of the new as did the Europeans, but he also 
claimed continuity with the American tradition.  This caused 
Wright to be seen through the eyes of European Modernist as 
a relic of the nineteenth century, a proto-Modern American 
equivalent of Art Nouveau and Sezession styles. (Doremus 
1985)  Yet continuity, as we have learned from John Dewey, 
is fundamental to an architecture-centered aesthetic 
experience.  Therefore, a complete rejection of the past, a 
failure to recognize the present, and a forsaking of the 
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future is unquestionably disadvantageous to perception, and 
subsequently the manifestation of spirituality via 
architecture.  In aesthetic experience the material of the 
past neither fills attention, as in recollection, nor is 
subordinated to a special purpose.  “There is, indeed, a 
restriction imposed upon what comes.  But it is that of 
contribution to the immediate matter of an experience now 
had.  The material is not employed as a bridge to some 
further experience, but as an increase and individualization 
of present experience.  The scope of a work of art is 
measure by the number and variety of elements coming from 
past experiences that are organically absorbed into the 
perception had here and now.” (Dewey 1934)  To forsake 
continuity, as some modernist did in both media and history, 
would be detrimental to the quality of the aesthetic 
experience.   
As mentioned, the time directly preceding the unveiling 
of Villa Savoye was extremely fruitful for the career of Le 
Corbusier, and Villa Savoye can be viewed as a realization 
of his philosophical and architectural contentions.  Housing 
was the principle focus of his efforts during the 1920‟s and 
between 1923 and 1927 he would emerge as one of Europe‟s 
leading architects and in a striking way. (Mallgrave 2005)  
Le Corbusier was a decorative artist and painter who 
recognized that circumstances were propelling him toward 
more encompassing tasks: “because buildings, especially 
dwellings, are so deeply intertwined with the lives of 
people that they must open themselves up to the problems of 
human existence.  In particular, the house must help people 
fill and profit from the sixteen hours of repose that follow 
the eight-hour workday.” (Anderson 2006)  It was in Towards 
a New Architecture that Le Corbusier reached his definitive 
conclusion: “A house is made for living in,” not for looking 
at.  “Pictures are made to be looked at.” (Corbusier 1986)  
Le Corbusier was acting from a reactionary stance to the 
sumptuous interiors of the Art Deco ensembliers in trying to 
make a home a more efficient place, to deal with everyday 
life, instead of with the esoteric, almost outdated problems 
of décor. (Anderson 2006)  Yet we have learned such a 
distinction cannot be effectively drawn.  “An architecture 
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pure, neat, clear, clean and healthy.  Contrast with this 
our carpets, cushions, canopies, wall-papers, carved with 
gild furniture, fated or „arty‟ colors: the dismalness of 
our Western Bazaar.” (Corbusier 1986)  The startling 
conclusion is thus seemingly logical and self-evident: “A 
house is a machine for living in.” (Corbusier 1986)  
However, living in this sense seems to be little more than 
conflated sustenance; nothing akin to dwelling.   
In contrast, Frank Lloyd Wrights presentation of 
Fallingwater can be viewed as more of a wildcard in his 
career.  In fact, at this time of maximum activity in 
Europe, Wright had gone west to California and Japan.  In 
1923 he just completed the Imperial Hotel in Japan.  “Wright 
was virtually a non-practicing architect in the years 1924-
7.” (Mallgrave 2005)  “Wrights lack of work led him – 
between 1927 and 1932 – to write.” (Mallgrave 2005)  In 1928 
Wright published a review of Le Corbusier‟s Towards a New 
Architecture, and with it begins a polemic that he would 
develop in essays and lectures over the next several years. 
(Mallgrave 2005)  In his review of Le Corbusier‟s book 
Wright attacks the notion that architecture is simply 
„surface and mass,‟ and therefore neglecting the third 
dimension of depth. (Mallgrave 2005)  In a spirited piece 
published in Architectural Record in 1929, Wright defends 
his “organic” conception – material weight, textural 
ornamentation, and depth – against the gas-pipe rails, thin 
slabs, and naked steel features of the European Modernist:  
A visual examination of the modern houses at the 1927 
Deutscher Werkbund exhibition “The Dwelling,” held in 
Stuttgart, Germany which was the most comprehensive 
gathering of modernist architects to date showed much 
uniformity among the work of architects throughout Europe in 
the late 1920‟s. (Anderson 2006)  “These artificially thin 
walls like cardboard, bent, folded, and glued together, are 
frankly, likewise dedicated not to the Machine but to 
machinery!  Therefore they do not live.” (Wright 1929)  
Moreover, Europeans lack sympathy with nature, and their 
“stark boxes blister the eyes by refusing the sun-acceptance 
tress, rocks, and flowers love.” (Wright 1929)  The 
disbanding of nature, as both Dewey and Heidegger have 
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taught us, is understandably detrimental to the realization 
of naturalized spirituality through aesthetic perception.   
Frank Lloyd Wright, in his Kahn lectures, delivered at 
Princeton University in the spring of 1930 reiterates his 
earlier critique of Le Corbusier and his followers in the 
lecture, “The Cardboard House” where he addressed the 
shallow space of Le Corbusier‟s Villas; the space of Cubist 
painting, and thus of early Purist canvases.  Speaking of 
Kahn, Noreberg-Schulz points out that he happens to be one 
of the few architects to place architecture rightly amongst 
existential importance; thus Kahn posed the question, “What 
does the building want to be?”; thereby posing the question 
in an existential form. (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  Anyhow, 
perhaps it‟s no coincidence then that Frank Lloyd Wright was 
the architect to deliver the Kahn lectures of which he said: 
The cardboard forms thus made are glued 
together in box-like forms – in childish 
attempt to make buildings resemble steamships, 
flying machines, or locomotives.  By way of a 
new sense of the character and power of this 
machine age, this house strips and stoops to 
conquer by emulating, if not imitating, 
machinery.  But so far, I see in most of the 
cardboard house of the “modernistic” movement 
small evidence that their designers have 
mastered either the machinery or the mechanical 
processes that build the house.  I find no 
evidence of integral method in their making.  
Of late, they are the superficial, badly built 
product of this superficial, new „surface-and-
mass‟ aesthetic falsely claiming French 
painting as a parent.  And the houses 
themselves are not the new working of a 
fundamental architectural principle in any 
sense. (Wright, The Cardboard House 2008)  
While today production techniques are perhaps 
on-par with Le Corbusier‟s vision the 
ramifications of such an aesthetic are still 
hard to justify spiritually.   
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As different as Le Corbusier and Frank Lloyd Wrights 
architectural philosophies may have been there was still a 
great deal similarity between these two architects.  For 
instance, Le Corbusier extolled modern advances under the 
unlikely “banner of decorative art.” (Anderson 2006)  A 
banner to which Frank Lloyd Wright also subscribed.  
Ceramics, jewelry, glassware, furniture, printed papers, 
woven textiles, murals, metalwork, lithographs, embroidery 
are, in many ways, constituents of every household.  “They 
constitute its décor, adjust its functions, and express the 
histories, tastes, and aspirations of its inhabitants.” 
(Anderson 2006)  “The house, then, was the fulcrum on which 
the great architectural revolution would turn.” (Anderson 
2006)  “Le Corbusier proclaimed that it was propelled by 
change in the decorative arts – in all those things that, 
assembled, constitute the habitable environment of a house.” 
(Anderson 2006)  In 1923 Le Corbusier pronounced that the, 
“The problem of the house is a problem of the epoch.  The 
equilibrium of society to-day depends upon it.  Architecture 
has for its first duty, in this period of renewal, that of 
bringing about a revision of values, a revision of the 
constituent elements of the house.” (Corbusier 1986)  
“Contemporary life – not style, not form, not aesthetics – 
was the foundation of modern architecture in the late 
1920‟s.  To see this, it was essential to understand 
architecture, interiors, furnishings, and equipment as 
essential and intertwined.” (Anderson 2006)  Yet, this 
holistic understanding of contemporary life „aesthetics,‟ 
just not analytic aesthetics as conceived by Le Corbusier.   
Le Corbusier ultimately concluded that, “Modern 
decorative art is not decorated.” (Corbusier, The Decorative 
Art of Today 1987)  In “Mass Production Houses” Le Corbusier 
presents his ideas as “one between architects and men of 
taste, and the universal love of the home.” (Anderson 2006)  
“Le Corbusier followed aims similar to those that 
progressive French designers had pursued for a long time: 
faith that art would bring about the „assimilation of the 
masses to the life of the spirit‟ and an interest in „the 
chaotic order of life,‟ as well as a avowed „hatred of 
stagnation.‟  He also emulated tastes that had begun to 
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develop in the 
decorative art 
ensembles a decade 
earlier, tastes based 
on „simple, pure, 
logical and even 
slightly harsh 
lines,‟ and followed 
a tacit presumption 
that French middle-
class people had 
enough taste to 
furnish their own homes artistically.  Le Corbusier looked 
for simplicity, instinct, and necessity in the objects he 
chose to furnish and equip the modern dwelling unit, and he 
composed them to bring out fortuitous relationships.” 
(Anderson 2006)  Le Corbusier‟s big mistake seems to be 
viewing life as chaotic.  For as we have seen this is simply 
not the case.  His second mistake seems to be making the 
assumption that the interior can be conceived of separate 
from the exterior, for that would defy the notion of 
wholeness emphasized by Dewey‟s conditions of aesthetic 
form.   
John Dewey believes that, “the moot problem of the 
relation of the decorative and expressive is solved when it 
is viewed in the context of the integration of matter and 
form.  The expressive inclines to the side of meaning, the 
decorative to that of sense.” (Dewey 1934)  Yet the 
isolation of sense is not characteristic of aesthetic 
objects.  The conclusion to be drawn is that the 
distinctively decorative quality is due to unusual energy of 
a sensory tract that lends vividness and appeal to the other 
activities with which it is associated.” (Dewey 1934)  “The 
active agency of a particular sense-organ is involved in the 
production of the quality, but the organ is not for this 
reason the focus of the conscious experience.  The 
connection of qualities with objects is intrinsic in all 
experience having significance.” (Dewey 1934)  “Were 
enjoyment simply of qualities by themselves, the decorative 
and the expressive would have no connection with each other, 
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one coming from immediate sense experience and the other 
from relations and meanings introduced by art.” (Dewey 1934)  
Therefore, matter carries the meaning, form carries the 
sense, and one should not aim to isolate one in favor of the 
other for aesthetic qualities sake.   
Like Le Corbusier, Frank Lloyd Write also inscribed 
decorative arts and took a holistic stance on constituting 
the habitable environment of a house, albeit his treatment 
was severely different than Le Corbusier‟s, thus providing 
an extremely dissimilar experience.  Wright was always 
associated with the Arts & Crafts Movement which is as much 
due to his philosophy of clean, simple straight lines as to 
his choice of materials.  Write wrote and delivered a paper 
entitled “The Art and Craft of the Machine.”  He took a more 
modern stance by championing the machine as a method of 
saving time and effort while still producing objects of 
beauty.  Decorative arts, in Wrights case, includes 
furniture, art glass, lightscreens, graphics, metalwork, 
ceramics, as well as decorative architectural flourishes.  
Looking at Wright‟s work from another perspective, it may 
seem that he fits more comfortably into the category of art 
nouveau. (Heinz 2001)  In contrast to Le Corbusier, Wright 
practiced completely integrated assemblage, with each item 
and each detail complementing and reinforcing the other.  
While he used the most historically common materials, he 
managed to utilize them in innovative and unusual ways 
without in any way altering their basic characteristics or 
deviating very far from what is suggested by the materials 
themselves. (Heinz 
2001)  Wright believed 
that, “This is the 
modern opportunity, to 
make of a building, 
together with its 
equipment, 
appurtenances and 
environment, an entity 
which shall constitute 
a complete work of 
art.” (Weston 1996)  
 137 
The Study 
This seems to be Dewey‟s pragmatic conditions of aesthetic 
form at work in their utmost regard.   
John Dewey tells us that objects of industrial arts 
have form – that adapted to their special uses.  “These 
objects take on esthetic form, whether they are rugs, urns, 
or baskets, when the material is so arranged and adapted 
that it serves immediately the enrichment of the immediate 
experience of the one whose attentive perception is directed 
to it.  No material can be adapted to an end, be it that of 
use as spoon or carpet, until raw material has undergone a 
change that shapes the parts and that arranges these parts 
with reference to one another with a view to the purpose of 
the whole.  Hence the object has form in a definitive sense.  
When this form is liberated from limitation to a specialized 
end and serves also the purposes of an immediate and vital 
experience, the form is esthetic and not merely useful.” 
(Dewey 1934)  The key here is the generation of form via an 
ordered relation of many constituent elements in an 
experience.   
The interfusion of all properties of the medium is 
necessary if the object in question is to serve the whole 
creature in his unified vitality. (Dewey 1934)  Design has a 
double meaning.  It signifies purpose and it signifies 
arrangement, mode of composition. (Dewey 1934)  Therefore, 
although both Le Corbusier and Frank Lloyd Wright understood 
this to a degree, Wright seemed more successful in having 
the constituent parts of a whole contribute to the 
consummation of a conscious experience.  Dewey believes that 
in the work of art, the relations cannot be told apart from 
what they relate except in later reflection.  A work of art 
is poor in the degree in which they exist in separation. 
(Dewey 1934)  This last statement essentially surmises the 
aesthetic deficiency of Le Corbusier‟s architectural 
philosophy.   
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The aesthetic shortcoming of Le Corbusier over Frank 
Lloyd Wright appears in at least two instances in these 
dwellings which serve to illustrate their aesthetic 
difference quite vividly.  One can be seen in their 
treatment of their fireplaces; the other can be seen in a 
similar statement they both made upon entry to the 
dwellings.  Le Corbusier‟s fireplace in Villa Savoye, while 
adhering to his purist aesthetic, seems to be designed as 
merely useful; if that.  The more primordial act of building 
a fire doesn‟t seem to mesh well with purist philosophy any 
better than does his fireplace for coping with it.  Wright‟s 
fireplace at Fallingwater is not only more useful than is Le 
Corbusier‟s, but he designs it with a holistic aesthetic  
 
reflecting the a more profound sensibility to the primordial 
act of building a fire.  It is not contrived.  As a result, 
Wrights approach to the natural phenomena did not consist in 
the abstract observation and analysis common in Europe, but 
in the direct experience of archetypal, meaningful “forces.” 
(Norberg-Shulz 1979)  “His use of natural materials must 
also be understood as the manifestation of a wish for a 
return to the concrete phenomena, that is, for a „deeper 
 
 
Fireplace at Fallingwater Fireplace at Villa Savoye 
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sense of reality.‟” (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  I, like 
Noreberg-Schulz in speaking of Wright‟s early prairie homes, 
believe that Wright‟s decorative effect is not achieved in 
isolation, it is not empty embellishment, or fastidious 
ornamentation.  Wright orders raw materials so that through 
interaction with the self experience can become delightful.  
Likewise, at the entry to Villa Savoye there is a standard 
lavatory presented as an overt symbol of the mass-produced 
functional object.  By contrast, at Fallingwater, a natural 
spring spills into a pool made from rocks thereby denying 
the factory-made object with an element particular to the 
function and nature of the site. (Doremus 1985)  Again, 
Wright succeeds over Le Corbusier in accounting for the 
wholeness of experience in accounting for particulars.  It 
is another attempt for a deeper sense of reality.  These are 
two completely different treatments which ultimately – in 
their own way – attribute to completely different 
architectural-centered aesthetic experiences.   
 
 
Water Feature at Fallingwater Water Feature at Villa Savoye 
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By 1928 Le Corbusier had become the ablest propagandist 
for the modern movement in Europe. (Mallgrave 2005)  The 
turning-point for Modernism, and subsequently for both of 
these architects careers, came in 1932 when modernism was 
christened „The International Style‟ at an exhibition held 
at the Museum of Modern Art in New York.  This show changed 
the view of Modernist design and architecture forever, 
leading after the Second World War to its adoption as an 
almost universal style.  Favored initially by large 
corporations, it spread to speculative office and apartment 
blocks and appeared throughout the world from Tokyo to Rio 
de Janeiro. (Weston 1996)  Alex T. Anderson, in his book The 
Problem of the House, speaking largely of the modern 
movement in Europe (and particularly France) believes that, 
“The house did not always fit well with the histories of 
modern architecture that ascribed the logic of new 
functions, the new application of pure forms, new materials, 
and new construction methods, as its „predisposing causes,‟ 
to use the words of Reyner Banham.” (Anderson 2006)  “The 
ordinary dwelling lay well outside the interests of „the 
first moderns,‟ who attempted to formulate universally 
applicable laws for architectural aesthetics.  Thus, even if 
the modern architecture that took shape in the late 1920‟s 
benefited from the academic rationalism of the eighteenth 
century and the technological developments that followed, it 
did not share the same concerns.  It responded to the 
heterogeneous conditions of everyday life, and until at 
least the late 1920‟s, its primary concern was the „problem 
of the house.‟” (Anderson 2006)  Yet, as we are coming to 
realize, a „universal aesthetic‟ to address the „problem of 
the house‟ is counter intuitive to dwelling.   
“Whatever the underlying motives – gender, power, 
consumption, fashion, geometry, color – for modernist 
architects of the 1920‟s, the modern house was the pivot on 
which the issues turned.  And it seemed that solutions to 
many of the problems of the age hinged on the solution to 
the problem of the modern house.” (Anderson 2006)  Thomas 
Doremus believes that Frank Lloyd Wright, after viewing 
Villa Savoye in the 1932 Museum of Modern Art exhibition – 
which he also submitted an entry to – seems to have 
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responded directly to Villa Savoye in the first commission 
he could use.  Which so happens to be the Kaufman House at 
Bear Run, Pennsylvania of 1935, also known as Fallingwater.  
As we have seen, Wright was an outspoken dissident of Le 
Corbusier and the International Style which had become the 
poster-child for Modern architecture.  Therefore, putting 
aside the obvious physical difference in their sites, the 
correspondences in program between their „dwellings‟ is 
striking.  “Each was a three-bedroom country house for a 
wealthy client who made frequent arrivals and departures by 
automobile.” (Doremus 1985)  Being dwellings, as opposed to 
government buildings for example, they are free of the 
burden of catering to the influence of outside forces such 
as a “political aesthetic.”  Also, as Doremus so 
illustratingly points out, “The presentation by each 
architect of a precisely defined structural system is 
indicative of a most crucial attitude toward Modern „style‟ 
that was common to both of them.  In Vers Une Architecture 
Le Corbusier proposes the idea of standardization as the 
foundation for modern style. 
„It is necessary to press on towards the 
establishment of standards in order to face the 
problem of perfection.  Here we have the birth of 
style, that is to say the attainment, universally 
recognized, of a state of perfection universally 
felt… The establishment of a standard is developed 
by organizing rational elements, following a line of 
direction equally rational.  The form and appearance 
are in no way preconceived, they are a result.‟ 
Modern architecture, then, is to be formed by the 
organization of building elements, rationally chosen, into 
systems based on real standards such as function or 
manufacture.  This same idea was espoused by Wright about 
the same time in his 1927-28 series of articles for 
Architectural Record, “In the Cause of Architecture”: 
„The question is now, how to achieve style, how 
to conserve that quality and profit to the fullest 
extent by standardization, the soul of the machine, 
in the work that is „Man.‟ …  [Style is obtained] 
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first by directly acknowledging the nature of the 
problem presented and expressing it with a sense of 
appropriate shape and proportion in terms of the 
character of the materials and the process of a work 
that [is] to make the building.‟ 
The clear expression of independent systems of building 
elements is therefore the key to understanding both the 
Villa Savoye and Fallngwater as statements of stylistic 
principles for Modern architecture.” (Doremus 1985)  Wright, 
more than Le Corbusier, seems to acknowledge that a style, 
or a design, cannot – and should not – be independent of the 
uniqueness that is its site.  He also seemed to acknowledge 
the existential importance of the character of materials 
which contribute to the quality of the architecture.   
However, before we get into greater detail on either of 
these two edifices, it is worth reflecting on the 
implications imbedded within the titles of these architects 
styles alone.  The title “International Style” already 
illustrates a disconnect from Dewey‟s conditions of 
aesthetic form, and our understanding of spirituality.  How 
can a dwelling be “international”?  Wouldn‟t a neglect of 
the particulars of place and cultural conditions that 
Heidegger, Solomon, and others taught us is so central to 
dwelling and spirituality compromise the manifestation of 
spirituality?  Even Encarta Dictionary list the word 
„domestic‟ as an antonym for „international.‟ (Encarta 
Dictionary 2007)  “Organic architecture,” on the other hand, 
as a title reflects the natural rhythms common to all life.  
The intrinsic vitality that develops naturally through 
growth contingent upon – not disregardful of - the 
particulars of place and culture (i.e. environment).   
As far as aesthetic impressions of these dwellings go 
Dewey tells us that the total overwhelming impression comes 
first, perhaps in seizure by a sudden glory of the 
landscape, or by the effect upon us of entrance into a 
cathedral when dim light, incense, stained glass and 
majestic proportions fuse in one indistinguishable whole. 
(Dewey 1934)  “Not only, however, is it impossible to 
prolong this stage of esthetic experience indefinitely, but 
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it is not desirable to do so.  There is only one guarantee 
that this direct seizure be at a high level, and that is the 
degree of cultivation of the one experiencing it.” (Dewey 
1934)  It is not wise to seek to recover by direct action 
the first fine rapture.  “The beginning of esthetic 
understanding is the retention of these personal experiences 
and their cultivation.” (Dewey 1934)  A work of 
architecture, like Dewey‟s „art‟ in general, is part of the 
objective world and its existence is causally conditioned by 
the coordination of materials and energies of the external 
world.  The first, and probably most important, 
characteristic of the environing world that makes possible 
the existence of artist form is rhythm. (Dewey 1934)  The 
larger rhythms of nature, which are so bound up in the 
conditions of even elementary human subsistence, can also be 
such as the circular course of the seasons. (Dewey 1934)  
Dewey‟s short definition of rhythm is a “ordered variation 
of changes.” (Dewey 1934)  Indeed, a profound understanding 
for the realization of rhythm is key to understanding 
Dewey‟s conditions of aesthetic form in general, and is also 
applicable to architecture.   
Le Corbusier‟s Villa Savoye, being the first of the two 
dwellings erected, was completed in 1929 at the height of 
the 1920‟s modernist movement in Europe.  I believe that the 
“total overwhelming impression,” to a large extent, can be 
derived from a picture.  Villa Savoye‟s is one of a building 
that seems to hover above its grassy site on an array of 
simple post and the supports seem to be placed without 
regard for the circumstances of its site. (Doremus 1985)  
“To present the bounding surfaces as „stretched planes‟ and 
not gravity-bound supporting walls, they were made as thin 
as possible and designed to create an unbroken effect.” 
(Weston 2003)  As Weston points out in his book Modernism, 
it has a planar character stressed by suppressing any 
suggestion of material weight.  However, even more striking, 
is the materiality of Villa Savoye.  Le Corbusier‟s passion 
for white grew out of the Purist aesthetic with its Platonic 
emphasis on the „primary sensations‟ aroused by simple 
geometric forms. (Weston 2003)  He viewed plain surfaces as 
the most effective means of exhibiting „mathematical 
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lyricism‟, which to him was the highest form of aesthetic 
order. (Weston 1996)   
Le Corbusier believed in a latent universal drive 
towards purification irrespective of technique which could 
bridge the gulf between culture, folklore and industry as a 
geometric impulse underlying all cultural form. (Frampton 
2001)  I don‟t believe such a „geometric impulse‟ exist.  
“Le Corbusier characterized this convergence by drawing the 
reader‟s attention to the similarity between the habitual 
whitewash seasonally applied to Mediterrean dwellings and 
the lead-based white enamel paint of industrial 
civilization.  He saw these two finishes – le lait de chaux 
(whitewash) and la loi du Ripolin (the rule of Ripolin, a 
commercial paint) – as a common purifying radiance uniting 
the vernacular 
of the Agean 
with the Purist 
plasticity of 
the industrial 
north.” 
(Frampton 2001)  
Perhaps Le 
Corbusier should 
have read Also 
sprach 
Zarathustra more 
thoroughly as Nietzsche – in his own unique manner – said, 
“Deep yellow and hot red: such is my taste, mixing blood 
into every color.  But he who whitewashes his house reveals 
to me a whitewashed soul.”  I think Dewey and Wright would 
also object to the spiritual consequences of museum-like 
walls upon which, in Vers une architecture, Le Corbusier 
advised the reader to only to exhibit a few paintings at any 
one time.  Thereby, he not only reinforced the „museum 
conception‟ of art which Dewey‟s pragmatist aesthetics is 
foundationally apposed, but going further by actually 
turning a house into a museum.   
Le Corbusier was also convinced that industrialized 
construction techniques, when fully developed, would yield 
the smooth „factory finish‟ he sought.  The reality of 
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building in the 1920‟s, was, needless to say, rather 
different, and far from being the seamless products of new 
building technology, his Purist villas – such as Villa 
Savoye – were ad hoc combinations of new and traditional 
materials, plastered over and painted white to appear 
homogeneous and machine made. (Weston 2003)  Through its 
„elimination of the equivocal,‟ wrote Le Corbusier, 
whitewash encouraged the „concentration of intention on its 
proper object.‟ (Weston 2003)  Again, Le Corbusier is 
undoubtedly implicating a divide in Dewey‟s conditions of 
aesthetic form.  In architecture is it really beneficial to 
eliminate the „equivocal‟?  If one did so wouldn‟t aesthetic 
perception of that object quickly become monotonous and 
aesthetically unfulfilling?   
The important point here is that Le Corbusier, and the 
white architecture of the International style, was 
challenged by the two great natural modifiers of buildings: 
climate and time.  “Reviewing a traveling exhibition of Le 
Corbusier‟s early villas in 1959, a mere 30 years after 
their completion, Nikolaus Pevsner became deeply depressed. 
… Le Corbusier‟s houses can‟t please in decay,‟ Pevsner 
observed.  „Concrete structures with walls designed to be 
rendered white make bad ruins.  What we are used to enjoy in 
decay, according to our upbringing, but perhaps also 
according to just laws of aesthetics, is weathered stone and 
lichens. … These white surfaces must be white, these metal 
window frames free from rust.  The Villa Savoye at Poissy 
should greet us on its hillcrest as an eternal vision.‟” 
(Weston 2003)  Le 
Corbusier‟s Villa 
Savoye, at least 
in the material 
term, is almost 
incapable of 
tolerating wear, 
or the patching 
and changes over 
time through the 
evolution of its 
materials.  It ask 
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to be re-clad rather than gradually remodeled. (Weston 2003)  
Le Corbusier virtually ignored Dewey‟s natural rhythms.  
Dewey might argue that Le Corbusier‟s material remained a 
means, and never became a medium.  In doing so nearly all 
still images of Villa Savoy – interestingly enough – are 
taken in pristine weather conditions.  There seems to be 
some sort of subconscious reflex to viewing Villa Savoye 
where it is only favorable to experience it on a sunny 
summer day.   
By contrast, Frank Lloyd Wrights Fallingwater was never 
allowed to fall into ruin, but even if it had it would make 
for a more successful ruin (and I believe there can be such 
a thing) than did Villa Savoye.  The “total overwhelming 
impression” of Fallingwater is as a vertical arrangement of 
cream-colored trays spreading in perpendicular directions 
from a massive stone core.  The trays give the impression of 
floating above the stream without support until the system, 
of cantilevering trellis beams is revealed behind the stone 
core as one crosses the bridge. (Doremus 1985)  Wrights 
response was site specific.  At Fallingwater, the memory of 
the quarry is inscribed into the architecture.  Wright found 
a local stone, which he had roughly squared and then laid to 
echo the natural bedding of the sedimentary rocks, which 
form low cliffs along the stream. (Weston 2003)  Wrights 
response to the landscape was direct and elemental.  “The 
three elements of nature – rocks, water, and light – that 
Wright distinguished at the site, each reacting with but 
independent of others, were translated into the component 
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systems of the house.” (Doremus 1985)  Frank Lloyd Wight did 
not ignore natures rhythms, contrary to Le Corbusier, he 
embraced them.  His success is evident in the fact that 
Fallingwater is often portrayed through photographs in a 
variety of seasonal and environmental conditions.   
Perhaps, the most telling of all avenues with which to 
investigate the architecture-centered aesthetic experience 
afforded through these two dwellings – without actually 
visiting – is through the video of others.  This perception 
forces us to objectify the character and quality of 
experience.  It will allow us to – in some form – experience 
the movement and space that is so integral to an 
architecture-centered aesthetic experience.  YouTube.com is 
a video sharing website on which users can upload and share 
videos.  YouTube displays a wide variety of user-generated 
video content, including movie clips, TV clips, and music 
videos, as well as amateur content such as video blogging 
and short original videos.  Most importantly, for our 
purposes, is the fact that the majority of the content on 
YouTube has been uploaded by individuals.  A search for 
“Villa Savoye” yields 20,126 results and a search for 
“Fallingwater” yields 201,160 results as of March 1st 2010; 
more than enough for our purposes.   
Many of the search results are animated computer 
generated renderings, or “fly-throughs,” of the original 
dwellings, but what interests us most is the manner in which 
these dwellings are being portrayed in actual “walk-
throughs” by physical visitors; in other words, actual 
experiences.  This sheds the most light on what a 
architectural-centered aesthetic experience might be like 
and allows us to extrapolate speculative conclusions with 
regard to John Dewey‟s conditions of aesthetic form.  It 
goes without saying that an experience one would incur as a 
tourist would be different than one an individual would 
incur as a owner.  For instance, as a tourist they must have 
experienced some form of anticipation, perhaps they are 
devoid of the tension a owner may experience, yet ultimately 
we can still ascertain a quality of experience.  We can 
address the objective space in and of itself.  These videos 
still provide us with qualitative insight that is pertinent 
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to our understanding.  Additionally, a “walk-through,” 
especially if the filming begins as the dwelling is being 
approached, gives us a greater sense of the tension and 
anticipation which Dewey spoke of as being integral to every 
aesthetic experience, thus allowing us to experience for 
ourselves in at least some small way.  It allows us to 
perceive the conditions of aesthetic form which accompany 
every integral aesthetic experience these dwellings more 
fully.  We can then even speculate at the fulfillment one 
must have derived from the experience.   
 The YouTube video results for a search of “Villa 
Savoye” are roughly 90/10 computer rendering “fly-throughs” 
to physical “walk-throughs;” while the YouTube video results 
for a search of “Fallingwater” are the opposite; roughly 
10/90 computer rendering “fly-throughs” to physical “walk-
throughs.”  Again, this could implicate a host of things.  
It could simply mean that Villa Savoye is easier to 
replicate on a computer than is Fallingwater, or that French 
architectural curriculum advocates the use of computer 
modeling more than does American counterpart.  More 
importantly, as we will continue to see, I believe this 
illustrates that Fallingwater is simply more aesthetically 
experiential than in Villa Savoye, and is thereby more 
conducive to the manifestation of spirituality.  In short, 
Fallingwater is more successful in capturing Dewey‟s 
conditions of aesthetic forms than is Villa Savoye judging 
from these videos.   
Again, I will begin by addressing Villa Savoye first.  
The videos of Villa Savoye all have some interesting 
similarities.  Firstly, they mostly begin inside of Villa 
Savoye.  They do not – as if almost subliminally - capture 
Dewey‟s formal conditions of tension and anticipation 
leading up to the visit as do some of Fallingwaters videos.  
In doing so they forsake the cumulation necessary to have a 
consummatory experience.  I believe this has a large part to 
do with the neglect of Villa Savoye‟s rural surroundings or 
„place,‟ while Fallingwater successfully respects and 
embraces it.  Villa Savoye can essentially be viewed in and 
of itself, which is perhaps why its videos are partial to 
computer reproductions.   
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 The other interesting occurrence is what happens once 
inside of Villa Savoye.  Le Corbusier, believing that the 
“house is a machine for living” was a huge fan of ramps to 
navigate between floors, and utilized them in his designs 
quite regularly as to create the illusion that the subject 
is literally „walking up the walls,‟ a device that served to 
induce a dynamic if somewhat idiosyncratic perception of 
space. (Frampton 2001)  In the YouTube videos the directors 
basically navigate the ramps all the way up to the roof 
terrace, quickly lose interest, and return back into the 
house to look for something interesting to film.  In 
general, they find little to pause and reflect at, and end 
up relaxing in Le Corbusier‟s ergonomically designed 
furniture.  This edifice reveals itself all at once; there 
is really no 
temporal 
unfolding.  In 
the YouTube 
videos of 
Fallingwater, by 
comparison, the 
experience is 
split between the 
interior and 
exterior of the 
house.  The 
directors seem to 
subconsciously 
capture Dewey‟s natural rhythms of the experience, and often 
pause to film around.  The “waterfall-shot,” which is most 
commonly associated with Fallingwater, is actually only a 
perspective obtainable after a short walk through the woods.  
In fact, the waterfall is not visible from the house at all.  
Wright believed that had he made the waterfall accessible 
from within the house it would quickly loose the quality of 
its effect.  Perhaps Wright understood the value of Dewey‟s 
conditions of aesthetic form such as cumulation, tension and 
anticipation?  In Fallingwater there is much to be perceived 
as a holistic continuity.  There is simply a different 
character of space.   
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 I am not sure how Le Corbusier conceptualized the space 
within Villa Savoye?  Speaking in general, Le Corbusier 
said, “I draw a character.  I make him enter the house; he 
discovers its volume, in the form of the room and, above 
all, the amount of light coming through the window or the 
pane of glass.  He advances: another volume, another influx 
of light.  After that, another source of light; still 
further on, a flood of light and shade on the side, etc.” 
(Corbusier 2005)  It doesn‟t seem as though he proved too 
deeply into the consequences of opening up space with 
regards to much introspection as to how it would ultimately 
be experienced and perceived.  He appears to have merely 
opened the interior space as much as possible by minimizing 
the separation between rooms.  From the videos we can 
determine that from 
within the Villa 
Savoye, every view to 
the surrounding 
countryside is 
framed, even to the 
extent of 
freestanding exterior 
screens at the second 
floor and roof 
terraces.  There is a 
resulting feeling of 
privacy and 
enclosure, a 
separation from nature.  Nature has been confined to 
isolated gardens on the roof terrace.  “The Villa Savoye is 
introspective, sitting detached and remote above its grassy 
site.” (Doremus 1985)  In many ways Villa Savoye seems to 
contradict everything which we have identified as being 
central to an architectural-centered aesthetic experience.  
Therefore, Villa Savoye seems – to me – highly unlikely to 
instigate the manifestation of spirituality through its 
perception.   
 In contrast, Fallingwater consciously denies the 
framing of the windows, first by making the mullions as thin 
as possible, and most strikingly at the corners where the 
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verticals disappear 
altogether and the 
glass is mitered; 
essentially the exact 
opposite of Villa 
Savoye.  Wrights 
denial of enclosure, 
an emphasized 
extension to the 
surrounding woods is 
an insistence on a 
connection between man 
and nature.  
“Fallingwater stretches itself out in every direction 
reaching for a union between the man-made and the natural.” 
(Doremus 1985)  Noreberg-Schulz believes that Wright was 
also the first to give an answer to the demand for "freedom" 
which is a central question of the modern movement.  
“Traditionally the human dwelling had been a refuge for the 
individual and the family. Wright wanted rootedness and 
freedom, and thus he destroyed the traditional “box” and 
created a new interaction between inside and outside by 
means of continuous walls which direct and unify space.  The 
concept of inside is thereby changed from a refuge to a 
fixed point in space, from which man could experience a new 
sense of freedom and participation.  This point is marked by 
the great fireplace with its vertical chimney.  Hence man no 
longer places himself at the center of the world as was the 
case in Versailles.  Rather we find at the centre an element 
which symbolizes the forces and order of nature.  A 
remainder evidently, that the modern world should not negate 
the basic meanings of existence.” (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  
Herein, I truly believe that Dewey would also advocate 
Wright‟s “spiritual success” over Le Corbusier.   
“Fallingwater relates custom-fabricated objects to 
machine-finished surfaces both smooth and rough, contrasting 
the homogeneity of steel, glass, and painted plaster with 
the natural surfaces of stone, water, and foliage.  The 
resulting dialogue is sensual as well as intellectual and 
can be thoroughly appreciated only through direct 
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experience.” 
(Doremus 1985)  
The living room 
he created a 
great dynamic, 
dramatic space.  
It incorporates 
the functions of 
a variety of 
rooms that one 
would typically 
find on the first 
floor of a 
typical home; 
music area, study area, various conversation areas, dining 
area all in one space, all pivot off central square creating 
great dynamism.  Like Le Corbusier, Wright opens up the 
living space, but unlike Le Corbusier, he manifests a 
tension through his holistic inclusion of functions in 
dynamic fashion.  In Le Corbusier‟s Villa Savoye he does not 
seem to account for the typical functions of a house beyond 
those which require infrastructure rendering it rather bland 
and lifeless.  Therefore, Fallingwater seems – to me – 
highly likely to instigate the realization of spirituality 
through its perception of an architectural-centered 
aesthetic with Dewey‟s conditions of aesthetic form. 
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Case Study Conclusion:   
ewey Believed that, “The experience is of material 
fraught with suspense and moving toward its own 
consummation through a connected series of varied 
incidents.” (Dewey 1934)  This consummation brings about 
fulfillment, if perceived properly, brings about naturalized 
spirituality.  The architectural-centered aesthetic 
experience, the work of art in its entirety – is perception.  
As we have learned, the particular quality of any experience 
is influenced by far too many extraneous influences to 
quantify them all, and also changes with time.  For example, 
a subtle difference in an individual‟s perception of Villa 
Savoye, as compared with that same individuals perception of 
Fallingwater, could be attributed to a multitude of factors.  
A Frenchman visiting Villa Savoye will no doubt have carry 
different sentiments and viewpoints than an American 
visiting Fallingwater; and vice versa.  As will the 
perception of a trained architect over a layman.  As would 
the varied particulars surrounding and influencing the 
uniqueness of any particular visit on any particular day.  
By now we have made this all evident.  Nevertheless, using 
John Dewey‟s conditions of aesthetic form, and similar – yet 
strikingly different – case studies, we have done our best 
to level the playing field in hopes of gaining a clearer 
objective understanding for the manifestation of 
spirituality via architecture.  One which, in the spirit of 
pragmatism, phenomenology, and architecture can be realized 
in concrete terms.   
In doing so, Frank Lloyd Wright‟s Fallingwater has 
emerged a clear favorite over Le Corbusier‟s Villa Savoye.  
The dialogue between Le Corbusier and Wright was in accord 
about the expression of standardized systems, the importance 
of clearly revealed function and structure, and the 
excitement of open planning.  There was, however, 
disagreement about the relation of man and nature, and about 
the exact use of the machine in fabrication. (Doremus 1985)  
This is precisely where – in regards to the manifestation of 
spirituality – Wright took the lead.  In recognizing this 
fact we can now better understand what conditions attributed 
D 
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to the spiritual successfulness of Fallingwater, and the 
spiritual downfall of Villa Savoye.  We now have a 
“spiritual toolbox” so to speak; a formation of new maps.  
Wright respected the rhythms of nature; the dynamic 
interaction of elements displaying the kind of continuity, 
cumulation, tension, conservation, anticipation, and 
fulfillment which, together with emotional intensity, are 
defining features of the spiritual-aesthetic experience.  
“His works are always „built,‟ and possess the quality of 
true „things.‟” (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  That, I believe is 
the ultimate aim of the architect, an aim central for 
manifesting spirituality in architecture.   
 Frank Lloyd Write understood space.  The aspect of 
architecture which we have learned is so central to the 
manifestation of spirituality.  In “The New Architecture: 
Principles,” which appeared in A Testament in 1957 Wright 
distinguishes his organic architecture from other forms of 
architecture:  [O]rganic architecture sees the third 
dimension never as weight or mere thickness but always as 
depth … [T]he third dimension transformed to a space 
dimension … [S]pace outside becomes a natural part of space 
within the building.  All building design thus actually 
becomes four-dimensional and renders more static than ever 
the two-dimensional of the old static post and girder, beam 
and box frame type of construction, however novel they seem 
to be made … A new sense of reality in building construction 
has arrived.” (Wright, A Testament 2008)  But how has it 
transpired into contemporary times?  It seems to me that we 
are still largely building static boxes.   
 Wright defined „architecture‟ in An Organic 
Architecture as “architecture is the interior space within 
to be lived in…  It is in the nature of any organic building 
to grow from its site, to come out of the ground into the 
light.” (Slater 1999)  Gail Slater, in her book Frank Lloyd 
Wrights Living Space, believes that from what we know about 
Wright‟s goals and methods, he would no doubt expect us to 
interpret spaces intuitively, or at least to bypass most of 
the conventional rules for defining, analyzing and 
interacting with the built form. (Slater 1999)  She believes 
Wright juxtaposes two tenses in his definition of 
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architecture: the present (is) and the progressive future 
present (to be lived). (Slater 1999)  In the first portion 
of the definition (architecture is), we are given a sense of 
certainty by as architectural works are entities that indeed 
require this sense of presence. (Slater 1999)  The 
definition does not end there, and tells us that what is 
visible and concrete is also dependent on and realized 
through user‟s actions or, more correctly, interactions 
with(in) the structures created.  “What is, at first, is now 
only a gloss for architectures real meaning.  The space 
created by building is always a presence, but it is one that 
continually changes in use and form, in the sense that the 
boundaries of interior and exterior may be negotiated.  
Wright‟s emphasis on the dynamic aspect of space reflects 
his refusal to be limited by walls, corners, or any 
construction that makes the work absolute and static.” 
(Slater 1999)  “The interior „space within to be lived in‟ 
moves us to a place where greater inclusion, interaction , 
and sociability are possible.” (Slater 1999)  “In addition, 
it renders space as something that is always potential, 
never complete, and never perfect.” (Slater 1999)  The 
perceiver then has the task to realize space as such.   
 In a similar vein, Dewey believed that “there are only 
two sorts of possible worlds in which esthetic experience 
would not occur.” (Dewey 1934)  In “a world of mere flux” no 
unity, stability, or sense of culmination would be possible.  
But, on the other hand, “a world that is finished, ended, 
would have no traits of suspense and crisis, and would offer 
o opportunity for resolution.  Where everything is already 
complete, there is no fulfillment.  We envisage with 
pleasure Nirvana and a uniform heavenly bliss only because 
they are projected on a background of our present world of 
stress and conflict.” (Dewey 1934)  Their actual experience, 
like that of a permanently enduring aesthetic unity of 
experience, would be deathly boring.  We need disturbance 
and disorder, since “the moment of passage from disturbance 
to harmony is that of intensest life” and most gratifying 
experience. (Dewey 1934)  Nor can we linger in such harmony; 
aesthetic experience is but a temporary savored culmination, 
a rhythmic interval of rest, which, sharing in life‟s demand 
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for variety, cannot be satisfied with order, and so “pushed 
us out into the unknown.” (Dewey 1934)   
 Dewey, calling attention to the behavior of the wisest 
person, noted: “All that the wisest man [or architect] can 
do is to observe what is going on more widely and more 
minutely and then select more carefully from what is noted 
just those factors which point to something to happen.” 
(Dewey 1916)  “The opposite… to thoughtful action are 
routine and capricious behavior.”  Routine behavior “accepts 
what has been customary as a full measure of possibility and 
omits to take into account the connections of the particular 
things done.” (Dewey 1916)  The Capricious person “makes the 
momentary act a measure of value, and ignores the 
connections of our personal action with the energies of the 
environment.” (Dewey 1916)  If the capricious person is one 
who acts on whim, he is one whose action has little 
connection with his surroundings.  Capricious behavior, 
Dewey concluded, “says virtually, „things are to be just as 
I happen to like them at this instant,‟ as routine says in 
effect „let things continue just as I have found them in the 
past.‟” (Dewey 1916)  The one continues past unchanged, the 
other the present moment.  Both, however, are less than 
fully intelligent, for they fail to consider the 
possibilities in the particular situation.  A more 
intelligent (or spiritual) person, on the other hand, sees 
more and chooses more carefully.  The more intelligent (or 
spiritual) person is the one who makes more informed choices 
concretizing architecture, perceiving architecture, and 
experiencing spirituality.  After all, experience is the 
interaction of the organism with its environment.  A work of 
architecture elicits and accentuates this quality of being a 
whole and of belonging to the larger, all-inclusive, whole 
which is the universe in which we live.   
 Norberg-Schultz further believes that Frank Lloyd 
Wright managed to define the concrete means which were 
needed to give man a new dwelling and that it is important 
in this context also to mention his idea of an “architecture 
of democracy.” (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  “Before, 
architecture was determined from „above,‟ and the dwelling 
only reflected the meaningful forms developed in connection 
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with church and palace.  Modern architecture, on the 
contrary, takes the dwelling as its point of departure, and 
all other building tasks are considered „extensions‟ of the 
dwelling, to use the term of Le Corbusier‟s.  The 
traditional order of building tasks is thereby reversed.  
This means that architecture is no longer based on dogma and 
authority, but ought to grow out of daily life, as an 
expression of man's understanding of nature, of other men 
and of himself.  The „higher‟ building tasks thus become a 
result rather than a condition, and they represent something 
man must conquer in his own life.  The esprit nouveau 
therefore should free man from the „systems,‟ and conquer 
the split of thought and feeling which was a characteristic 
product of bourgeois society.” (C. Norberg-Schulz 1979)  So 
too, as we have seen, these aims are similar to that of John 
Dewey and the pragmatist ideologies.   
“In great art, there is no limit set to the 
individualization of parts within parts.” (Dewey 1934)  We 
see buildings in which there is little or nothing in the 
parts to arrest attention and our eyes literally glance over 
and by. (Dewey 1934)  There is nothing to dwell upon.  
William James observed: “Provided you grant some separation 
among things, some tremor of independence, some free play of 
parts on one another, some real novelty and chance, however 
minute, she is amply satisfied and will allow you any 
amount, however great, of real union.” (Shusterman 2000)  
“Organic unity, at least in those versions where the 
different parts enjoy some relative autonomy, can perhaps 
provide a model for nonrepressive unity or harmony in 
difference.” (Shusterman 2000)  As for the essence of parts 
of course, in the sense of logical necessity, everything may 
be contingent.  “But some things are clearly more contingent 
than others, and failure to distinguish between these 
differing sorts of contingencies simply reflects our bad 
philosophical habit of absolutist thinking.  If there are no 
logical necessities in our world, there remain probabilities 
that constitute practical certainty; if there are no 
foundational essences, there remain historical norms 
(alterable and contestable as they are) which structure and 
regulate our linguistic and other social practices, thus 
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serving, so to speak, as relative historicized essences.” 
(Shusterman 2000)  Forsaking the essential role the parts 
play to the formation of the whole was more a fault of Le 
Corbusier‟s in Villa Savoye than of Wright‟s in 
Fallingwater.   
John Dewey would most likely argue that to look at a 
work of architecture in order to see how well certain rules 
are observed and canons conformed to impoverishes 
perception, and this type of view is more fundamental to the 
viewing of Villa Savoye than of Fallingwater.  Villa Savoye 
ask to be recognized; Fallingwater ask to be perceived.  
Furthermore, to strive to note the ways in which certain 
conditions are fulfilled, such as the organic means by which 
the media is made to express and carry definite parts, or 
how the problem of adequate individualization is solved, 
sharpens esthetic perception and enriches its context. 
(Dewey 1934)  Therein, the poverty of modern architecture 
stems from the atrophy of sensuality.  Everything is 
dominated by reason in order to create amazement without 
proper research.  The art of the engineer is not enough if 
it is not guided by the primitive needs of men.  Reason 
without instinct.  We must mistrust merely pictorial 
elements if they are not assimilated by instinct.” (Adam 
1987)  As we have seen, in these ways, Le Corbusier‟s Villa 
Savoye simply fails to meet the conditions of great art 
which are partial in their experience to the conditions of 
aesthetic form.  Fallingwater on the other hand does seem 
more conducive to sharpening aesthetic perception and 
enriching its context.   
Dewey sees architectures materials as being closer to 
nature than are pigments and musical instruments, and if 
there is any doubt about this fact, there is none about its 
use of the energies of nature.  No other products exhibit 
stresses and strains, thrusts and counterthrust, gravity, 
light, cohesion, on a scale at all comparable to the 
architectural, and it takes these forces more directly, less 
immediately and vicariously, than does any other art.  It 
expresses the structural constitution of nature itself. 
(Dewey 1934)  Buildings, among all art objects, come the 
nearest to expressing the stability and endurance of 
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existence.  Architecture is not nature, but is nature 
transformed by entering into new relationships where it 
evokes a new emotional response. (Dewey 1934)  Additionally, 
because of their inherent power to endure, architecture 
records and celebrates – more than any other art – the 
generic features of our common human life.  Again, 
Fallingwater was more respective of the nature that is 
materials while Villa Savoye seemingly ignored that 
fundamental part of nature.   
To be fair to Le Corbusier it should be dually noted 
that Le Corbusier “radically changed his architecture during 
the 1930‟s” through which the injunction of the 
International Style against symbolic expression was swept 
away and a new generation of expressionists blossomed. (Roth 
1993)  However, such changes were not – well – 
international.  For Le Corbusier “these changes involved 
molding of space, but more importantly they revolved around 
a change in materials, away from the smooth stucco and 
seamless surfaces of the 1920‟s to rough materials and 
deliberately crude workmanship, giving the surfaces of Le 
Corbusier‟s postwar building a rich texture.” (Roth 1993)  
“The most vivid break with his past, and one for which most 
observers were unprepared, was Le Corbusier‟s chapel at 
Ronchamp, France, built just after the war.” (Roth 1993)  As 
with Villa Savoye, Le Corbusier was given a rural site and a 
completely free hand.  “Le Corbusier spend several days on 
the site in the ruins of the old chapel, sketching the 
profile of the surrounding setting and gradually the new 
chapel form itself in his mind, creating what he called „a 
visual echo of the landscape.‟” (Roth 1993)  This is a very 
different position than Le Corbusier took towards Villa 
Savoye‟s landscape.   
 As Leland Roth points out in his book Understanding 
Architecture; Its elements, history, and meaning,: “Although 
the plan of the chapel was based on a mathematically 
proportioned Modulor grid incised in the concrete floor, the 
chapel seemed to be completely at odds with the rational 
precision of Le Corbusier‟s prewar work.  The thick outer 
walls curve in, and the heavy roof swells and sinks in the 
middle; the curves that seem to open out to the landscape 
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when seen 
outside vie a 
sense of 
compression and 
containment when 
experienced from 
within.” (Roth 
1993)  While the 
apparent about-
face disturbed 
critics the 
freeform walls 
were not so 
different from 
the poetic 
shapes of the roof terrace of the Villa Savoye. (Roth 1993)  
The building was finished in 1955, and some saw it 
surprising that a person who was not a practicing Catholic 
could design what they say as the most religious building of 
modern times. (Roth 1993)  Le Corbusier, while driven by 
different ideology than Wright‟s organicism, seems to have 
come ever closer to the pragmatist aesthetic through his 
molding of space to create form.  Perhaps another 
aesthetically telling comparison would be between the 
religious edifices of Le Corbusier‟s chapel at Ronchamp, and 
Wright‟s Unity Temple in Chicago completed nearly 50 years 
prior.   
The lesson from this study comes, not so much in being 
able to understand the multifaceted movement known as 
Modernism, or even the history behind these two particular 
dwellings, but in being able to implicate the importance of 
a well thought out architectural theory which unquestionably 
stems from personal philosophies.  This is important, if for 
no other reason, than it contributes to a deepening of 
architectural meaning, and therefore an enhancement of the 
quality of perception.  Hence, were it not invariably so, no 
discussion of this nature would, or could, conceivably 
occur.  Additionally, the ability to identify the potential 
conditions of aesthetic form which perpetually arise is also 
invaluable for the architect, as it is the layman.  In doing 
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so, one can then treat any situation with a spiritual 
understanding it so rightly deserves, and as for so long 
been neglected.   
Norberg-Schultz believes that, “today man is mainly 
educated in pseudo-analytic thinking, and his knowledge 
consists of so-called „facts.‟  His life, however, is 
becoming ever more meaningless, and ever more he understands 
that his „merits‟ do not count if he is not able to „dwell 
poetically.‟”  To him, „Education through Art‟ is therefore 
more needed than ever before, and the work of art which 
above all ought to serve as the basis for our education, is 
the place which gives us our identity.  Only when 
understanding our place, we may be able to participate 
creatively and contribute to its history.” (C. Norberg-
Schulz 1979)  As stressed already, the phenomenologist 
philosophy of Heidegger and Norberg-Schulz places great 
emphasis on the importance of place.  Norberg-Schulz also 
stresses an „education through art‟ as a means to „dwell 
poetically.‟  “We „dwell poetically‟ when we are able to 
„read‟ the revealing of the things which make up our 
environment.  Things are made with the purpose of revealing; 
they gather world, and may themselves be gathered to form a 
microcosmos.” (Norberg-Schulz 1979)  Herein, „dwelling 
poetically‟ can be likened to the aesthetic experience with 
regards to architecture.   
John Dewey and his pragmatist aesthetic has provided us 
with the „education through art‟ that Norberg-Schulz and his 
phenomenology felt was so urgently needed.  Subsequently, it 
is the conditions of aesthetic form which usher in an 
architecture-centered aesthetic experience.  Through 
architectures perception spirituality is realized.  Through 
architectures concretization of an existential foothold 
spirituality is manifested.  These case study dwellings have 
served to show us only a few instances of how architectural 
perception and formation effects us through the 
stereotypical nature of their design ideologies which still 
persist today.  The task is for the architect to apply this 
understanding in their own life; in the uniqueness that is 
every architectural endeavor.   
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Project Conclusion: 
n the introduction I set the goal of vindicating 
aesthetic philosophy as the ideal choice for 
supplementing the spiritual deficiency of 
architecture.  A deficiency which I believed arose as a 
result of a long held misguided aesthetic foundation to 
begin with.  I then hypothesized that John Dewey‟s aesthetic 
pragmatism provided the philosophical remedy needed.  In 
striving for such a goal I was entailing many varied 
ideologies (analytic, pragmatic, oriental, theological, 
religious, spiritual, sacred, scientific, continental, 
phenomenological, etc…).  All of which had to be, and have 
been, clarified and concluded in their own right.  Given the 
multifaceted nature of this architectural-aesthetic-
spiritual puzzle, and the fact that certain pieces were 
susceptible to the possibility of interchanging throughout, 
it is exceedingly difficult to conclude this project with a 
succinct summation.  The case study further served to 
illustrate the multifaceted ramifications of an aesthetic 
pursuit of architecture, and has been concluded in depth in 
its own section.  Indeed, in the spirit of pragmatism, there 
is no one true conclusion; rather there is a series of 
successive conclusions which need to be understood in their 
own right so that one might better perceive the manner which 
they contribute to the greater whole.   
One thing is for sure, when we treat architecture 
analytically we miss the concrete environmental character, 
that is, the very quality which is the objects of man‟s 
identification, and which may give him a sense of 
existential foothold.  Analytic aesthetics impoverishes 
aesthetic lives.  The elevation of the ideal above and 
beyond immediate sense has operated not only to make it 
pallid and bloodless, but it has acted, like a conspirator 
with the sensual mind, to impoverish and degrade all things 
of direct experience.  Analytic aesthetics aim is to analyze 
and clarify concepts and practices of established criticism, 
not to revise them in any substantial sense.  It was to give 
a true account of our concept of art, not to change it.  In 
vivid contrast, Deweyan aesthetics is interested not in 
I 
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truth for truth‟s sake but in achieving richer and more 
satisfying experience, in experiencing that value without 
which art would have no meaning or point, without which it 
cannot as a global phenomenon exist or be understood, let 
alone be defined.  In Dewey‟s pragmatism, experience rather 
than truth is the final standard; even the value of ideas 
lies in the experiences to which they lead.   
Everything, including our methods of knowing and 
choosing, is open to criticism and modification.  Even 
intelligent, well-educated people disagree.  Architects want 
more specifics, more content.  Where is the program of 
action?  One might think that architects need to develop a 
program that the smart and the not-so-smart can buy into.  
That only by outlining a course of action and laying it out 
in a set of rules or a architectural program can we hope to 
deal with the very real problems that confront us.  Dewey‟s 
reply, however, might be that of course we need plans and 
organizations, but these are situational – not for all time.  
What endures is the need for intelligence.  Fortunately, as 
Eldridge reminds us intelligence is for the having.  Within 
almost every situation there are better and worse 
possibilities.  By reflecting on these and the conditions 
needed to realize the more desirable (or effective) ones, we 
can choose ends (and means) that remake our lives, that 
remake our architecture.  We can learn to live, dwell, and 
build better than we do now.  Simply put, for Dewey 
intelligence is grasping the relation between aims, 
conditions, and consequences, then acting in a deliberate 
way on this knowledge (with an awareness of alternatives) to 
accomplish one‟s aims; aims such as dwelling.  The 
overarching point is to live well.  Dewey thought we can do 
this best by developing the intelligent elements within our 
personal and collective experience in such a way that our 
practices and institutions become more fulfilling.  We can 
modify who we are and what we do in such a way that we 
increase our satisfactions and create the conditions for 
future satisfactions.  Being intelligent is not an end in 
itself; living well – or dwelling – is the point.  But 
intelligence is the best way to enhance our practices and 
institutions so that we might live well.   
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In this regard one can accept life and experience in 
all its uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half-knowledge and 
turn that experience upon itself to deepen and intensify its 
own qualities.  Like naturalized spirituality, an aesthetic 
experience is a continuous movement of subject-matters which 
may involve pain, but may be enjoyed when experienced as 
means of developing an experience.  Dewey‟s implicit claim 
is that even the most mundane and routine of our doings 
could become more infused with significance and therefore 
more meaningful to us if crafted in a manner that roughly 
parallels the making of an art object.  The arts, above all, 
teach us something about what it means to undergo an 
experience.  Successful encounters with art objects, such as 
architecture, offer a set of standards by which to judge 
ordinary experiences.  Such art-centered experiences are 
distinguished by their unity and wholeness.  They are 
consummatory.  They are accompanied by feelings of 
fulfillment and satisfaction.  They are self-sufficient and 
meaningful.  The do not point beyond themselves.  Lesser 
forms of experiencing, by way of contrast, contain but 
fragments, mere shards, of what Dewey would call an 
experience.  I agree with Alexander in believing that it is 
the very possibility for experience to take on satisfying 
quality which determines the evaluation of so much of our 
ordinary experience as unfulfilling, fragmented, 
problematic, or meaningless.  If human experience reached 
its possible limits in mindless routine or disconnected 
activity, not only would Dewey‟s aesthetics be superfluous 
but his instrumentalism as well. 
Meaning is the fundamental human need.  Surely without 
it there can be no dwelling, no spirituality.  The purpose 
of architecture is to keep and transmit meanings.  Man 
dwells when he can orientate himself within and identify 
himself with an environment, or, in short, when he 
experiences the environment as meaningful.  However, 
architectures meaning is constantly changing.  For it is the 
product of the ever changing context of experience, which 
always involves the interactive play between the relatively 
stable architectural product, and the organism and its 
environing factors; which are both in continual flux.  Dewey 
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reminds us that while a piece of wood, steel, or stone 
remains (subject to the ravages of time) self-identical 
throughout the ages, a work of architecture only lives in 
some individualized experience, it must be somewhat 
differently recreated every time it is aesthetically 
experience.  For experience is a matter of the interaction 
of the artistic product with the self.  It is not therefore 
twice alike for different persons.  It changes with the same 
person at different times as he brings something different 
to the work.  Even the architect himself would find 
different meanings in it at different days and hours and at 
different stages of his own development.  If he could be 
articulate, he would say “I meant just that,” and that means 
whatever you or anyone can honestly, that is in virtue of 
your own vital experience and close attention to the 
architectural product, get out of it.  Any other idea makes 
the boasted „universality‟ of the work of architecture a 
synonym for monotonous identity.  This is the criterion of 
immediate empiricism.   
For Dewey immediate empiricism postulates that things – 
anything, everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use 
of the term „thing‟ – are what they are experienced as.  
Hence, if one wishes to describe architecture truly, his 
task is to tell what it is experienced as being.  The 
primary philosophic demand is to find out what sort of an 
experience knowing is – or, concretely how things are 
experienced when they are experienced as known things.  It 
is the concrete architectural structure as experienced that 
all grounds and clues to its own intellectual or logical 
rectification are contained.  The question of truth is not 
as to whether Being or Non-Being, Reality or mere 
Appearance, is experienced, but as to the worth of a certain 
concretely experienced architectural structure.  Therefore, 
similar to Dewey‟s aims, the value of my effort here can be 
seen not so much as a quest to practicalize architectural 
intelligence, but to intellectualize architectural practice; 
and thus the architecture-centered aesthetic experience that 
comes in doing such. 
Nevertheless, there can be no aesthetic experience 
apart from an object, and for architecture to be the content 
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of aesthetic appreciation it must satisfy those objective 
conditions without which the necessary conditions of 
aesthetic experience are impossible.  The material out of 
which a work of architecture is composed belongs to the 
common world.  Form then marks a way of envisaging, of 
feeling, and of presenting experienced matter so that it 
most readily and effectively becomes material for the 
construction of adequate experience on the part of those 
less gifted that the architect.  Dewey reminds us that 
aesthetic experiences arises from experiencing and preceding 
the meaning of life‟s cadenced form – not an artificial 
order that the individual imposes upon either the world or 
his own experience, but a very natural and organic thing, 
and thus architectural form, the expression of this order, 
is rooted deep in the very nature of the world itself.  
Architectural form is the organic rhythm of the reality 
which it describes.  It thus cannot be arbitrary.  Whenever 
it is, we immediately sense the falsity of a contrived form.  
Only when the constituent parts of a whole have the unique 
end of contributing to the consummation of a conscious 
experience, do design and shape lose superimpose character 
and become form.  The interfusion of all properties of the 
medium is necessary if the object in question is to serve 
the whole creature in his unified vitality.  Form is the 
dynamic interaction of elements displaying the kind of 
continuity, cumulation, tension, conservation, anticipation, 
and fulfillment which, together with emotional intensity, 
are defining features of an aesthetic experience and 
referred to as the formal characteristics of an aesthetic 
experience.   
Similarly, it is equally important to emphasize that it 
is not the formal properties of architecture which make it 
spiritual, but rather the relation between the subject and 
object that makes the particular experience of that object 
spiritual.  These experiences are based off personal 
experiences and social conventions.  Therefore, not only is 
it impossible to understand the concept of spirituality 
separated from the context, but it is also not possible to 
penetrate it in a purely rational way.  Herein, the word 
aesthetic refers to experience as appreciative, perceiving, 
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and enjoying.  It denotes the clients, rather than the 
architects standpoint.  Analytic aesthetics has a 
positivistic dream that all problems of aesthetic theory 
would dissolve as soon as specific objects, features or 
qualities could be established so that they automatically, 
inescapably, produce an aesthetic experience in any subject 
exposed to them.  Pragmatist aesthetics tells us this is 
simply not the case.  An experience has evolutionary, 
culturally-learnt, individual-emotional roots involving 
multidimensional relationships between properties of the 
environment and our senses, mind, knowledge dependent upon 
the time, place, and varied role factors.   
As such, spirituality falls under the province of 
aesthetics as heightened, widened, cultivated sensory 
awareness allowing one to understand the beauty of nature, 
life, and the full range of perceptual experience.  This is 
awareness of a very wide context.  Spiritually speaking, we 
are talking about the quality of experience, rather than a 
separable experience.  It is the polar opposite of some type 
of experience that can exist by itself.  This is the sort of 
experience that Dewey thought we value and is possible here 
and now without divine intervention or special states of 
consciousness.  A naturalized spiritual experience then is 
of an extensive and underlying whole.  By the principle of 
organic unity any aesthetic whole is more than the sum of 
the properties of its parts as isolated parts.  Indeed, the 
parts themselves would not even appear as they do, were it 
not for their integration into the whole.  A work of 
architecture elicits and accentuates this quality of being a 
whole, and of belonging to the larger, all-inclusive, whole 
which is the universe in which we live.  At times of intense 
aesthetic perception the sense of whole is a spiritual 
feeling.  We are introduced into a world beyond this world 
which is nevertheless the deeper reality of the world in 
which we live in our ordinary experiences.  Herein, the 
spiritual function is completely transferred to the 
aesthetic in a pragmatist fashion.  Completely the opposite 
of analytic aesthetics. 
In simplest terms, the spiritual value of architecture 
inheres in clarifying and intensifying values which are 
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already there in life.  Naturalism, in the broadest and 
deepest sense of nature, is a necessity of all great 
architecture.  All deliberation, all conscious intent, grows 
out of things once performed organically through the 
interplay of natural energies.  As such, the distinguishing 
contribution of man is consciousness of the relations found 
in nature.  Man uses the materials and energies of nature 
with the intent to expand his own life, and he does so in 
accord with the structure of his organism – brain, sense-
organs, and muscular system.  Architecture is living and 
concrete proof that man is capable of restoring consciously, 
and thus on the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, 
impulse and action characteristic of a live spiritual 
creature.  Perhaps that‟s why Frank Lloyd Wright said, “The 
land is the simplest form of architecture.  Building upon 
the land is as natural to man as to other animals, birds, or 
insects.  Insofar as he was more than an animal his 
buildings became what we call architecture.” 
I foresee much promise in the pragmatist aesthetic 
pursuit of both architecture and spirituality; taken in 
conjunction with one another or even as separate entities.  
As far as spirituality as an aesthetic pursuit goes this 
project has been pretty clear cut in its direction 
conjoining the aesthetic to a naturalized spirituality.  
Nevertheless, there is always room for improvement of course 
because aesthetic perception is the result of persistent 
adjustment, perpetual experiences, continual gathering, 
cultivation, and an unending deepening of meaning.  I 
believe aesthetic considerations are, and should be, crucial 
and paramount in determining how we choose to lead or shape 
our lives.  Also how we assess what a spiritual life is.  
Spiritual activities or spiritual experiences in a 
naturalistic way are those which are broadly philosophical, 
humanitarian, or universal in range and interest as opposed 
to the narrowly selfish satisfaction of bodily appetites and 
activities devoted thereto.  It is a pervasive adjustment of 
the self and the environment.  It is about being captured 
and pushed forward to fulfillment though one‟s own engaged, 
contributing energies which find satisfaction and increased 
vitality through being so absorbed in aesthetic experience.   
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As far as architecture is concerned at least four 
important directions stand out to me as a result of this 
project.  One has to do with the profession of architecture 
and architectural education.  The other two have to do with 
pursuing architecture as a spiritual experience.  The last 
with architectural perception and formation.  The first task 
would be introducing pragmatist aesthetics into the 
architectural education system which would essentially 
require a revamping of architectural education as we 
currently know it.  In contrast to the Deweyan goal of 
pleasurable aesthetic experiences, analytic philosophy is 
aimed at objective truth, which it too narrowly construed as 
the truth about mind-independent objects.  So too, we have 
seen how this hegemonic ideology has been prevalent in 
architecture as long as „architecture‟ and the „aesthetic‟ 
have been enunciable topics.  Further proliferating this 
vitally deficient analytic stance is the fact that criticism 
in the university had to profess objective knowledge rather 
than enhanced experience.  Objective knowledge was assumed 
to require a well-defined object; and analytic aesthetics as 
metacriticism saw this as its goal.  As such, in 
architecture school we have „crits‟ of our projects as 
though a hypothetical resolve to a hypothetical scenario 
could be right or wrong, and judgments are made.   
Perhaps what is more valuable grounds for judgment is 
the experiential knowledge gained in from the process of 
undertaking the project than the project as a final object?  
Less emphasis on the end and more on the means.  While our 
architectural education system seems to appreciate both 
ideologies to a certain degree the most insightful and 
rewarding aspect of my whole education – practicum – has 
been all but banished to the wayside.  Practicum is being 
forsaken for the more analytic isolationist form of 
education, rather than an pragmatic holistic one, where I 
believe the student ultimately stands to profit the most.  
Perhaps there is still a better way these two could see more 
eye to eye.  I believe there is a good reason that practicum 
and pragmatic both share a root in the word prāssien which 
means: to do, act, or perform.  It seems that both concepts 
understand the richness of undergoing an experience which in 
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turn produces an experienced individual.  Now, if this 
experience was crafted as an aesthetic experience, which is 
the highest form of experience, the benefits could be 
insurmountable by pseudo-analytic thinking whose knowledge 
consists of so-called „facts.‟  I am not familiar with the 
whole of Dewey‟s philosophy, but I suspect his views on 
education would fall somewhere along these lines.   
Again, Dewey‟s ideology depends on reconceiving 
philosophical definition and theory in distinctly pragmatist 
fashion, as aimed not primarily at the resolution of 
abstract philosophic puzzles, but at bringing us closer to 
achieving more and better concrete goods in experience 
(though intellectual satisfaction in philosophical 
abstractions is not excluded from such experiential goods).  
I, like Dewey, am not seeking a traditional theory of 
architecture which would issue in a formal definition giving 
art‟s necessary and sufficient conditions, or some algorithm 
for classifying and evaluating architectural works, for I 
feel such formal definitions leave us cold.  Instead, I 
think a definition is good when it points the direction in 
which we can move expeditiously toward having an experience.  
So a good definition of architecture should effectively 
direct us toward more and better aesthetic experiences.  
Shusterman helps us to understand that defining architecture 
as experience expeditiously directs us toward this goal in 
at least two ways.   
First, it primes us to look for and cultivate aesthetic 
experience in our transactions with architecture by 
reminding us that experience (rather than criticism) is 
ultimately what architecture is about.  It seems as though 
the possibility for improved experience all too often takes 
a back seat to the safer generic norm.  Secondly, it helps 
us to recognize and valorize those expressive forms which 
provide us aesthetic experience, but which could provide us 
far more and far better, if they could be appreciated and 
cultivated as legitimate art.  In short, redefining 
architecture as experience liberates it from the narrowing 
stranglehold of the institutionally cloistered practice of 
architecture.  Architecture as the purposeful production of 
aesthetic experience becomes more rewardingly open to future 
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experimentation through the vast variety of life‟s 
experienced materials, which it aesthetically shapes and 
transfigures.  The aim then is to widen architectures 
borders to forms of contemporary culture, to the ethical art 
of fashioning one‟s life, to what the most fulfilling 
aesthetic experience might be.  In this way philosophy 
remains perennial, but in a new sense.  Dewey believed it as 
better it is for philosophy to err in active participation 
in the living struggles and issues of its own age and times 
than to maintain an immune monastic impeccability, without 
relevancy or bearing in generating ideals of its 
contemporary present.   
Ultimately, understanding architecture in terms of 
vivid experience rather than static objects does better 
justice to the dynamic power and moving spirit which makes 
architecture so captivatingly alive and enlivening.  For 
aesthetic experience, even of the contemplation of so-called 
static arts like architecture, is always a temporally moving 
process of doing and undergoing where experience is 
developed cumulatively and brought to fulfillment; and where 
the perceiver, like the architect, is captured and pushed 
forward to spiritual fulfillment through his own engaged, 
contributing energies which find satisfaction and increases 
vitality through being so engaged and absorbed.  As such, an 
architect must critically examine what he is building; what 
he is building with; what he is building for, and then seek 
to optimize these relationships in time.  Just as in any 
scientific work where the validity of the rules of logic and 
method, those general foundations of our orientation of the 
world, are presupposed; so too architecture can only be 
interpreted with reference to its ultimate meaning, which 
one must accept or reject according to one‟s ultimate 
attitudes toward life. 
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